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BLACKHAWK DOWN OR BLACKHORSE DOWN? 
THE LANHAM ACT’S PROHIBITION 
OF TRADEMARKS THAT “MAY DISPARAGE” 
& THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
RUSS VERSTEEG* 
[A] function of free speech . . . is to invite dispute. It may indeed 
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It 
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound 
unsettling effects . . . . [T]he alternative would lead to 
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or 
dominant political or community groups.1 
—Justice William O. Douglas 
Introduction 
During the past three decades the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), and our 
federal courts have examined the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor, New England Law | Boston. I’m indebted to Barry Stearns and Brian 
Flaherty, Research Librarians at New England Law | Boston, for their outstanding 
contributions. Thanks also to Nathan Hall, Lindsay Kistler, and the staff at the Oklahoma 
Law Review for their hard work and help. I would also like to thank Kimberley Maruncic, 
who initially suggested that I write about this topic. Discussions with her about the issues 
helped to shape my thinking, and I simply would not have and could not have written this 
article without her encouragement. 
 1. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, reh’g denied, 337 U.S. 934 (1949). 
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the Lanham Act on several occasions.2 The cases that have garnered the 
most public attention and stirred both debate and controversy have focused 
on the National Football League’s (NFL) trademark for the Washington 
Redskins.3 If trademark law prevents federal registration for Native 
American terms such as “Redskins,” is it also likely that other, more benign 
names such as Cleveland “Indians,” Atlanta “Braves,” Kansas City 
“Chiefs,”4 Golden State “Warriors” (the 2015 NBA Champions), and 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Joshua R. Ernst & Daniel C. Lumm, Does Budda Beachwear Actually Fit? 
An Analysis of Federal Registration for Allegedly Disparaging Trademarks in the Non-
Corporate Context, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 177 (2009-2010) (“While the 
TTAB has developed its disparaging mark jurisprudence with respect to individuals as a 
distinct bar to registration over the last twenty years; the Federal Courts have only 
considered the TTAB's treatment of these allegedly disparaging marks once during the same 
span of time.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, Native American Mascots and Team Names: Throw 
Away the Key; The Lanham Act Is Locked for Future Trademark Challenges, 15 SETON 
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 197, 199 (2005) (“The Washington Redskins' mascot, team name, 
and team fight song, as well as the use of other Native American names and mascots in 
professional, college, and high school sports have been heavily scrutinized over the last 
decade.”); Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 179 (“The central contention of the American 
Indians' claim is that the REDSKINS family of marks is disparaging, in derogation of the 
requirements for federal trademark registration.”); Jason Finkelstein, Note, What the Sioux 
Should Do: Lanham Act Challenges in the Post-Harjo Era, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
301, 306 (2008) (“Hundreds of collegiate and high school athletic programs have likewise 
adopted Native American names, mascots and logos.”); Jessica M. Kiser, How Dykes on 
Bikes Got It Right: Procedural Inequities Inherent in the Trademark Office’s Review of 
Disparaging Trademarks, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 12-16 (2011) (summarizing the Harjo 
litigation); Justin Reiner, Proud Traditions: Reflections of a Lifelong Washington Redskins 
Fan on the Harjo Decisions & the Use of Native American Names in Sports, 2 WILLAMETTE 
SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2005), http://willamette.edu/law/pdf/sportslaw/spring05/final_traditions. 
pdf (“Conflicting viewpoints and contrary perspectives are key reasons why the debate over 
the use of Native American names in sports continues and why the owners steadfastly 
oppose changing the name of their team. The support of loyal fans and staunch traditionalists 
provides owners with an additional reason to stay the course. Conversely, the viewpoints of 
Native Americans, along with the passionate opposition of the use of these names in sports 
by other groups, provide Native Americans with a reason to pursue further avenues of 
resolve.”). 
 4. See Julie A. Hopkins & Thomas M. Joraanstad, Challenge-Flag Thrown: The 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Cancellation of the Redskins’ Trademarks and Pro-
Football’s Chances on Appeal, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 267, 270 (2015) (“In 1963, the Dallas 
Texans relocated to Kansas City and were renamed the Chiefs, the last professional sports 
team to adopt a Native American mascot.”). 
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Chicago “Blackhawks” (the 2015 Stanley Cup Champions) will also be 
axed (or should we say “tomahawked”)?5 
In April of 2015, however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) focused its analytical lens much more sharply to ask one specific 
question about this issue; namely, whether the “may disparage” prohibition 
of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment.6 The case that 
has brought the issue to a head is In re Tam, a case involving the PTO’s 
                                                                                                                 
 5. In addition to these teams, the history of professional sports has seen numerous 
other teams whose names and logos some might find offensive. For example, the now 
defunct NHL Kansas City Scouts used a logo of an Indian riding a horse. The Scouts 
initially wanted to use the name “Mohawks” coupled with an Indian-head logo but met 
opposition from the Chicago Blackhawks organization. See STEPHEN LAROCHE, CHANGING 
THE GAME: A HISTORY OF NHL EXPANSION 234 (Michael Holmes ed., 2014). For discussion 
regarding the potential for further litigation challenging team names other than the Redskins, 
see for example, Dennie, supra note 3, at 208 (“The Harjo court noted further that finding 
that such a small amount of questionable evidence sufficient to cancel these trademarks 
would mean that virtually all professional sports teams with similar marks would have to 
refrain from activity that could be construed as even mildly insulting or derogatory to Native 
Americans.”) (citing Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 134 (D.D.C. 2003); id. 
at 211 (“‘Redskins,’ however, is an anomaly. It is wholly distinguishable from other Native 
American names and symbols currently used by sports teams.”); Ernst & Lumm, supra note 
2, at 204 (“[A] successful cancellation of the REDSKINS family of marks as a result of the 
Blackhorse cancellation proceedings will call into the question the eligibility for registration 
of other sports teams' registered marks.”); Rachel Clark Hughey, The Impact of Pro-Football, 
Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark Protection of Other Marks, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 327, 360 (2004) (“Many other Native Americans suggest that the term ‘redskin’ 
offends them, but terms like ‘braves,’ ‘Seminoles,’ and ‘Sioux’ do not. Suzan Harjo called 
the term ‘redskin’ ‘the worst name you can call Native Americans in the English 
language.’”) (footnotes omitted); see also André Douglas Pond Cummings, Progress 
Realized?: The Continuing American Indian Mascot Quandary, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
309, 332 (2008) (“Of the primary professional sports leagues in the United States, 
specifically the NFL, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL), each league maintains at least one club that 
uses an offensive American Indian moniker, mascot, and/or logo.”); cf. John R. Wallace, 
Note, Discriminatory & Disparaging Team Names, Logos, & Mascots: Workable 
Challenges & the Misapplication of the Doctrine of Laches, 12 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 
203, 208 (2011) (“It is important to note that ‘[n]ames like “Cowboys,” “Vikings,” or 
“Fighting Irish” do not have comparable effects because the history of each of these groups 
is one of inclusion and survival, rather than exclusion and potential cultural extinction.’") 
(quoting Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: 
Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words that Offend?, 72 U. COLO. 
LAW REV. 415, 424 (2001)). 
 6. In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
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refusal to register the mark “The Slants” for an Asian musical group.7 And 
while briefs were being submitted in Tam in preparation for a rehearing en 
banc, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee, of the district court of the Eastern District of 
Virginia, ruled in Pro-Football v. Blackhorse, on July 8, 2015, that the 
“may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) does not offend the First Amendment 
and affirmed the TTAB’s cancellation of the Redskins’ trademarks.8 Then 
on December 22, 2015, the CAFC decided In re Tam, holding that the “may 
disparage” prohibition does conflict with the First Amendment and, 
therefore, is unconstitutional.9 
This Article focuses on at that one very narrow issue; namely, whether § 
2(a)’s prohibition of trademarks that “may disparage” violates the First 
Amendment.10 In short, the Article argues that § 2(a)’s prohibition of 
trademarks that “may disparage” is, in fact, unconstitutional, because it 
violates the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. This Article 
contends that the statutory language of § 2(a) (i.e., “may disparage”) is 
rooted in archaic, early Twentieth Century concepts of decency that are 
now outmoded given the context of contemporary First Amendment 
jurisprudence—a jurisprudence that today protects commercial speech.  
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Amanda E. Compton, N.I.G.G.A., Slumdog, Dyke, Jap, and Heeb: 
Reconsidering Disparaging Trademarks in a Post-Racial Era, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 23 (2014) (“Another example, involves the Asian-American rock band, 
The Slants. A member of the band attempted to register THE SLANTS in connection to ‘live 
performances by a musical band.’ The application was filed in 2011, but the applicant 
claimed to be using the mark since 2006. Ultimately, the mark was deemed to be disparaging 
and the Trademark Office refused to register the mark. To date, the band is still performing 
under the name The Slants.”) (footnotes omitted). See also infra Parts I, III, IV, and V for 
more detailed consideration of In re Tam.  
 8. See Pro Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (2015).  
 9. 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 10. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 
7-8 (1958) (“[W]here the will of the legislature declared in its statutes stands in opposition to 
that of the people declared by the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter 
rather than the former.”). There is reason to believe that the “may disparage” prohibition is 
unconstitutional on its face and also as applied to both the terms “Redskins” and “Slants.” 
See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.1(g), at 
1264 (8th ed. 2010) (“When the Court determines whether a law is invalid on its face, it 
looks at not only the statutory language but also the way the courts and enforcement 
authorities have interpreted the language. . . . If a law is not invalid on its face, the litigant 
can still argue that it is invalid as applied in a specific case.”). This Article does not address 
the strengths and weaknesses of the doctrine of laches as it may or may not apply to § 2(a). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/1
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Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the salient cases that have 
considered the issue of trademark disparagement and articulated the 
principal rules related to § 2(a). Part II summarizes major points raised by 
scholarship that has focused on this issue. Part III summarizes the CAFC’s 
April opinion in In re Tam, Judge Moore’s “Additional Views” submitted 
in conjunction with the opinion, the briefs of the parties submitted for the 
CAFC’s en banc hearing (with the addition of some editorial comments), 
and the CAFC’s December 2015 en banc decision. Using basic First 
Amendment principles, Part IV first examines how contemporary First 
Amendment jurisprudence applies to § 2(a)’s prohibition of marks that 
“may disparage.” Part IV then applies “commercial speech” doctrine to § 
2(a) before considering Judge Lee’s (Eastern District of Virginia) summary 
judgment decision in Blackhorse and its reliance on Walker v. Texas 
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.11 Next, this Part, like portions 
of the CAFC’s en banc opinion, also suggests that copyright law may offer 
insight into the issue. And lastly Part IV briefly looks at the applicability of 
the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. The Conclusion offers a 
reminder of the importance of the First Amendment’s protection of freedom 
of speech and suggests ways to increase the likelihood of realizing some of 
§ 2(a)’s goals in light of the interests of the public and trademark owners. 
I. Litigation Background & Summary 
A. Statutory Basis 
The Lanham Act is the United States’ federal trademark statute.12 
Congress enacted it on July 5, 1946, and it became law on July 5, 1947.13 
As amended, the Lanham Act’s definition of a trademark includes “any 
word, name, symbol, or device . . . [used] to identify and distinguish . . . 
goods.”14 Registration of a trademark on the Principal Register of the PTO 
provides a number of significant benefits to registrants.15 
                                                                                                                 
 11. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1127 (2012). 
 13. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
5:4 (4th ed. 2013) (“[T]he Lanham Trademark Act was signed into law by President Truman 
on July 5, 1946, and took effect one year later, July 5, 1947.”). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 3:1. For purposes of the 
discussion regarding First Amendment issues detailed infra Part IV, it may be useful to keep 
in mind that “symbolic speech” generally qualifies as “speech” entitled to First Amendment 
protection. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.1(d) (“[T]o be considered as 
speech, non-verbal activity must be of a type that a reasonable onlooker would understand as 
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First, registration of the trademark provides constructive notice 
to others that the registrant owns the trademark, an important 
protection against potential trademark infringers. Second, 
registration facilitates incontestability of a trademark. . . . Third, 
registration allows the holder of the trademark to renew 
registration of it in ten year increments, thus allowing for 
continuous protection.16 
In addition: 
Although federal registration does not create a trademark or 
confer ownership, a registered mark enjoys numerous benefits 
including: (1) public notice of ownership of the mark; (2) a legal 
presumption of ownership of the mark and exclusive right to use 
the mark nationwide or in connection with the good and services 
registered; (3) the ability to bring actions associated with the 
mark in federal court; (4) a basis to obtain registration in foreign 
countries; and (5) U.S. Customs protection against the 
importation of infringing foreign goods.17 
                                                                                                                 
conveying some type of message.”); id. § 16.48 (“The Supreme Court has recognized the 
notion that speech may be nonverbal as far back as 1931. Stromberg v. California provided 
First Amendment protection to certain forms of symbolic expression.”) (citing Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)). 
 15. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (listing and explaining the 
many substantive and procedural benefits of federal registration); see also 3 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 13, §§ 19:9-10. 
 16. Kristine A. Brown, Native American Team Names and Mascots: Disparaging and 
Insensitive or Just Part of the Game?, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 115, 121 (2002); see also Hughey, 
supra note 5, at 362 (“Without federal trademark protection, the team is still allowed to use 
the mark, but may not preclude others from using it. For example, if the trademark had been 
cancelled, the Redskins franchise would have to compete with unlicensed vendors for tee-
shirt sales and other royalties.”). 
 17. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 273 (footnotes omitted); see also Kimberly 
A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How 
Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (1994) (“While 
cancellation of the trademark's federal registration does not prevent the team from 
continuing to use the Redskins name, it does revoke the benefits afforded by federal 
registration. Canceling federal registration on the basis that the trademark disparages Native 
Americans could eliminate the team's exclusive right to use the trademark.”) (footnotes 
omitted); id. at 19-20 (1995) (summarizing the benefits afforded by federal registration of 
trademarks). 
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Section 2 of the Lanham Act articulates specific reasons why a 
trademark might be denied registration.18 Section 2 begins by stating: “No 
trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from 
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on 
account of its nature unless . . . .”19 Section 2(a) then specifies that a mark 
will be denied registration if it “may disparage . . . persons, . . . institutions, 
beliefs, . . . or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”20 Section 4(3) of the 
Lanham Act provides a number of reasons for which a previously registered 
mark might be cancelled, including instances in which the mark was 
registered in contravention of § 2(a).21  
                                                                                                                 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 1052(a); see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 19:77.25 (summarizing the 
doctrine and discussing many of the important cases, including the litigation involving 
Harjo, Blackhorse, and Tam); see also Pace, supra note 17, at 9 (“Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act prevents the registration of a trademark with such words as ‘nigger,’ because it 
would ridicule African-American people and depict them in a disparaging way.”). It is 
striking how similar this language is to the Sedition Act of 1798, which prohibited 
“publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government 
of the United States, or either house of Congress . . . or the President . . . with intent to . . . 
bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute.” NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.5(b) 
(noting that the Alien and Sedition Acts “remain the epitome of an unconstitutional 
abridgement of free speech.”). 
 21. A trademark may be canceled in circumstances where “its registration was obtained 
fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of . . . subsection (a) . . . of section 1052 . . . .” 15 
U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012); see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, §§ 20:40, 20:59; see also, e.g., 
Pace, supra note 17, at 21 (“While registration does constitute prima facie evidence that the 
trademark is valid, the mark's validity can still be attacked by any person who believes that 
she is damaged by the registration. If the action is taken within five years of the mark's 
registration, a person who believes that she is damaged by the registration can file a Petition 
for Cancellation of the trademark for any of the reasons that the examiner could have refused 
registration. After five years, a Petition for Cancellation can only be filed if the registered 
mark becomes generic, has been abandoned, was fraudulently obtained, or should not have 
been granted because the mark was inconsistent with one of the content-based prohibitions 
in subsections 2(a), (b), or (c) of the Lanham Act. A Petition for Cancellation, like an 
opposition, is heard by the TTAB. Decisions of the TTAB can be appealed to either the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or to a United States District Court.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for 
Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007) 
(“Challenges on any grounds that the examiner could have used initially to refuse 
registration can be brought within the first five years of the mark's registration; after five 
years, the grounds for challenges are narrower but still include, inter alia, that a mark is 
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In addition to refusal to register by a PTO examining attorney and 
cancellation, it is also possible that a trademark could be denied registration 
by a third party’s opposition.22 In sum, then, a trademark owner may be 
unable to reap the benefits of registration on the Principal Register23 due to 
three types of actions: 1) the trademark examining attorney refuses to 
register; 2) an opposer successfully opposes registration; or 3) a third party 
successfully cancels the registration post hoc.24 
B. Legal Principles Established 
1. General 
Although refusal to register, opposition, or cancellation are three distinct 
procedural means by which the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) can 
deny a trademark owner the benefits of registration on the Principal 
Register, all three apply the same legal principles when determining 
whether a mark “may disparage.” We now turn to those legal principles. 
The origin of the “may disparage” prohibition in the Lanham Act is far 
from transparent.25 Yet, the TTAB, the administrative body that hears 
appeals relating to denials of registration for reasons including the § 2(a) 
“may disparage” prohibition, and several federal courts have established a 
methodology for analyzing cases involving § 2(a)’s “may disparage” 
prohibition. The cases have involved trademarks associated with a variety 
of goods and services, including wine, beachwear, clothing, and sports 
(specifically football). Generally speaking, when considering whether § 
2(a)’s may disparage prohibition applies to persons, the current analysis 
focuses on whether mark disparages a substantial composite26 of those 
                                                                                                                 
scandalous or disparaging.”); see also Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2 (discussing the 
consequences of cancellation for a trademark owner). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 1063; see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, §§ 20:1, 20:20. For a discussion 
relating to standing either to oppose or to cancel a registration, see, for example, Smith, 
supra note 21, at 456 (“A party bringing suit in opposition to a pending registration or 
moving for cancellation of a registration ‘must have a real interest in the proceedings and 
must have a reasonable basis for his belief of damage.’”) (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 
F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072 (2012). 
 24. See id. § 1064.  
 25. See infra Section IV.A.2.c. for a more in-depth examination of this issue.  
 26. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 13330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Geller, 751 
F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see Kiser, supra note 3, at 17 (“However, the TTAB 
noted, ‘applicant's own evidence shows that not all members of the relevant public find the 
term HEEB to be unobjectionable;’ the letters submitted ‘suggest that there is a generational 
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persons at the time of the issuing of registration.27 The ultimate 
determination of “[w]hether a trademark is disparaging ‘is ultimately a fact-
bound conclusion that rests with the fact-finder.’”28  
One difficulty that examining attorneys, the TTAB, and courts have 
encountered in construing the “may disparage” prohibition is that § 2(a) 
also prohibits registration of marks that are immoral or scandalous.29 
                                                                                                                 
divide in the perception of this term.’”) (citing In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1071, 1076 (T.T.A.B. 2008)); Francine Ward & Stephanie Quick, Offensive Marks: 
The Policing of Trademarks in a Diverse World, 5 LANDSLIDE 52, 53 (2013) (“Whether a 
proposed mark is disparaging must be determined from the standpoint of a substantial 
composite of the referenced group in the context of contemporary attitudes. Case law does 
not provide a fixed number or percentage for ‘substantial composite.’ However, it is well 
established that a ‘majority’ is not necessarily required.”) (citing In re Squaw Valley Dev. 
Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1264, 1269 (T.T.A.B. 2012); Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1758 (T.T.A.B. 1999); In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 
1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
Arguably, this raises an interesting problem. The “substantial composite” test still allows a 
minority of a minority to bring about trademark cancellation. This puts a great deal of power 
in the hands of a small group who are merely contending that their feelings have been 
bruised. 
 27. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 124 (“In a trademark challenge, the petitioner 
must demonstrate that the trademark in question was ‘disparaging’ at the time it was 
registered.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)); Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 186 
(“[T]he TTAB specified that the ‘critical dates’ for determining whether the marks were 
disparaging would be the dates that the marks were issued; thus any evidence must show that 
the marks were disparaging at the date of issuance rather than the date of the cancellation 
petition.”) (citing Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1832 (T.T.A.B. 1994)); 
Hughey, supra note 5, at 338 (“In order for a mark to be cancelled under section 2(a), the 
mark must have been scandalous or disparaging when it was originally granted.”) (citing 15 
U.S.C. § 1064(3)); Smith, supra note 21, at 464 (“The Washington Redskins case also 
implies that a substantial composite is a very high percentage of the potentially 
disparaged.”). 
 28. Hughey, supra note 5, at 350; see, e.g., Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 281 
& n.25 (“Whether a mark is disparaging to the referenced group is a question of fact, not 
law.”) (citing Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117 (D.D.C. 2003)); id. at 117 
n.125 (explaining that in the case of Harjo, “The court reiterated, however, that the court 
reviews de novo the question of whether the legal standard applied by the TTAB is the 
appropriate standard. [Further,] ‘[The TTAB’s] findings of fact . . . are reviewed under the 
substantial evidence test. The Court then turns its attention [sic] the legal principles adopted 
by the TTAB to help it resolve this case. The court reviews the TTAB’s legal principles de 
novo.’”) (citation omitted). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter . . . .”) see, e.g., 
Smith, supra note 21, at 460 (“Very few words have been found to be scandalous per se. 
One exception to this rule was the mark ‘Bullshit’ as applied to a line of designer 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
686 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:677 
 
 
Although current jurisprudence recognizes that the questions of whether a 
mark is “immoral,” “scandalous,” or one that “may disparage” are distinct 
inquiries,30 this has not always been the case, and both the TTAB and the 
courts have occasionally fallen prey to treating these terms as 
synonymous.31 
2. Greyhound, Hines, Harjo, & the Name “Redskins”  
One of the first cases to interpret § 2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition 
was Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc.32 Both Worlds sold t-shirts with 
a visual image that looked a great deal like the well-known logo of the 
Greyhound Bus Corporation. But the Both Worlds’ image depicted the dog 
in a squatting position, defecating (a “pooping pooch”). The TTAB held 
that the Both Worlds’ logo was disparaging to Greyhound and, therefore, 
could not be registered.33 Greyhound is both unusual and interesting 
                                                                                                                 
handbags.”) (citing In re Tinseltown, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981)); id. at 
461 (“The court in In re McGinley outlined the seminal test for whether a trademark is 
scandalous: ‘Whether or not the mark, including innuendo, is scandalous is to be ascertained 
from the standpoint of not necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general 
public.’”) (citation omitted); see also Dennie, supra note 3, at 203-04 (“Trademarks found to 
be scandalous generally involve marks that are clearly offensive to moral feelings such as: 
‘“Dickheads” restaurant services, “Bullshit” personal accessories, and “Bubby Trap” 
brassieres.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 30. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 17, at 33 (“It is important to note from the outset, that the 
statute clearly distinguishes between the test for scandalous and immoral marks, on the one 
hand, and disparaging marks on the other.”); Smith, supra note 21, at 453 (“Courts have 
interpreted Section 2(a) to comprise two grounds for denial: a trademark can be either 
‘scandalous’ or ‘disparaging.’”); id. at 463 (“[W]hile scandalousness is normally targeted at 
majority populations, disparagement is more often concerned with minority subgroups.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 463 (“Although the ‘scandalous’ and 
‘disparaging’ provisions appear in the same clause of Section 2 of the Lanham Act, and are 
occasionally conflated in court decisions, the two appeal to very different standards. 
Whether a trademark is scandalous depends on the reaction from the general public; whether 
a trademark is disparaging depends on its effect upon the specific group allegedly being 
disparaged.”); Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 183. 
 32. Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988); 
see also Brown, supra note 16, at 124 (“The TTAB examines the nature of the trademark in 
light of the test for disparagement set out in Greyhound Corp. v Both Worlds, Inc. In 
Greyhound, the TTAB held that in order for a trademark to be deemed ‘disparaging,’ two 
elements must be present: (1) the trademark must be reasonably understood as referring to 
the plaintiff, and (2) the trademark must be considered offensive or objectionable by a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.”). 
 33. Greyhound, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640; see also Dennie, supra note 5, at 204 (“In 
Greyhound v. Both Worlds, Inc., the TTAB held that a petitioner must establish two 
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because, unlike a number of the more recent cases that have involved 
Native Americans and religious groups, this case examined the “may 
disparage” prohibition in the context of a corporation. The Greyhound 
Corporation claimed that the Both Worlds’ pooping pooch logo was 
disparaging to its own (i.e., Greyhound’s) corporate symbol. Nevertheless, 
Greyhound serves as an adequate beginning point to examine the doctrine. 
In re Hines, however, is the case that established the next important 
phase of the § 2(a) “may disparage” analysis.34 Hines sought to register the 
mark “Budda Beachwear” for apparel.35 The PTO’s examining attorney 
refused registration on the basis that the mark was disparaging to the 
religion of Buddhism.36 One factor that makes Hines especially important is 
that the issue focused on whether the mark disparaged persons (i.e., 
Buddhists), an institution (i.e., Buddhism), and beliefs (i.e., the beliefs held 
by Buddhists). In particular, unlike Greyhound, here the TTAB addressed 
the nuances at play when determining whether a mark is disparaging to a 
group of persons. The TTAB held that the opinions of the general public 
were irrelevant. Rather the pivotal question is whether a substantial 
composite of the allegedly disparaged group feels disparaged.37 According 
to the TTAB, the allegedly disparaged group is “those referred to, identified 
or implicated in some recognizable manner by the involved mark . . . .”38 
Thus, Hines departed from the concerns relating to disparagement of a 
                                                                                                                 
elements for a trademark to be disparaging. First, the trademark must be ‘reasonably 
understood’ to refer to the plaintiff. Second, a ‘reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’ 
must consider the trademark offensive or objectionable. Hence, the second prong of the 
Greyhound Test is an objective standard: a reasonable person in society must find the 
trademark offensive and objectionable.”); Pace, supra note 17, at 30 (“The TTAB decided 
that disparagement was ‘a violation of one's right of privacy—the right to be “let alone” 
from contempt or ridicule.’ In formulating its test for disparagement, the Board adopted the 
definition of disparagement offered by the Second Restatement of Torts pursuant to which, 
‘[a] statement is disparaging if it is understood to cast doubt upon the quality of another's 
land, chattels or intangible things . . . .’”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 629 
(1977)); Ward & Quick, supra note 26, at 52 (“In Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., the 
TTAB defined ‘disparagement’ as essentially a violation of one’s right of privacy—the right 
to be ‘let alone’ from contempt or ridicule. Under this view, the intent of § 2(a) was 
primarily to protect against the registration of marks that harmed the reputation of a 
particular individual or company.”). 
 34. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
 35. Id. at 1685-86. 
 36. Id. at 1686. 
 37. See id. at 1688. 
 38. Id. 
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corporate logo (i.e., the central issue in Greyhound) and instead addressed 
the disparagement vel non of a group of individuals.39  
Although other cases subsequent to Greyhound and Hines have 
considered the issue of disparagement,40 the most in-depth analysis of the § 
2(a) “may disparage” prohibition evolved from the litigation brought by 
Susan Harjo in her attempt to challenge and cancel the trademark 
registrations of the Washington Redskins.41 Harjo and other plaintiffs 
sought to cancel the Washington Redskins trademarks, arguing that they 
were disparaging to Native Americans.42 Briefly stated, “Native Americans 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See Dennie, supra note 3, at 205 (“In contrast, in In re Hines the TTAB held that, in 
determining whether a trademark is disparaging to a racial group, only the perceptions of a 
substantial composite of those ‘referred to, identified or implicated in some recognizable 
manner by the involved mark’ are relevant. Therefore, demonstrating that a mark is 
disparaging to a particular racial group, such as Native Americans, in a cancellation 
proceedings requires a two-part showing. Under the In re Hines standard, plaintiffs must 
show: (1) that the trademark is reasonably understood to refer to the plaintiffs; and (2) the 
‘substantial composite’ associated with the mark find it disparaging or scandalous. Thus, the 
‘substantial composite’ refers to the reasonable member of the relevant racial group, rather 
than the reasonable person.”); Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 183 (discussing In re Hines). 
 40. See infra Section I.D., where these cases are discussed. 
 41. There were six different Washington Redskins trademarks. For a summary of the 
Harjo litigation see, for example, Brown, supra note 16, at 125 (“In Harjo v Pro-Football, 
Inc., a group of Native Americans brought cancellation proceedings against the Washington 
Redskins football team, alleging that the team's registered trademarks were disparaging. The 
petitioners asserted that the word ‘redskin(s),’ or a form of that word, appeared in each of the 
trademarks they sought to have cancelled; that the word ‘redskin(s)’ ‘was and is a pejorative, 
derogatory, denigrating, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable, disparaging and 
racist designation for a Native American person;’ and that the ‘registrant's use of the 
[trademarks] in the identified registrations “offends” petitioners and other Native 
Americans.’ They further contended that ‘the [trademarks] in the identified registrations 
‘consist of or comprise matter which disparages Native American persons, and brings them 
into contempt, ridicule, and disrepute’ and were therefore violative of section 2(a).”); Justin 
P. Grose, Comment, Time to Bury the Tomahawk Chop: An Attempt to Reconcile the 
Differing Viewpoints of Native Americans and Sports Fans, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 695, 700-
09 (2010-2011); Wallace, supra note 5, at 219-20; id. at 225-29. 
 42. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 117 (“The Native American community asserts 
that these names and logos portray Native Americans in a racist and degrading manner that 
dehumanizes them as members of society.”); Dennie, supra note 3, at 205 (“In Harjo v. Pro-
Football, Inc., a group of Native Americans brought a trademark cancellation proceeding 
against the Washington Redskins, alleging that the team's registered trademarks were 
disparaging under the Lanham Act.”); J. Gordon Hylton, Before the Redskins Were the 
Redskins: The Use of Native American Team Names in the Formative Era of American 
Sports, 1857-1933, 86 N.D. L. REV. 879, 882 (2010) (“In 1992, a group of seven Native 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/1
2016]      LANHAM ACT’S PROHIBITION OF TRADEMARKS 689 
 
 
oppose the use of American Indians as team logos, trademarks and mascots. 
They claim that the marks depict Indians in a racist and degrading fashion, 
and that they perpetuate demeaning stereotypes.”43 The TTAB agreed that 
the marks ought to be canceled pursuant to the “may disparage” prohibition 
of § 2(a),44 but after four years of appeal, the District of Columbia Court 
                                                                                                                 
American activists, led by Suzan Harjo, filed a complaint with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), requesting the Board 
decertify the team's trademark, which had been registered in 1967. The Harjo petition was 
based on the claim that the term ‘Redskins’ was particularly offensive to Native Americans 
and was the equivalent of referring to African Americans as ‘niggers.’”); Mark S. Nagel & 
Daniel A. Raschert, Washington “Redskins”–Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: 
Legal and Economic Issues Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 17 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 791 (2007) (“The primary legal contention from the 
Redskins' opponents is that Section 2 of the 1946 Lanham Act prohibits trademarks that 
‘consists of . . . matter which may disparage . . . persons . . . or bring them into contempt or 
disrepute’ and that the term ‘Redskins’ is known in the dictionary and in the common 
American lexicon as ‘a disparaging term for a Native American’ and is considered ‘the most 
derogatory thing Native Peoples can be called in the English language.’”) (footnotes 
omitted); Wallace, supra note 5, at 207 (“There has been an initiative in the Native 
American community to address these disparaging logos and mascots containing Native 
American imagery. The movement argues ‘that such Native American team symbols are 
disparaging, racially discriminatory, create racially hostile environments and perpetuate 
racial stereotypes.’”) (footnote omitted). 
 43. Pace, supra note 17, at 11; id. at 12 (“Native American Indian groups have long 
been claiming that the Washington Redskins' trademark is particularly racist and degrading. 
They insist that the term ‘Redskin’ is a racial epithet, and as such, it perpetuates demeaning 
stereotypes of Native Americans.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 308 (“In 1999, in Harjo v. Pro-Football 
(Harjo II), the TTAB ordered the cancellation of the various trademarks owned by Pro-
Football incorporating the word ‘redskin.’”); id. at 303 (“However, four years later in Harjo 
III, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia reversed that decision on 
grounds that the plaintiffs did not meet the requisite burden of proof, and also because of a 
laches defense argued by Pro-Football and the Washington Redskins.”) (citing Pro-Football, 
Inc. v. Harjo (Harjo III), 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145 (D.D.C. 2003). This decision was 
ultimately remanded in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo (Harjo IV), 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 
2005)), based on an improper application of laches. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 303 (“In 
Harjo II, the Trial Trademark and Appeal Board (TTAB) held that the National Football 
League's Washington Redskins were in violation of the Lanham Act for using a logo-mark 
that was disparaging to a large number of Native Americans. The TTAB relied on section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the use of a trademark that is ‘scandalous’ or 
‘which may disparage’ a certain group.”); Kiser, supra note 3, at 13 (“On April 2, 1999, the 
TTAB canceled these six marks stating that the term ‘redskins’ as used in Pro-Football, 
Inc.'s marks references Native Americans.”); Ward & Quick, supra note 3, at 52 (“The 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) cancelled the trademarks, finding that the marks 
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ultimately reversed, ruling that the TTAB’s decision regarding 
disparagement was not supported by substantial evidence and that the 
doctrine of laches barred the plaintiffs’ suit.45 But most importantly for our 
                                                                                                                 
may disparage Native Americans and may cast Native Americans into contempt or disrepute 
in violation of Lanham Act § 2(a).”); Grose, supra note 41, at 702 (“[T]he TTAB finally 
ruled in favor of the petitioners, calling for the cancellation of the Washington Redskins' 
trademark registration.”) (citing Harjo II, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749); Jeffrey Lefstin, 
Note, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 
668-71 (1999-2000) (summarizing the TTAB’s decision). 
 45. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, supra note 3, at 207 (“The District Court for the District 
of Columbia reversed, determining that the TTAB had improperly cancelled the ‘Redskins’ 
trademarks. The Harjo district court found that the TTAB's conclusion that the term 
‘redskin’ was disparaging to Native Americans was not supported by substantial evidence. In 
addition, the district court recognized a laches defense.”); Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 
189 (“The district court overturned TTAB's decision on two alternative grounds: 1) that the 
TTAB's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence; and 2) that the American Indians' 
cancellation petition was barred by laches.”); Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 309 (“Four years 
after the decision by the TTAB, the District Court for the District of Columbia reversed the 
cancellation of the ‘redskins’ marks, both for a lack of sufficient evidence to support the 
finding of disparagement and because of a laches defense.”) (citing Harjo III, 284 F. Supp. 
2d at 145); Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 282 (“Despite affirming the TTAB’s test 
for disparagement, the court ultimately concluded that the TTAB’s holding that the marks 
disparaged Native Americans was unsupported by substantial evidence.”); Kiser, supra note 
3, at 14 (“On September 30, 2003, the district court overturned the TTAB's decision on two 
grounds: (1) the TTAB's finding of disparagement was not supported by substantial 
evidence; and (2) the consideration of the case was precluded by the doctrine of laches, an 
equitable defense that applies when a plaintiff’s delay in bringing a suit has unduly burdened 
the defendant.”); Nagel & Raschert, supra note 42, at 794 (“On October 1, 2003, Judge 
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ruled that the TTAB erred in its finding that there was sufficient 
evidence to decisively conclude that the name ‘Redskins’ was disparaging to Native 
Americans.”) (citing Harjo III, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 121); Smith, supra note 21, at 458 (“One 
of the leading cases discussing the nuances of Section 2(a) is Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 
which reversed the TTAB's finding that the Washington Redskins's trademark should be 
revoked, holding that ‘Redskins’ was not disparaging, or, in the alternative, that laches 
prevented the Native American challengers from bringing suit.”) (citing Harjo III, 284 F. 
Supp. 2d at 136); Ward & Quick, supra note 26, at 52 (“Pro-Football successfully appealed 
the TTAB’s decision in federal district court, where the court held that the suit was barred by 
the doctrine of laches and that the finding of disparagement was not supported by substantial 
evidence.”); Grose supra note 41, at 703 (“The district court determined the following: ‘The 
TTAB's finding of disparagement is not supported by substantial evidence and must be 
reversed. The decision should also be reversed because of the doctrine of laches precludes 
consideration of the case.’”); see also Hughey, supra note 5, at 348-49 (“Pro-Football 
appealed the TTAB decision to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Pro-
Football argued several reasons why the court should overturn the TTAB's decision. First, it 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/1
2016]      LANHAM ACT’S PROHIBITION OF TRADEMARKS 691 
 
 
purposes, the District Court approved the TTAB’s legal test for 
disparagement; it reversed on other grounds (lack of substantial evidence 
and laches). Relying on Hines, the TTAB laid the foundation for the current 
analytical model (a two-part test) for the “may disparage” prohibition of § 
2(a), even though the District Court overturned the decision for other 
reasons.46  
The TTAB . . . clarified that whether the marks at issue are 
disparaging is based on the disparaging nature of the marks 
when the respective registrations were issued, and not whether 
the marks are considered disparaging in present society. 
Furthermore, the TTAB stated that “scandalous” and “disparage” 
as used in Section 2(a) represented different statutory bars, 
holding that “scandalous” looked to society as a whole, while 
“disparage” looked only to the beliefs of the identifiable group. 
In doing so, the TTAB declared that the opinions of those 
individuals in the identifiable group are the only relevant points 
of view as to whether the term was disparaging. Thus, the TTAB 
developed the two-part test that became the standard for whether 
a mark should be barred for being disparaging:  
 (1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question, 
taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the 
relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the 
nature of the goods and services, and the manner in which the 
                                                                                                                 
argued that the trademarks did not disparage Native Americans and did not bring Native 
Americans into contempt or disrepute. Second, it asserted that section 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act was unconstitutional because it was a vague, overbroad, content-based restriction on 
speech. It further argued that section 2(a) was unduly vague in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. Finally, Pro- Football contended that the cancellation petition was barred by 
the doctrine of laches.”) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the doctrine of laches and 
its application in the Harjo case, see, for example, Wallace, supra note 5, at 229-36; see also 
Hughey, supra note 5, at 353 (“The district court also found that, in the alternative, because 
of the delay in challenging the trademark, laches barred the petitioners' suit.”); id. at 349 
(“After considering motions from parties and the evidence on the record, the district court 
held that the TTAB's finding of disparagement was not supported by substantial evidence 
and the suit was barred by laches, and consequently reversed the TTAB decision.”) (citing 
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 96,141 (D.D.C. 2003)); Dennie, supra note 3, at 
217; Grose, supra note 41, at 708-09. 
 46. See, e.g., Hopkins & Joraanstad supra note 4, at 281 (“[T]he court upheld the two-
part test crafted by the TTAB to determine whether a mark is disparaging, including limiting 
the relevant perceptions to only those people who are part of the identifiable group.”). 
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mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or 
services; and 
 (2) if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, 
institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning 
may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced 
group.47 
In terms of the TTAB’s analysis, one crucial, legal determination stands 
out: although the general public’s views are relevant in determining 
whether a mark is “scandalous,” only the views of the allegedly disparaged 
group of people—not the general public’s views—are relevant when 
assessing whether a mark “may disparage.”48 According to the TTAB, “it is 
only logical that, in deciding whether the matter may be disparaging, we 
look, not to American society as a whole . . . but to the views of the 
referenced group.”49 Thus the TTAB narrowed the assessment of 
disparagement by zeroing in on the feelings, the mindset, of the allegedly 
disparaged group. 
One of the more interesting aspects of the litigation concerning the 
Redskins is the history of the name. When the franchise started in 1932, the 
team originally was named “Braves” but was renamed “Redskins” in the 
following year, and then in 1937, the team relocated from Boston to 
Washington, D.C.50 Like many professional football teams, the Boston 
team initially adopted the name of its professional baseball sibling in the 
city, in this case, the Boston Braves.51 But after one year of playing its 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 279-80 (footnotes omitted); see In re Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting this test from the Trademark Manual of 
Examining Procedure (TMEP) § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.)); see also Finkelstein, supra 
note 3, at 308-09 (“To reach this outcome, the TTAB employed the test set forth in the 1994 
case In re Hines. This test requires looking at the ‘perceptions of those referred to, identified 
or implicated in some recognizable manner by the involved mark.’ Thus, under Hines, the 
TTAB had to find 1) that the ‘redskins’ trademarks owned by Pro-Football were ‘reasonably 
understood’ to refer to the plaintiffs, and then, if so, 2) that a ‘substantial composite’ of 
Native Americans found the marks ‘disparaging.’ Based on the evidence provided, including 
the testimony of linguists, dictionary definitions of ‘redskin(s),’ and survey evidence, the 
TTAB found both prongs of the test to be satisfied, and thus ruled to cancel Pro-Football's 
trademarks.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 48. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1748-49 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
 49. Id. at 1739. 
 50. Hylton, supra note 42, at 886-90. 
 51. The Boston Braves baseball team was originally named the “Beaneaters.” See 
Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 269 (“[I]n 1912, the Boston Beaneaters, now the 
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games at Braves Field, the team moved to Fenway Park, whereupon the 
owners changed the team name to Redskins, retaining the team’s Native 
American connection while infusing the phonetic sounds of its Fenway 
Park neighbor “Red Sox.”52 The team became the “Washington Redskins” 
when it relocated to Washington, D.C. in 1937.53  
The Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo litigation, however, adapting principles 
forged by Greyhound and Hines, established the fundamental, doctrinal 
analysis for evaluating the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a), as applied 
to a specific group of persons: namely, Native Americans.54 First, the fact 
finder must ascertain the meaning of the mark in relation to the goods or 
services to which it relates. Second, in light of that meaning, the fact finder 
must determine whether a substantial composite of the referenced group 
would deem the mark disparaging.55 Examining attorneys, the TTAB, and 
                                                                                                                 
Atlanta Braves, changed its name to the Boston Braves, becoming one of the first 
professional teams to use a Native American term as its name.”). 
 52. Hylton, supra note 42, at 889 (“‘Redskins’ followed as a replacement name, which 
echoed the principle [sic] sounds of ‘Red Sox,’ the baseball inhabitants of Fenway Park.”). 
 53. See id. at 886-90 (explaining the evolution of the Washington Redskins’ team name, 
which actually began in 1932 as the Boston Braves, playing at Braves Field (where the 
professional baseball team played long before they moved first to Milwaukee and then to 
Atlanta) in Boston, Massachusetts); Pace, supra note 17, at 13 (“The team federally 
registered the ‘Redskins’ trademark in 1967, though the team actually began using the name 
‘Redskins’ in 1933, in Boston, Massachusetts.”) (footnote omitted); See also Reiner, supra 
note 3, at 6-7 (recounting briefly the history of the Redskins name-change and move from 
Boston to Washington, D.C.). 
 54. See generally Brown, supra note 16, at 126 (“In Harjo, the TTAB articulated a 
broad, liberal test for determining what constitutes a ‘disparaging’ trademark. The TTAB 
noted that the term ‘disparage’ as it appears in section 2(a) addresses an identifiable target 
such as a person or institution. Based on this premise, the TTAB concluded that a finding of 
whether a trademark was ‘disparaging’ would be determined by the views of the referenced 
group, rather than the general public. From this basis, the TTAB concluded that the 
trademarks challenged by Harjo and the other Native American petitioners were in fact 
disparaging, and therefore not capable of being registered under section 2(a).”) (footnotes 
omitted); Wallace, supra note 5, at 347 (discussing the TTAB’s analysis used to determine 
whether a mark is disparaging). 
 55. See Hughey, supra note 5, at 340 (“A mark is disparaging if it would ‘dishonor by 
comparison with what is inferior, slight, deprecate, degrade, or affect or injure by unjust 
comparison.’ When evaluating disparagement, courts as well as the TTAB consider ‘only the 
perceptions of those referred to, identified or implicated in some recognizable manner by the 
involved [trade]mark’ which is to be evaluated as of the date of registration of the mark.”) 
(footnotes omitted); id. at 347 (“In response to the second question, the TTAB found that 
‘the word “redskin,” as it appears in respondent's marks in those registrations and as used in 
connection with the identified services, may disparage Native Americans, as perceived by a 
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courts have devoted a great deal of discussion to these issues. They have, 
for example, relied on dictionary definitions, surveys, and expert testimony 
trying to apply the statute to specific facts.56 
C. NCAA Position  
Interestingly, “[c]ollege sports teams using Indian names was relatively 
rare prior to the 1920s.”57 As the Harjo litigation reached its final stages,58 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) adopted a policy, 
prohibiting member institutions that used Native American names and 
imagery (deemed to be “hostile and abusive”) from participating in post-
season play and hosting post-season tournaments.59 “On August 5, 2005, 
                                                                                                                 
substantial composite of Native Americans.’”); see also Dennie, supra note 3, at 204 
(“Similarly, if a trademark is found to be disparaging, it will not be afforded federal 
protection. A trademark is disparaging if it would ‘dishonor by comparison with what is 
inferior, slight, deprecate, degrade, or affect or injure by unjust comparison.’”) (citing Harjo 
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1738 (T.T.A.B. 1999)).  
 56. See Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 200 (quoting the test for disparagement as 
follows: “1) what is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not 
only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the 
mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the 
market place in connection with the goods or services; and 2) if that meaning is found to 
refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning 
may be disparaging to substantial composite of the referenced group”).  
 57. Hylton, supra note 42, at 900.  
 58. The Harjo litigation was not finally put to rest until all appeals had been exhausted, 
which occurred when the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
558 U.S. 1025 (2009). 
 59. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 315; see also id. at 303 (“[T]he NCAA set forth a 
detailed policy . . . for its member institutions that banned the use of ‘hostile and abusive 
racial/ethnic/national origin mascots, nicknames or imagery at any of the 88 NCAA 
championships,’ specifically targeting schools using Native American names, mascots and 
logos.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 316 (“Effective February 1, 2006, colleges and universities 
having such Native American mascots were to be prohibited from hosting any NCAA 
championships at their facilities.”); Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 270 (“In 2005, 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (‘NCAA’) stated it would no longer allow the 
use of Native American mascots or nicknames in its postseason tournaments, simultaneously 
issuing a list of eighteen schools with ‘hostile or abusive’ mascots and nicknames.”). See 
generally Cummings, supra note 5, at 319 (“In 2005, the NCAA adopted a policy that 
prohibited member institutions from participating in NCAA-sanctioned postseason events if 
the institution maintained a mascot, moniker, nickname, or logo that was offensive to Native 
American citizens. In the policy announcement, the NCAA described its purpose: ‘The 
presidents and chancellors who serve on the NCAA Executive Committee have adopted a 
new policy to prohibit NCAA colleges and universities from displaying hostile and abusive 
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the NCAA formally announced the adoption of a policy forbidding its 
member institutions from employing ‘hostile and abusive . . . mascots, 
nicknames or imagery’ during NCAA championship play, specifically 
pertaining to Native American references.”60  
Many NCAA member institutions took steps to change their mascots; 
others sought permission from the pertinent Native American group in 
order to take advantage of an appeal process that allowed schools to retain 
Native American mascots upon proof of adequate permission.61 The Florida 
State Seminoles and University of Utah Utes are probably the most well-
known of those who received permission to keep their Native American 
names and imagery.62 The North Dakota Fighting Sioux and University of 
                                                                                                                 
racial/ethnic/national origin mascots, nicknames or imagery at any of the [eighty-eight] 
NCAA championships.’”) (footnotes omitted); Hylton, supra note 42, at 881 (“The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered the fray in 2005 by banning the use of 
Indian names and symbols by teams engaging in post-season play, unless teams using tribal 
names secured the permission of the tribe itself.”); Wallace, supra note 5, at 210-12. For a 
discussion of Native American mascot names used by colleges and universities prior to 
2005, see John B. Rhode, Comment, The Mascot Name Change Controversy: A Lesson in 
Hypersensitivity, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 141, 152-58 (1994-1995).  
60. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 315. 
 61. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 5, at 327 (“The NCAA, after carefully considering 
and adopting its new policy prohibiting offensive or hostile imagery, took a decided step 
backward in allowing an appeals process giving university administrations that championed 
these derogatory and discriminatory American Indian images an opportunity to keep their 
hostile mascots. The NCAA made a determination that if member institutions could provide 
support for their continued use of American Indian mascots, then they would be removed 
from the postseason ban list and could continue with their hostile tradition unencumbered.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Dennie, supra note 3, at 200 (“In sum, over the last thirty years more 
than six hundred high schools and colleges have changed their mascots and team names in 
response to heightened public scrutiny resulting from advocates' objections.”); Finkelstein, 
supra note 3, at 316 (“Two weeks after the policy was announced, the NCAA Executive 
Committee approved an appeals process by which colleges and universities subject to the 
sanctions could challenge their individual status.”); see also Nagel & Raschert, supra note 
42, at 797 (“After many years of criticism of their name's potential inference to gun 
violence, the NBA's Washington Bullets changed their name to ‘Wizards’ in 1997.”); id. 
(“Certainly, the altering of an offensive nickname, logo, or mascot offers the franchise an 
initial positive public relations platform on which to launch its new marketing efforts.”) 
(footnote omitted); id. at 797-98 (“For the potential re-branding of a controversial name like 
the Washington Redskins, some fans have voiced their displeasure with the potential name 
change and have raised concern that their support for the team may wane if it yields to 
public pressure.”). 
 62. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 327 (“Since its adoption of the ‘one step forward, 
two steps back’ policy, the NCAA has granted appeals to Florida State University and the 
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Illinois Fighting Illini were among those who went to great lengths in an 
effort to retain their Native American mascots.63 The University of North 
Dakota relented and eventually retired its Fighting Sioux mascot in 2012.64  
D. Legal Principles Extended & Applied: Heeb, Khoran, & Redskins 
(Again!) 
Two additional cases worthy of mention are In re Heeb Media, LLC65 
and In re Lebanese Arak Corp.66 In re Heeb examined whether the word 
“Heeb” may disparage Jews, and In re Lebanese Arak considered whether 
“Khoran” may disparage Muslim beliefs. In both cases, the TTAB ruled 
that the marks could not be registered pursuant to § 2(a)’s “may disparage” 
prohibition. The word “Heeb” (for apparel) was denied registration 
because, as slang for “Hebrew,” it is a term considered offensive to Jews, 
and “Khoran” (for wine) was denied registration because those who follow 
the Muslim Islamic faith believe that consuming alcohol is sinful.67 
                                                                                                                 
University of Utah, allowing both to keep their nicknames (Seminoles and Utes, 
respectively) and to keep their mascots, traditions, and mockery.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Wallace, supra note 5, at 206 (“Similar to their professional counterparts, . . . [colleges] also 
expose numerous people to discriminating depictions of Native Americans. For instance, the 
Florida State Seminoles use Chief Osceola, a man who rides out on horseback with war paint 
and a feather spear, as its mascot.”). 
 63. See Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 303-04; id. at 302 (“On one side of the 
disagreement stand those who believe that using the ‘Fighting Sioux’ name is an appropriate 
means of honoring one of the most powerful groups in the history of that part of the country. 
However, several other groups are adamantly opposed to the name, as well as the use of any 
other Native American names for athletic teams.”) (footnote omitted); Kelly P. O'Neil, 
Comment, Sioux Unhappy: Challenging the NCAA's Ban on Native American Imagery, 42 
TULSA L. REV. 171, 180-84 (2006). For additional discussion regarding the University of 
North Dakota and University of Illinois situations, see, for example, Cummings, supra note 
5, at 329-32. 
 64. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 41, at 700 (“On September 9, 2010, however, ‘[t]he 
North Dakota Board of Higher Education adopted a resolution directing UND officials to 
retire the Sioux nickname and logo.’”). For additional discussion regarding the situation 
involving the University of North Dakota (and Marquette), see Nagel & Raschert, supra note 
42, at 798-99. 
 65. 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008); see Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 
196-97 (discussing In re Heeb Media, LLC). 
 66. 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2009); see Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 
198 (discussing In re Lebanese Arak Corp.). 
 67. In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1071-72; In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1221. 
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Admittedly, the word “Khoran” is the phonetic equivalent of the word 
“Koran,” the name of the holy book of Islam.68 
Amanda Blackhorse initiated the most recent litigation involving 
cancellation of the Washington Redskins trademarks on August 11, 2006.69 
On June 18, 2014, the TTAB, in a two-to-one decision, ordered cancellation 
of the Redskins’ marks, holding that they violated the “may disparage” 
prohibition of § 2(a).70 Pro-Football, Inc., the owner of the Washington 
Redskins’ trademarks, filed an appeal, but on July 8, 2015, Judge Gerald 
Bruce Lee of the Eastern District of Virginia, on summary judgment, 
upheld the TTAB’s cancellations, ruling, among other things, that § 2(a) 
does not conflict with the First Amendment.71 Relying on Walker v. Texas 
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,72 Judge Lee held that the 
Principal Register of federal trademarks is “government speech” and 
therefore exempt from the First Amendment.73 
Meanwhile, the Tam litigation now appears to have jumped to the front 
of the line.74 Simon Shiao Tam, the front-man for a musical group whose 
members are of Asian descent, applied for service mark registration for the 
name of their band, “The Slants.”75 The PTO examining attorney refused 
                                                                                                                 
 68. In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218, 1221. 
 69. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 450 (E.D. Va. 2015).  
 70. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, 
at *1, 7-8, 43 (T.T.A.B 2014); see also Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 283-84 (“The 
Blackhorse Litigation culminated in the TTAB’s cancellation of all six marks on the grounds 
that the term redskin(s), as used in connection with the goods and services offered under the 
marks, is disparaging to Native Americans.”). 
 71. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 452; see Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 4, at 287 
(“Soon after the TTAB issued its decision, Pro-Football filed suit in the federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to have the decision overturned.”); Ernst & 
Lumm, supra note 2, at 177 (“Ideally a Federal Court will address these hurdles in the 
inevitable appeal of the TTAB's decision in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.”). 
 72. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 73. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 457. For a more detailed discussion of Judge Lee’s 
Blackhorse decision and Walker, see infra Section IV.C. Briefly stated, Walker involved the 
question of whether the Texas state government’s refusal to print license plates with a 
replica of the Confederate flag conflicted with the First Amendment. See also Wallace, 
supra note 5, at 207 (“[C]onfederate imagery has also been deemed discriminatory. School 
mascots with the images of "[t]he Confederate flag, the Rebel mascot, and other symbols 
associated with the antebellum South were successfully challenged in the 1970s during the 
implementation of court-ordered integration.") (footnotes omitted). 
 74. For a more detailed examination of this case, see infra Parts III and V. 
 75. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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registration based on the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a).76 After 
Tam appealed to the TTAB, the TTAB affirmed the examining attorney’s 
decision to deny registration.77 Tam then appealed to the CAFC, but the 
CAFC affirmed the TTAB and the examining attorney’s decision to deny 
registration on § 2(a) grounds.78 Judge Kimberly Moore filed a separate 
document, entitled “Additional Views,” suggesting that the court ought to 
reconsider the issue of whether the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) 
conflicts with the First Amendment.79 On April 27, 2015, the CAFC 
vacated its opinion and asked the parties to brief the First Amendment issue 
in preparation for a hearing en banc.80 Oral argument took place October 2, 
2015,81 and the court issued its decision December 22, 2015, holding the 
“may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) unconstitutional.82 On April 20, 
2016, the USPTO filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court.83 Given the importance of the decision as a First 
Amendment precedent, chances are high that the Supreme Court will grant 
certiorari to resolve the question of whether the “may disparage” 
prohibition of § 2(a) violates the First Amendment.  
II. Scholarship Summary 
A. Overview 
Scholars, commentators, and pundits have written a great deal about the 
“may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a). The majority of scholarship has 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Although not unprecedented, it is atypical for the applicant to be a member of the 
group of persons whom the trademark examining attorney thinks may experience 
disparagement. See, e.g., Kiser, supra note 3, at 10 (“This refusal to register the mark is 
somewhat unusual in the history of section 2(a) decisions, given that the applicants are 
members of the group that is allegedly disparaged by the mark: lesbians who have 
reappropriated the mark as a symbol of pride and rebellion in connection with their 
motorcycle and entertainment services marketed towards fellow women.”). 
 77. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
 78. Tam, 785 F.3d at 568-69. 
 79. See id. at 573-85 (Moore, J., “additional views”). 
 80. In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 81. Id. (order setting oral argument) (“Oral argument en banc for this appeal is 
scheduled for October 2, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 201. This appeal will have 30 
minutes per side for a total argument time of one hour. The parties shall notify the court by 
ECF filing by September 2, 2015 of the names of the counsel who will present oral 
argument.”). 
 82. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 83. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tam, No. 15-1293 (Apr. 20, 2016).  
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appeared subsequent to the onset of the Harjo litigation. A few 
commentators have squarely addressed the First Amendment issue.84 Most 
appear to recognize the First Amendment potentially poses a serious threat 
to the vitality of § 2(a).85 Curiously, some seem to dismiss it as if it were 
some type of straw man.86 Much of the scholarship, however, has not aimed 
directly at the First Amendment issue but instead has focused on the 
propriety (or lack thereof) of using Native American names and imagery as 
trademarks.87 Most writers have taken sides and have voiced strong 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 17; Smith, supra note 21, at 451; Lefstin, supra note 44, 
at 668-71. 
 85. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 452 (“[T]he Lanham Act's prohibition on 
scandalous and disparaging marks is a troubling exception to our First Amendment civil 
liberties.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 41, at 722-24 (discussing the potential application of the 
First Amendment to § 2(a) but not appearing to grasp a number of the subtleties of the 
doctrine and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence). One article has dismissed the notion 
that a federal court of appeals will find that the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) 
violates the First Amendment. See Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 189 n.77 (“Without 
going into an in-depth constitutional analysis which would be beyond the scope of this 
article, it appears a court would likely reject both of Pro-Football's constitutional claims. 
Pro-Football's first constitutional claim was that its First Amendment free speech rights 
would be violated if its trademarks were cancelled. However, under Federal Circuit 
precedent, the cancellation of a mark does not contravene a party's First Amendment free 
speech rights.”) (citations omitted). 
 87. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 6, at 312 (“To some, American Indian mascots 
represent strength, power, reverence, and dignity. For others, Native American mascots are 
deeply offensive and mock ancient and sacred culture. Historically, professional and 
collegiate athletic teams have unabashedly sported American Indian mascots and monikers, 
and it has not been until recent decades that this issue has arisen as offensive or 
insensitive.”) (footnotes omitted). The visual images used have not been the center of 
attention. In its second Harjo opinion, the TTAB held that the imagery was not disparaging. 
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1743 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
Nevertheless, a number of commentators have noted the offensive nature of the Cleveland 
Indians’ “Chief Wahoo” imagery. See, e.g., Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2, at 206 (“The most 
notorious mascot still in use, with registered live trademarks, is the Cleveland Indians' Chief 
Wahoo. Activists have referred to Chief Wahoo as ‘the most offensive racial icon in the 
country.’ The Cleveland Indians' use of Chief Wahoo, ‘a grinning Indian face caricature with 
a feather and bright red face,’ was challenged in court in 1972 under a theory of group libel, 
but was settled out of court.”) (footnotes omitted); Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 325 (“[T]he 
animated ‘Chief Wahoo’ logo employed by the Cleveland Indians . . . has drawn criticism 
for being derogatory . . . .”); Reiner, supra note 3, at 8 (“Chief Wahoo is seen as a grinning, 
buffoonish abomination and the negative image the character projects is the reason Native 
Americans object to its use.”); see also Cummings, supra note 5, at 333 (“In Cleveland, the 
logo of ‘Chief Wahoo’ adorns baseball caps and almost all team memorabilia. The Chief is a 
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opinions.88 But some scholarship has been relatively neutral; these writers 
apparently have attempted to refrain from taking sides, striving for 
objectivity, weighing the pros and cons of both sides of the debate in a 
neutral fashion.89  
B. Anti-Use of Native American Names & Imagery 
Of those who have taken sides, many have expressed support for the 
Harjo and Blackhorse plaintiffs, and have lashed out in an angry and 
frustrated fashion, pillorying those who have, in their opinion, disrespected 
Native Americans in a most unseemly manner by continuing to use Native 
American names and imagery as trademarks for their sports teams.90 Like 
                                                                                                                 
dark red, cartoonish caricature of an American Indian smiling broadly (the smile takes up 
more than one-third of the cartoon face) and wears a feather in the back of its head.”); Jack 
Achiezer Guggenheim, The Indians' Chief Problem: Chief Wahoo as State Sponsored 
Discrimination and a Disparaging Mark, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 211 (1998); Hughey, supra 
note 5, at 361 (describing the depiction of Chief Wahoo and suggesting that it is “ripe for 
cancellation”); id. at 348 (2004) (“The TTAB found no support in the record—and, thus, 
rejected—the proposition that the use of Native American references or imagery by non-
Native Americans was per se disparaging to Native Americans or that such use in 
connection with football was per se disparaging. Therefore, although the TTAB held that the 
trademark should be cancelled, it did not rule that the use of Native American names and 
images was per se disparaging to Native Americans.”) (footnotes omitted); Hylton, supra 
note 42, at 898 (“[T]he first version of the infamous Chief Wahoo logo did not appear until 
1946. It [i.e., the Cleveland baseball team] also did not print the name Indians on its 
uniforms until after World War II.”); Rhode, supra note 59 (noting that President Clinton 
decided not to wear a hat with Chief Wahoo at a game where he threw out the ceremonial 
first pitch on Opening Day of the 1994 MLB season); see also Hughey, supra note 5, at 360 
(“The TTAB in Harjo found that the challenged drawings were not disparaging, but those 
marks were described as simple, benign profiles of Native Americans.”). For additional 
discussion regarding the Cleveland Indians’ Chief Wahoo logo, see Dennie, supra note 3, at 
214-15. 
 88. One commentator has called for a complete change in the burdens placed on 
trademark applicants. See Kiser, supra note 3, at 29-36 (recommending that the burden be 
placed on an applicant to prove that the mark is not disparaging). This argument, however, 
completely ignores the importance of First Amendment doctrine in the “public interest” 
debate. 
 89. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 42; Ward & Quick, supra note 26. 
 90. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 5, at 204 (“The pervasive use of the Native American 
likeness as spectacle in sport can be very damaging and should be addressed by both the 
legal community and public opinion in general.”). One commentator decries the performance 
of a white college student clad in American Indian dress at sporting events. See Cummings, 
supra note 5, at 311 (“He will spend the next four to six hours desecrating, mimicking, and 
debasing an entire tribe of American Indians and, by association, an entire race of 
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the Harjo and Blackhorse plaintiffs, these writers emphasize the offensive 
nature91 of the marks and the negative emotional and psychological damage 
that Native Americans suffer as a result of the hatred and ridicule that they 
perceive to be caused by such trademarks.92 The complaints about these 
alleged negative consequences appear sincere and genuine.93  
C. Pro-Use of Native American Names & Imagery 
But others frame the debate differently. The opposing viewpoint supports 
the use of Native American team names and logos, contending that the 
names and images honor the traditions and the positive spirit and 
characteristics of American Indian culture.94 The Redskins ownership has 
                                                                                                                 
Americans.”); id. at 314 (“The mascot that dresses up like an Indian chief is mocking sacred 
rituals, mimicking hallowed traditions, and caricaturizing a proud race in debilitating 
ways.”). Yet presumably in other circumstances, Native American ceremonial dances and 
exhibitions are considered honorific theatre. See also Grose, supra note 41.  
 91. Interestingly, the Supreme Court invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a Texas 
statute regarding flag desecration in circumstances where “the actor knows [his actions] will 
seriously offend one or more persons . . . .” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 n.1 (1989). 
 92. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 41, at 696 (“There is mounting evidence, however, to 
suggest that these types of names have detrimental effects on the well-being and self-esteem 
of Native American children.”); id. at 701 (“But in light of recent studies documenting the 
harmful psychological effects of the continued use of such team names, it is difficult to make 
the argument that Native Americans are unharmed.”). For example, testimony from the 
Harjo litigation alleged: “the use of Native American stereotypes has a negative effect on the 
self-esteem of Native American children” and that “the use of stereotyping objectifies and 
dehumanizes the individual.” Id. at 705-06 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Wallace, supra note 5, at 209 (“The continued and pervasive use of Native American images 
and likenesses is a ‘painful legac[y] of an era in advertising that relied on the use of racial or 
ethnic minorities as the basis for logos, without much attention to the psychological harms 
such logos can cause.’”) (citation omitted). See generally Ernst & Lumm, supra note 2. 
 93. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 41, at 710-22 (discussing the negative emotional effects 
of the use of Native American names and mascots by sports teams). 
 94. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 119 (“Supporters for the use of the names argue 
that, by doing so, they are ‘honoring’ Native American culture and therefore are not 
demeaning the culture.") (citing Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: 
Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (1995)); id. at 119 (“Rather, they 
suggest that these names reflect positive attributes of Native Americans such as dedication, 
courage, and pride.”) (citing Richard Justice, Washington Redskins, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 
30, 1992, at 29); Cummings, supra note 5, at 316-17 (“Still, those that support the continued 
use of hostile American Indian imagery have hunkered down, believing that they are 
resisting the political correctness movement and are in fact supporting tradition and honoring 
native peoples.”); Dennie, supra note 3, at 213-14 (“Professional and college sports teams 
typically adopted Native American names and symbols, not to offend, but rather, to emulate 
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advanced this argument for decades.95 One commentator posits this position 
in a rather matter-of-fact manner, claiming that “many professional sports 
teams such as baseball's Cleveland ‘Indians’ and football's Washington 
‘Redskins’ have decided to honor American history through the use of 
Native American references in their names and logos.”96 Similarly, another 
commentator states that “the vast majority of Native American-based 
names and symbols are not offensive and, indeed, carry positive 
connotations of Native American culture.”97 Yet another remarks that 
                                                                                                                 
the historic bravery and athleticism of Native American culture. These teams want to be 
respected and admired. Arguably, team owners, university presidents, and school boards 
choose Native American mascots and team names to promote ‘courage, strength, boldness, 
and resourcefulness.’ Thus, teams honor Native Americans because teams often associate 
Native Americans with qualities and virtues to which they aspire. Furthermore, sport has a 
close connection to war and the field of battle. The virtues embodied in Native American 
culture, such as resourcefulness and calculated precision, are traits necessary to build a 
champion on the field of battle and the athletic field. This correlation honors the battles and 
struggles Native Americans have faced throughout history.”) (footnotes omitted); Ernst & 
Lumm, supra note 2, at 203 (“Further complicating the social policy issues underlying the 
question of racial-group disparagement is the argument that the use of American Indian 
imagery is not intended to be denigrating, but rather to be a representation of honor and 
tradition, both of the team and the tribe.”); Hylton, supra note 42, at 902 (“Although the 
general treatment of Native Americans by the mainstream American culture throughout 
history was patronizing, insensitive, and immoral at times, the early use of Native American 
team names does not, in the context of sports team names, appear to have been particularly 
disparaging. Teams were named after Native Americans as patriotic gestures, as geographic 
identifiers, and occasionally as humorous references, but almost never with the intention of 
insulting or making fun of Native Americans specifically.”); Reiner, supra note 3, at 2-3 
(“Ironically, driving the passion of many owners and sports’ fans to retain Native American 
names in sports is the perceived notion that the use of Native American names connotes 
honor and respect, thereby precluding any argument that there is any intent to injure or 
harm.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 17, at 15 (quoting former Redskins owner Jack Kent 
Cook: “I admire the Redskins name. I think it stands for bravery, courage and a stalwart 
spirit, and I see no reason why we shouldn't continue to use it.”) (citation omitted). 
 96. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 306 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 333 (“[T]eams 
and schools, such as UND, appear to use such Native American references as a means of 
honoring the true founders of our nation. ‘If Americans didn't hold Indians in high regard, 
tribal names wouldn't find their way onto all kinds of consumer products, such as the Jeep 
Cherokee and the Dodge Dakota. . . . The Army wouldn't name their helicopters after tribes: 
the Apache Longbow . . . and the Blackhawk.’”) (footnote omitted). Also consider the “Red 
Man” brand of chewing tobacco. 
 97. Dennie, supra note 3, at 220. See also id. (“In most cases, these teams do little to 
discriminate against minority groups and have nothing but the best intentions in regards to 
Native American names, chants, and traditions.”). 
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“[p]eople don't name teams after things they hate. A team name is designed 
to project certain qualities fans and athletes can admire and emulate, 
whether it's toughness, ferocity, or regional pride.”98  
And, historically speaking, it appears as though the positive qualities 
associated with Native Americans are precisely what both college and 
professional teams typically had in mind when they adopted American 
Indian team names, mascots, and imagery. Professor Hylton explains: 
In the 1910s and 1920s, professional and college teams began to 
formally adopt Native American team names . . . because of a 
growing association in the public mind between Native 
Americans and success in athletics, particularly baseball, 
football, and track and field. Thanks to the accomplishments of 
individual athletes like Jim Thorpe, Chief Meyers, and Chief 
Bender and of teams like the Carlisle and Haskell Indian 
Schools, the independent Nebraska Indians baseball team, and 
the Oorang Indians of the NFL, a new association developed 
between Indians and athletic proficiency. With such a perception 
embraced, names referred [to] Native Americans' acquired skills 
in American team sports rather than [to] supposedly savage 
qualities.99  
The original Major League Baseball “Braves,” for example, intended to 
honor American Indians’ positive attributes. “The first major league 
baseball team to intentionally adopt a Native American team name was the 
Boston National League team in 1912, and in doing so, it made clear 
reference to the idea that Indians had special athletic skills.”100 And when 
                                                                                                                 
 98. John J. Miller, Fighting Sue: The Unsavory War Against Indian Symbols, 1 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 291, 291 (2002). 
 99. Hylton, supra note 42, at 890-91; see also id. at 896 (“Until the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the attachment of a Native American name to a baseball club was usually 
intended to emphasize the ‘American’ nature of the game of baseball. Having such a name 
was more likely to occur in the Eastern United States where Native Americans were treated 
as a historical phenomenon or an abstraction. Use of a Native American name also provided 
a humorous alternative to simply referring to a team by its city name. The choice of names 
does not appear to have had any particular reference to the athletic prowess of Native 
Americans; that is, until the first decade of the twentieth century.”). 
 100. Id. at 896-97; see also id. at 897 (“Ward's [(co-owner of the team)] decision appears 
to have been influenced by a number of factors. His co-owner, James Gaffney, was a 
member of New York City's Democratic Tammany Hall political machine, whose operatives 
were known jokingly as ‘braves.’ Moreover, the name ‘Braves’ resonated with Boston's 
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the Major League Baseball team in Cleveland changed its name to 
“Indians,” it did so “in honor of Louis Sockalexis, the first Native American 
to play professional baseball, who was regarded as ‘a marvel’ by his 
teammates and coaches. Therefore, the ‘Indians’ name was adopted in 
honor of a former star player associated with the Cleveland franchise.”101 
Many who support the use of Native American trademarks warn that 
using the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) to combat Native American 
names and imagery as trademarks is a cop-out, merely acquiescing to the 
hypersensitivity of contemporary society’s willingness to give in to political 
correctness.102 One commentator has soberly warned that “[t]he United 
States has transformed into a society filled with affirmative action and 
political correctness, due in part to the Civil Rights movement of the mid to 
late-twentieth century.”103 Perhaps facetiously, others have noted that 
Christians have not yet challenged the Los Angeles Angels, the New 
Orleans Saints, the Arizona State Sun Devils, nor the Duke Blue Devils.104 
                                                                                                                 
history of pretend ‘braves’ who threw the British tea overboard during the Boston Tea Party. 
In addition, the term ‘Boston Braves’ had earlier been attached to the Honorable Artillery 
Company, an honorary military unit based in Boston. Although it traced its origins back to 
1638, the Honorable Artillery Company's function by the end of the nineteenth century was 
entirely ceremonial, and its ranks were drawn from the city's social elite.”). 
 101. Dennie, supra note 3, at 214 (footnote omitted). 
 102. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 456 (“The Lanham Act effectively allows small 
special interest groups to curtail others' speech, raising the risk that trademarks are governed 
by political correctness rather than free speech values. For example, a conservative Christian 
group may have standing against a pro-gay rights trademark.”); see also Grose, supra note 
41, at 701 (acknowledging the argument: “The team owners and fans assert that there is a 
tradition behind the team names and mascots. They believe that the movement to change the 
team names is simply the product of a progressive and ‘politically correct’ modern 
society.”); Rhode, supra note 59, at 159. 
 103. Reiner, supra note 3, at 3. 
 104. See Dennie, supra note 3, at 201 (“In addition, traditionalists point to 
hypersensitivity among some Native Americans as the real source of this controversy. 
Traditionalists note that other sports teams use potentially controversial team names but that 
the propriety of those names is not seriously debated or challenged. For instance, although 
the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim and the New Orleans Saints could potentially offend 
non-Christians, they have not evoked controversy. Similarly, the Arizona State Sun Devils 
and the Duke Blue Devils could be offensive to Christians, but have not been the target of 
opposition.”) (footnotes omitted); Rhode, supra note 59, at 142 (“Furthermore, do names 
like the California Angels and the New Orleans Saints offend non-Christians? What about 
the Arizona State Sun Devils and the Duke Blue Devils—do they offend Christians?”) 
(footnote omitted). It is also possible to extend this concern to even further extremes, to team 
names such as the San Diego Padres, Pittsburgh Steelers, Dallas Cowboys, Green Bay 
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III. In re Tam (“Slants” case) 
A. Introduction 
Simon Tam first applied for federal trademark registration for his 
musical group THE SLANTS in 2010.105 After the examining attorney 
refused registration on grounds that the mark was disparaging to people of 
Asian descent, Tam abandoned that application, but then filed a second 
application on November 14, 2011.106 “The examining attorney again found 
the mark THE SLANTS disparaging and declined to register it.”107 In 
September 2013, the TTAB affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal.108 
And on April 20, 2015, the CAFC affirmed the TTAB’s decision.109 But 
only a week later, on April 27, 2015, the CAFC vacated that decision and 
ordered a rehearing en banc.110 The court asked the parties to address one 
isolated issue on appeal: “Does the bar on registration of disparaging marks 
in 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) violate the First Amendment?”111 Because Part IV 
will consider First Amendment doctrine in greater detail, the summaries 
here in Part III will merely outline the discussions and arguments of the 
CAFC (both the April 22, 2015 opinion as well as the en banc decision of 
December 22, 2015), and Judge Moore’s “Additional Views.” 
B. CAFC Decision (April 20, 2015) 
Judge Moore’s opinion affirmed the TTAB’s decision, which in turn had 
affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal of registration on the basis of the 
“may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a).112 The decision noted that a 
disparaging mark “dishonors by comparison with what is inferior, slights, 
deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust comparison.”113 Judge 
Moore acknowledged that one meaning of “slants” was a reference to 
                                                                                                                 
Packers, and the hundreds of schools which use “Rebels” as a mascot. Additionally, a 
number of business use the word “Dixie” as part of their trademarks. 
 105. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 568-69; see also In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
 109. Tam, 785 F.3d at 573. 
 110. In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Tam, 785 F.3d at 569. 
 113. Id. (citing In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014)) (alterations omitted). 
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persons of Asian descent,114 and also that the term is a racial slur.115 The 
opinion agreed that the TTAB was correct in holding that a substantial 
composite of persons of Asian descent would find the mark “The Slants” 
disparaging.116 Regarding Tam’s argument that § 2(a) conflicts with the 
First Amendment, Judge Moore quoted In re McGinley and conceded that 
the CAFC is constrained to follow the precedent of McGinley: 
With respect to appellant’s First Amendment rights, it is clear 
that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does not 
affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no 
tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, 
appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by the 
refusal to register his mark.117 
The opinion concluded by briefly addressing—but dismissing—Tam’s 
arguments that the statute was void due to vagueness, that his due process 
rights have had been abridged, and that it robbed him of equal protection.118 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. at 570 (“There is no dispute that the term ‘slants’ has a number of meanings, one 
of which refers to people of Asian descent.”). 
 115. Id. (“The record also contains the band’s entry in Wikipedia, which states that the 
band’s name is ‘derived from an ethnic slur for Asians.’”) (citation omitted). 
 116. Id. at 571 (“Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the mark THE 
SLANTS is likely offensive to a substantial composite of people of Asian descent.”); Id. 
(“Additionally, the record includes a brochure published by the Japanese American Citizens 
League describing the term ‘slant,’ when used to refer to people of Asian descent, as a 
‘derogatory term’ that is ‘demeaning’ and ‘cripple[s] the spirit.’”). 
 117. Id. at 572 (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981)); see also 
Brown, supra note 16, at 122 (“In In re McGinley, the United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals asserted that section 2(a) was not ‘an attempt to legislate morality, but, 
rather, a judgment . . . that such [trademarks] not occupy the time, services, and use of funds 
of the government.’”) (quoting McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486); Pace, supra note 17, at 36 
(“Only one court has addressed the constitutionality of section 2(a), and it concluded, 
without any analysis, that First Amendment rights were not at issue because the trademark 
owner was not denied the right to use the mark, but merely denied the benefits afforded by 
federal registration.”) (citing McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484). For further discussion of 
McGinley, see Smith, supra note 21, at 454 (“[S]ome have proposed that the government 
should not expend funds to register trademarks that are scandalous or disparaging to the 
public.”) (citing 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 3.04(4) (6th 
ed. 1980)); id. (“Yet, as a dissent from a registration denial noted, ‘more “public funds” are 
being expended in the prosecution of this appeal than would ever result from the registration 
of the mark.’”) (citing McGinley, 660 F.2d at 487); Lefstin, supra note 44, at 676-77. 
 118. Tam, 785 F.3d at 572-73. 
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C. Judge Moore’s “Additional Views”  
Once she took care of her obligation of writing the court’s opinion, 
Judge Moore added her “Additional Views.”119 She forthrightly asserted, 
“It is time for this Court to revisit McGinley’s holding on the 
constitutionality of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.”120 She noted that the 
McGinley court’s dismissal of the First Amendment challenge to § 2(a) 
failed to cite “any legal authority,” and that it was cursory at best.121  
More than thirty years have passed since McGinley, and in that 
time both the McGinley decision and our reliance on it have been 
widely criticized. Furthermore, First Amendment jurisprudence 
on the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine and the protection 
accorded to commercial speech has evolved significantly since 
the McGinley decision.122  
She explained that trademarks and trade names are a kind of commercial 
speech and emphasized that even the government has conceded that 
point.123 The discussion continued with more about McGinley and 
enumerated the benefits that federal registration provides to trademark 
owners.124 Judge Moore next explained the “unconstitutional conditions” 
doctrine and why she believed that it applies to § 2(a),125 concluding, “[t]he 
government cannot hinge the benefits of federal trademark registration on 
constitutionally protected speech—here, the applicant’s selection of a 
suitable mark—unless the government’s actions pass constitutional 
scrutiny.”126 
She then moved forward, reasoning that the “may disparage” prohibition 
of § 2(a) constitutes both an impermissible content-based and viewpoint-
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. at 573 (Moore, J., “additional views”). This document, strictly speaking, is 
neither a concurrence nor a dissent. Much of the argument appears to be drawn from her 
1994 law review article, Pace, supra note 17, at 15-16. 
 120. Tam, 785 F.3d at 573 (Moore, J., “additional views”). 
 121. Id. at 573 (“In In re McGinley, our predecessor court held without citation to any 
legal authority in just a few sentences that § 2(a) does not implicate the First 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 122. Id. at 573-74 (footnote omitted). 
 123. Id. at 575 (“Indeed, the government has conceded that ‘[t]rademarks are a form of 
commercial speech.’ Because a trademark identifies the source of a product or service for 
users, it is protected commercial speech.”) (citation omitted).  
 124. Id. at 575-77. 
 125. Id. at 577-81. 
 126. Id. at 581. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
708 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:677 
 
 
based brand of discrimination regarding freedom of speech.127 The 
discussion turned next to an analysis of trademarks as commercial speech. 
As commercial speech, any statutory restrictions on trademarks are subject 
to the Supreme Court’s test developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corporation. v. Public Service Commission.128 One particular Achilles’ 
heel stressed by Judge Moore is that one prong of the Central Hudson test 
asks whether the government’s interest in imposing a restriction on speech 
is “substantial.”129 She argued, however, 
The government has not put forth any substantial interests that 
would justify § 2(a)’s bar against disparaging marks. One 
purpose of the disparagement provision of § 2(a) is evident on its 
face, and it is message-based: to discourage the use of 
trademarks that are disparaging to persons, institutions, beliefs, 
or national symbols. The legislative history reinforces the 
conclusion that Congress enacted § 2(a) because it disapproved 
of the message conveyed by disparaging marks.130 
Citing Supreme Court precedents, the argument explained that suppressing 
speech that some people may deem offensive is not even a legitimate 
government objective, much less a substantial one.131 
Anticipating the argument made by Judge Gerald Lee in Blackhorse,132 
Judge Moore contended that trademarks are decidedly private speech—not 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 581-82. 
 128. Id. at 582-85 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 129. Id. at 582. 
 130. Id. at 582-83 (“See Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of 
the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-21 (1939) (statement of Rep. Thomas 
E. Robertson) (Rep. Maroney) (‘[W]e would not want to have Abraham Lincoln gin.’). This 
is plainly true of the reason for denying registration here, as in other disparagement cases.”). 
Of course, today we have Samuel Adams Lager. 
 131. Id. at 583 (“While the government may argue that it has an interest in discouraging 
the use of disparaging marks that may be offensive to persons, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, this is not a legitimate government interest. See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2670. 
The Supreme Court has ‘consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be 
offensive to some does not justify its suppression.’ Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 71, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983). It is a ‘bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment . . . that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’ United States v. Eichman, 
496 U.S. 310, 319, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990).”). 
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government speech—and therefore are subject to the principles of the First 
Amendment.133 She noted that “[a]lthough the government publishes 
registered trademarks in the Trademark Principal Register, it does so not to 
communicate a particular message or select a particular viewpoint; rather, it 
publishes trademarks to provide notice that a mark has been registered.”134  
She concluded her remarks by reemphasizing her commercial speech 
analysis and also by punctuating the importance of reconsidering McGinley, 
taking into account the context of both contemporary First Amendment 
jurisprudence and contemporary practices in the PTO.  
We have yet to be presented with any substantial government 
interests that would justify the PTO’s refusal to register 
disparaging marks. Without this, § 2(a) cannot satisfy the 
Central Hudson test. It is time to revisit the holding in McGinley 
in light of subsequent developments in the law and the trademark 
registration funding regime.135 
As was mentioned, on April 27, 2015, the CAFC vacated its April 20 
opinion and decided sua sponte to rehear the case en banc with all active 
members of the court.136 
D. Summary of Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing (June 11, 
2015) 
Tam’s brief stressed two points: (1) because trademarks are commercial 
speech, they are entitled to First Amendment protection; and (2) the “may 
disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) conflicts with the First Amendment both on 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Pro Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 457 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“[T]he 
federal trademark registration program is government speech and is thus exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.”). See also infra Section IV.C. 
 133. Tam, 785 F.3d at 584. 
 134. Id.; see also id. at 585 (“The trademark is printed on private property, in fact 
commercial goods, not on any government property. The purpose served by trademarks, to 
identify the source of the goods, is antithetical to the notion that the trademark is tied to the 
government.”). 
 135. Id. at 585. 
 136. Order Granting Sua Sponte Hearing En Banc, Tam, No. 14-1203 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 
2015) (“The panel opinion of April 20, 2015 is vacated, and the appeal is reinstated.”); id. at 
2 (“The parties are requested to file new briefs. The briefs should address the following 
issue: Does the bar on registration of disparaging marks in 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) violate the 
First Amendment?”). 
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its face and as applied.137 As an initial matter, the brief pointed out the key 
functions of the Lanham Act: “The purposes of the Act are to protect a 
trademark holder’s right to benefit from its own goodwill; to protect 
established marks from appropriation; and to protect the consuming public 
from confusing, misleading, or false and deceptive marks which create a 
misimpression between a product and its source.”138 In simple terms, Tam’s 
point is, “Section 2(a) of the Act serves no commercial purpose advanced 
by trademark registration.”139 Tam also articulated the many benefits 
derived from trademark registration and explained that these advantages are 
superior to the ownership privileges of unregistered marks.140 Tam noted 
the curious place that § 2(a) occupies in the statute relative to the other 
subsections of § 2 and observed that it was a late addition to the federal 
statutory scheme.141 Tam contrasted § 2(a) with other subsections of § 2—
(b)(c)(d) and (e)—in order to point out its anomalous effect and to explain 
why it is an outlier, unrelated to the key goals of trademark law and 
policy.142 “Indeed, the PTO’s role as a referee of political correctness 
concerning ethnic and racial discourse has nothing to do with advancing the 
commercial purposes of trademark registration established under the 
Act.”143 Tam concluded this portion of the brief, stating: 
The §2(a) prohibition of disparaging marks is an aberration 
which does not serve the commercial purposes of trademark law, 
the free and accurate flow of commercial speech, or any other 
legitimate government interest. Instead, §2(a) mandates that the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Brief On Behalf of Appellant For En Banc Hearing at 6, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1203) (“The bar on registration of disparaging marks in §2(a) of the 
Act violates the First Amendment. . . . Trademarks are a form of commercial speech, 
protected under the First Amendment.”); id. at 6-7 (arguing that § 2(a) is a “content-based 
regulation of speech” and that it is “content-based” on its face and “viewpoint-
discriminatory as applied” to Tam.). 
 138. Id. at 6. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
 140. Id. at 9-10. 
 141. Id. at 12 (“The bar on registering disparaging marks did not exist prior to the 1946 
codification of U.S. trademark law. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (noting that 
exclusive right to use [a] mark was ‘simply founded on priority of appropriation. We look in 
vain in the statute for any other qualification or condition’). Under the earlier federal 
trademark statutes and common law, the PTO registered, and courts enforced, arguably 
disparaging marks.”). 
 142. Id. at 11. 
 143. Id. at 13. 
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PTO make content-based moral judgments to exclude truthful, 
non-confusing marks and is at odds with the purposes of the 
Act.144 
The brief then shifted to the topic of commercial speech.145 This section 
of the brief began by citing Friedman v. Rodgers146 for the proposition that 
trade names are a kind of commercial speech,147 and that, when the 
government denies benefits based on expression, that denial of benefits 
conflicts with the First Amendment.148 According to Tam, “Given that 
trademarks are commercial speech, the PTO’s assessment of the expressive 
meaning of a mark as disparaging or not under §2(a) is an impermissible 
regulation of speech by the government.”149  
The brief next identified weaknesses in the court’s reasoning in 
McGinley.150 One particular problem is that the McGinley court, and others 
since, had very little substance on which to rely when speculating about the 
congressional intent of § 2(a).151 Tam argued that “[t]he rationale of 
McGinley fails to account adequately for the chilling effect on the free 
expression of commercial speech caused by the burden § 2(a) imposes on 
an owner’s ability to benefit from the substantive and procedural rights 
attendant to registration.”152  
Tam then tied his discussion of McGinley to an explanation of why he 
believes that § 2(a) imposes an “unconstitutional condition” on trademark 
applicants.153 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in turn, is closely 
related to Congress’s authority pursuant to the Spending Clause of Article I, 
§ 8, clause 1 of the Constitution. Quoting precedent, Tam explained, under 
the Spending Clause, “Congress has the power both to allocate funds for 
public purposes as well as ‘an ancillary power to ensure that those funds are 
properly applied to the prescribed use.’”154 Summarizing the relevant 
Spending Clause principles derived from case law, Tam reasoned “the 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. at 14. 
 145. Id. at 14-16; id. at 14 (“[C]ommercial speech, like other varieties, is protected.”). 
 146. 440 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 147. Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing, supra note 137, at 15. 
 148. Id. at 15-16. 
 149. Id. at 16. 
 150. Id. at 17-20. 
 151. Id. at 16-17. 
 152. Id. at 18. 
 153. Id. at 20-23. 
 154. Id. at 19 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 145 n.4 (1991)). 
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constitutionality of a regulation turns on whether the receipt of 
governmental benefits pursuant to that regulation is conditioned on 
requirements imposed within or without the limits of the government 
program itself.”155 Tam then concluded, therefore, that § 2(a) runs afoul of 
the First Amendment because it “penalizes the mark-holder for no reason 
other than official disapproval of what, in an agency’s judgment, that mark 
‘may’ mean.”156  
Tam then devoted considerable attention to the argument that strict 
scrutiny should apply.157 Strict scrutiny (i.e., the requirement that, in order 
to be deemed constitutional, a statute must be narrowly drafted to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest) applies to content-based regulations. 
Section 2(a) is content-based because, “[b]y its very terms, §2(a) focuses 
on, and cannot be justified without reference to, the expressive content of 
the potentially disparaging mark.”158  
The brief next argued that, if Central Hudson applies to trademarks as a 
form of commercial speech, §2(a) is still unconstitutional.159 Tam analyzed 
the Central Hudson test and finds fault, especially in the government’s 
purported reasons for (i.e., its “interest” in) the “may disparage” prohibition 
of § 2(a). Tam posited, 
The only conceivable interest the government may have in the 
suppression of disparaging trademarks through §2(a) is 
protecting the public, or a subset of the public, from offensive 
expression. However, the potential of a listener’s offense is 
“classically not justification[] validating the suppression of 
expression protected by the First Amendment.”160 
Lastly, he maintained that § 2(a) is both a content-based restriction that is 
unconstitutional on its face161 and a viewpoint-based restriction that is 
unconstitutional as applied to him.162 
  
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. at 22. 
 156. Id. at 23. 
 157. Id. at 23-25. 
 158. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
 159. Id. at 25-28. 
 160. Id. at 26-27 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)). 
 161. Id. at 28. 
 162. Id. at 29-30. 
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E. Summary of En Banc Brief for Appellee (July 16, 2015) 
The principal thrust of the United States’ brief is that the First 
Amendment does not apply to this case, and therefore, there is no need to 
consider either a traditional First Amendment analysis or a commercial 
speech analysis.163 The United States argued that the First Amendment does 
not apply because the federal trademark registration system merely 
provides benefits to a trademark owner; it does not convey trademark 
rights.164 And, the argument maintained, the government (Congress) is 
within its rights to withhold the benefits of registration for marks that are 
disparaging.165 Thus, like Judge Lee’s decision in Blackhorse, which argues 
that the First Amendment does not apply because the federal trademark 
registration system is government speech, not private speech,166 there is no 
need to assess the merits of either traditional or commercial speech First 
Amendment doctrine.167 
The government’s brief began by rephrasing the issue: “The question in 
this case is whether the First Amendment requires Congress to open the 
Principal Register of the United States to trademarks that comprise racial 
slurs, and thereby embrace those racial slurs as instruments of federal 
law.”168 Actually, that is not the question that the court asked to be briefed. 
The question is not about “racial slurs”; it is about the application of the 
First Amendment to § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Perhaps the government 
framed the issue in this inflammatory manner, hoping to strike a nerve in its 
readers? Nevertheless, it is an interesting debate tactic.  
As was mentioned, the government’s main contention is that the First 
Amendment is inapplicable: “But section 2(a) does not in any way abridge 
Tam’s speech. Rather, the statute limits the marks eligible for federal 
registration and for certain associated legal benefits that facilitate 
enforcement of the mark against infringers.”169 The brief recounted the 
history of trademark law, registration, and protection in the United States170 
and noted, in particular, that the predecessor trademark act, the 1905 
                                                                                                                 
 163. En Banc Brief for Appellee at 2-3, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 
14-1203).  
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. Id. at 6. 
 166. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 462 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 167. En Banc Brief for Appellee, supra note 163, at 3. 
 168. Id. at 1. 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Id. at 4-9. 
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Trademark Act, prohibited most of the kinds of marks currently barred by § 
2(a), but that it did not prohibit marks that “may disparage.”171 The 
government then discussed many of the benefits that a registrant acquires 
by virtue of federal registration.172 Providing additional background, the 
government then discussed Tam’s trademark application, the refusal by the 
PTO, and the TTAB’s decision.173 Next comes a summary of the CAFC’s 
decision on April 20, 2015, Judge Moore’s Additional Views, the vacating 
of the decision, and the order for en banc reconsideration on April 27, 
2015.174 
The heart of the government’s argument is that § 2(a) cannot restrict 
freedom of speech because trademark registration is optional.175 “The 
Constitution does not preclude Congress from creating a federal trademark 
registration program without extending it to embrace racial epithets as 
commercial identifiers.”176 According to the government, federal 
registration merely provides procedural advantages and withholding those 
advantages does not abridge free speech.177 The government’s brief also 
maintained that it is not “an ‘unconstitutional condition’ for Congress to 
prohibit federal registration of disparaging marks.”178 The government 
further noted that the standard of review for holding a statute 
unconstitutional on its face is exceptionally high.179  
The United States then discussed McGinley and argued that McGinley 
was correct in holding that § 2(a) does not restrict speech.180 Here the brief 
reminded us that people are free to use unregistered marks and that a lack of 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id. at 5-6. 
 172. Id. at 6-8. 
 173. Id. at 9-12. 
 174. Id. at 12-13. 
 175. Id. at 14 (“Congress has set up an optional federal registration scheme, and section 
2(a) constitutes an exercise of Congress’s broad authority to define the limits of a federal 
program.”). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 14-16. 
 178. Id. at 15 (“The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine is implicated only if Congress seeks to leverage federal benefits or 
subsidies to regulate constitutionally protected conduct outside of the federal program in 
question. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2328 (2013).”). 
 179. Id. at 16 (“To prevail in a facial challenge to an Act of Congress, a plaintiff 
normally must show that ‘no set of circumstances exists under which [the challenged law] 
would be valid or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.’”) (citation omitted). 
 180. Id. at 17-21. 
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federal registration in no way prevents them from expressing themselves in 
any manner that they choose.181 According to the government, § 2(a) 
“reflects Congress’s judgment that a federal agency should not use its 
resources affirmatively to promote the use in commerce of racial slurs and 
similar disparagements as the means for avoiding confusion as to the source 
of goods or services.”182 The government argued that federal registration 
merely provides additional benefits to a trademark owner, that Congress has 
decided to whom it wishes to provide those benefits, and that Congress has 
the authority to decide the criteria for receiving those benefits.183  
Perhaps being a bit alarmist and/or hyperbolic, the government suggested 
that, if Tam wins this case, the PTO will be forced to register “the most vile 
racial epithets.”184 Continuing this line of reasoning, it forecasted that the 
PTO would be “constitutionally compelled to record scandalous words and 
lewd photographs on its Principal Register, in order to facilitate the 
enforcement of those marks in commerce as well.”185 This warning of doom 
may or may not be true, but it ignores the fact that this court is not currently 
reviewing the “scandalous” and “immoral” prohibitions of § 2(a)—
prohibitions that presumably could still prevent registration of “the most 
vile racial epithets,” “scandalous words and lewd photographs”—but rather 
this court is reviewing only the “may disparage” prohibition.186 It also fails 
to acknowledge that the Copyright Office is currently required by law to 
register copyrights for similarly offensive materials.187  
In any event, the government argued in this section of its brief that 
Congress is within its rights to impose the “may disparage” restriction. 
Quoting Rust v. Sullivan,188 the government notes: 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 18. (“Tam does not and cannot contend that he needs a federally registered 
mark in order to engage in any expressive activity. Tam does not need federal trademark 
registration to use the name he chose for his band.”). 
 182. Id. at 21. 
 183. Id. at 22-28. 
 184. Id. at 22. 
 185. Id. at 23 (“The Constitution does not put Congress to the choice of either 
eliminating the federal trademark registration program altogether or extending it to embrace 
racial epithets and lewd photographs as commercial identifiers.”). 
 186. Id. at 22-23. 
 187. Presumably the government considers the use of this hyperbolic and exaggerated, 
inflammatory rhetoric necessary in its role as zealous advocate. For additional discussion 
regarding the applicability of Copyright principles to this issue, see infra Sections IV.D., 
V.A.1, V.A.3, and V.A.5. 
 188. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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[T]he Supreme Court upheld “Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) regulations which limit the ability of Title X 
fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities.” The 
Court confirmed that “[t]he Government can, without violating 
the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain 
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the 
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal 
with the problem in another way.” “In so doing,” the Court 
explained, “the Government has not discriminated on the basis 
of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the 
exclusion of the other.”189 
Continuing this general train of thought, the government explained that 
the McGinley court merely “recognized that section 2(a) represents ‘a 
judgment by the Congress that [certain] marks not occupy the time, 
services, and use of funds of the federal government.’”190 The government 
then took the next logical step—arguing its view that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine is inapplicable in this case.191 
The government also maintained that the federal trademark registry 
ought not be classified as a “public forum.”192 It contended that “[t]he facts 
of this case underscore that section 2(a) has neither the intention nor the 
effect of promoting any viewpoint or eliminating any viewpoint from the 
marketplace of ideas,”193 and, in addition, reasoned that “[s]ection 2(a) is 
viewpoint neutral.”194 The argument that follows posited that the 
government has a legitimate interest in prohibiting registration of 
disparaging trademarks, relying in particular on Walker195 for the 
proposition that “private speakers cannot compel the government to publish 
                                                                                                                 
 189. En Banc Brief for Appellee, supra note 163, at 24.  
 190. Id. at 30 (citing In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and In re McGinley, 
660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
 191. Id. at 32-34 (discussing several cases in support of its position). 
 192. See id. at 35-37 (“Federal trademark registration does not create a forum for the 
expression of ideas.”). 
 193. Id. at 39. 
 194. Id. at 40. The CAFC expressly rejected this argument, holding, “A mark that is 
viewed by a substantial composite of the referenced group as disparaging is rejected. It is 
thus the viewpoint of the message conveyed which causes the government to burden the 
speech. This form of regulation cannot reasonably be argued to be content neutral or 
viewpoint neutral.” In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 195. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2251-53 
(2015).  
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material the government rejects, and that the government is entitled to 
dissociate itself from speech it finds odious.”196 The government’s view is 
that, in a manner similar to the way that the Sons of Confederate Veterans 
were not permitted to force the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles to 
publish license plates with an image of a Confederate flag, “Tam cannot 
force the government to register vile racial epithets . . . .”197 Aligning itself 
further with the reasoning in Walker, the United States noted, “Although 
the USPTO does not endorse any particular product, service, mark, or 
registrant, the government’s publication of disparaging marks on its 
Principal Register would convey to the public that the United States regards 
racial slurs as appropriate source identifiers for goods and services in 
commerce.”198 In closing, the government briefly mentioned the possible 
application of Central Hudson, and asserts, without any genuine analysis, 
that § 2(a) “would withstand scrutiny” under the Central Hudson test.199 
F. Summary of Reply Brief On Behalf Of Appellant For En Banc Hearing, 
(August 4, 2015) 
In the Introduction to his reply brief, Tam invoked R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul,200 and quoted Justice White’s concurring opinion: “The mere fact that 
expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not 
render the expression unprotected.”201 He accused the government of 
mischaracterizing the real issue in the case and also of mischaracterizing 
the nature of the federal trademark registration system.202 The brief 
                                                                                                                 
 196. En Banc Brief for Appellee, supra note 163, at 41. 
 197. Id. at 42. 
 198. Id. at 44. 
 199. Id. at 45-46 (“But especially in light of the provision’s limited and indirect effect on 
Tam’s protected expression, the statute would withstand scrutiny even if the standard 
applicable to restrictions on commercial speech set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), were thought to apply.”). 
 200. 505 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1992). 
 201. Reply Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing at 1, In re Tam, 808 F.3d 
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1203). 
 202. Id. at 2 (“[T]he government reformulates the question as to whether Congress 
intended to open the Register to ‘embrace those racial slurs as instruments of federal law’. 
[sic] The government insists that registration somehow transforms the government into the 
‘owner’ of registered trademarks–which, as private commercial speech, are unquestionably a 
form of protected expression–and an ‘underwriter’ of selective enforcement of trademarks 
whose content it approves. This mischaracterization of the statutory scheme for trademark 
registration is novel but has no basis in the Lanham Act’s language, statutory history, or case 
law.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). 
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challenged several of the government’s arguments. First, it challenged the 
government’s position that trademark registration amounts to a “subsidy” 
and countered that “Tam is not seeking a penny of taxpayer funds or even 
an iota of ‘government assistance’ to enforce the rights to which he is 
entitled under trademark law.”203 The brief then addresses Walker v. Texas 
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.204 and contends that the 
government is mistaken to believe that this case applies in such a way to 
render the federal trademark registration system a kind of government 
speech.205 Tam carefully examined the factors relied upon in Walker to 
assess government speech and concluded that “the registration of a private 
trademark is not a medium of government speech.”206 To illustrate his 
point, Tam listed several trademarks that have been registered that appear to 
be antithetical to U.S. government policies; these registrations suggest that 
the U.S. Government is not the speaker endorsing these messages.207 This 
section of the brief concluded with one simple assertion: “Section 2(a) 
clearly does not implicate government speech.”208 
The next major section of Tam’s reply brief revisited the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine. Tam argued that the government “attempts to redefine 
the trademark registration system enacted by Congress as a regime for 
excluding certain categories of speech, thereby setting §2(a)’s regulation of 
speech inside the contours of the program.”209 He explains the point as 
follows: 
To the extent that §2(a) purports to authorize the government to 
leverage this program against speech disfavored by the 
government, such leverage imposes the pre-condition of content 
propriety on registrable marks, without which otherwise-
qualified marks are denied the significant benefits of the Act. 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. at 3-4. 
 204. 1355 S. Ct. 2239, 2246-49 (2015). 
 205. Reply Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing, supra note 203, at 5-10. 
 206. Id. at 6-7. 
 207. Id. at 7-8 (noting numerous examples of “(1) marks espousing support for a 
particular religion,” such as: “GIVE JESUS A CHANCE” and “KNIGHTS IN SATAN’S 
SERVICE”; “(2) marks that would seem to conflict with American foreign policy,” such as: 
“RUSSIA MADE ME”; “(3) marks that conflict with the government’s war on drugs,” such 
as: “ILC – I LOVE COCAINE,”; and “(4) other marks that seem inconsistent with generally 
sound public policy,” such as: “ALCOHOL ABUSE.” (citations omitted)). 
 208. Reply Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing, supra note 203, at 10. 
 209. Id. at 11. 
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This is constitutionally offensive as an abridgement of speech, 
and the government offers no contrary substantive analysis.210 
Tam next challenged the government’s position that § 2(a) is “viewpoint-
neutral.”211 “On its face, §2(a) explicitly requires the government, in the 
manner of a government censor, to sort and treat differently marks whose 
content it determines are offensive from those it does not.”212 He pointed to 
anomalous and inconsistent trademark registrations (based on the content 
and viewpoints expressed) and challenged the government’s interpretations 
of several cases, which Tam believed does not stand “for the proposition 
that the First Amendment permits the government to refrain from giving 
assistance to private speakers.”213 
Lastly, the reply brief focused on the applicability of Central Hudson214 
and contended that the government’s interests in upholding § 2(a)’s “may 
disparage” prohibition “fall short.”215 Tam reminded the court that, “under 
Central Hudson, any government interests must be ‘substantial.’”216 
According to Tam, neither of the two interests claimed by the government 
were “substantial.”217 In addition, he noted that the Central Hudson test 
requires that, in order to pass First Amendment muster, a statute: “(1) must 
directly advance the government interest and ‘alleviate [the alleged harms] 
to a material degree’, and (2) must not be more extensive than necessary to 
serve the government’s interest.”218 Here Tam argued that § 2(a) fails again: 
“The government has made no showing that refusing to register offensive 
marks alliviates [sic] racial intolerance or even protects the public from 
exposure to offensive commercial speech. The government has admitted it 
does no such thing.”219 And similarly, he posited that the statute is both 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. at 12. 
 211. Id. at 13-17. 
 212. Id. at 13. 
 213. Id. at 14-15. 
 214. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-64 
(1980). 
 215. Reply Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing, supra note 203, at 17. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. (“The government identified only two interests that might possibly justify the 
existence of §2(a): public policy against racially offensive speech and the desire to permit 
the States to discriminate against offensive trademarks. Neither withstands constitutional 
scrutiny.”). 
 218. Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted). 
 219. Id. at 18. 
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overinclusive and overbroad, which demonstrates that it is decidedly more 
extensive than necessary.220 
Tam concluded, stating: “The government’s proffered interests cannot 
support §2(a)’s unconstitutional burden on speech and this court should 
strike down §2(a) as unconstitutional.”221 
G. Summary of the CAFC En Banc Decision (December 22, 2015) 
On December 22, 2015, the CAFC, en banc, held that the “may 
disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) is unconstitutional because it fails under a 
First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.222 Writing for the court, at the 
outset Judge Moore acknowledged: “It is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment that the government may not penalize private speech 
merely because it disapproves of the message it conveys.”223 Furthermore, 
the court reasoned that § 2(a) “would also be unconstitutional under the 
intermediate scrutiny traditionally applied to regulation of the commercial 
aspects of speech.”224 The court directly asserted its conclusion in the 
caption of Part I of its discussion: “Section 2(a)’s Denial of Important Legal 
Rights to Private Speech Based on Disapproval of the Message Conveyed 
Is Subject to, and Cannot Survive, Strict Scrutiny.”225 
Judge Moore explained that § 2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition is both 
content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination.226 She stated simply: 
“And § 2(a) does more than discriminate on the basis of topic. It also 
discriminates on the basis of message conveyed, ‘the idea or message 
expressed,’ it targets ‘viewpoints [in] the marketplace.’ It does so as a 
matter of avowed and undeniable purpose, and it does so on its face.”227 
Judge Moore pointed out that, “[f]rom its enactment in 1946 through its 
defense of the statute today, the government has argued that the prohibited 
marks ought not to be registered because of the messages the marks 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 19. 
 222. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government regulation 
at issue amounts to viewpoint discrimination, and under the strict scrutiny review 
appropriate for government regulation of message or viewpoint, we conclude that the 
disparagement proscription of § 2(a) is unconstitutional.”). 
 223. Id. at 1327. 
 224. Id. at 1328. 
 225. Id. at 1334. 
 226. Id. at 1335-37.  
 227. Id. at 1335 (citations omitted). 
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convey.”228 Thus she concluded that § 2(a) plainly constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination.229 
Having concluded that § 2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition is both 
content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination, the opinion next held 
that strict scrutiny applies to evaluate its constitutionality.230 The CAFC 
contended that strict scrutiny applies because it is the expressive quality of 
trademarks that that trigger the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) not 
their commercial character.231 In fact, the CAFC emphasized that the PTO 
only refuses to register marks on the basis of § 2(a)’s “may disparage” 
prohibition in cases where it is the expressive quality of the mark that 
causes the disparagement: “Importantly, every time the PTO refuses to 
register a mark under § 2(a), it does so because it believes the mark conveys 
an expressive message—a message that is disparaging to certain groups.”232 
To punctuate the point, the court concluded: “Every single time registration 
is refused or cancelled pursuant to the disparagement provision, it is based 
upon a determination by the government that the expressive content of the 
message is unsuitable because it would be viewed by the referenced group 
as disparaging them.”233 Thus, in the court’s view, although trademarks 
have a “dual character” in that they may be considered commercial speech 
on one level, because it is the non-commercial, expressive nature of a mark 
that triggers the application of § 2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition, strict 
scrutiny applies.234 “In particular, commercial speech that is ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ with expressive speech is treated as expressive speech under 
the First Amendment when the expressive aspect is being regulated.”235 
Part II of the CAFC’s opinion addressed and rejected three arguments 
advanced by the government in support of the constitutionality of § 2(a).236 
First, the government argued that, because refusing to register a mark does 
not prohibit an applicant from using that mark, a refusal to register pursuant 
                                                                                                                 
 228. Id. at 1336. 
 229. See id. (“When the government discriminates against speech because it disapproves 
of the message conveyed by the speech, it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
 230. Id. at 1337-39. 
 231. Id. at 1338 (“[M]arks often have an expressive aspect over and above their 
commercial-speech aspect.”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1338-39. 
 235. Id. at 1339 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)). 
 236. Id. at 1339-55. 
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to § 2(a) does not ban any speech.237 But the CAFC makes it clear that a 
government regulation may violate the First Amendment even if it does not 
completely ban speech.238 According to the court, when a governmental 
“denial of a benefit would chill exercise of the constitutional right” of 
freedom of speech, that denial violates the First Amendment.239 “The 
general principle is clear: ‘Lawmakers may no more silence unwanted 
speech by burdening its utterance than by censoring its content.’”240 And 
the court explicitly recognized that the “may disparage” prohibition poses 
precisely this type of Sword of Damocles situation: “Denial of these 
benefits creates a serious disincentive to adopt a mark which the 
government may deem offensive or disparaging.”241 The chilling effect of § 
2(a) is even more pronounced because, “[e]ven if an applicant obtains a 
registration initially, the mark may be challenged in a cancellation 
proceeding years later.”242 Furthermore, the court elaborated, explaining 
that any common law rights or rights that may be obtained by state 
trademark registration in the absence of federal registration pale in 
comparison to the rights available through federal registration.243 Thus the 
court concluded: “Denial of federal trademark registration on the basis of 
the government’s disapproval of the message conveyed by certain 
trademarks violates the guarantees of the First Amendment.”244 
The opinion next addressed the government’s argument that trademarks 
constitute “government speech” and therefore are immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny.245 The court wasted no time in asserting, “[t]his 
argument is meritless [sic]. Trademark registration is a regulatory activity. 
These manifestations of government registration do not convert the 
                                                                                                                 
 237. Id. at 1339 (“The government argues that § 2(a) does not implicate the First 
Amendment because it does not prohibit any speech.”) (citing En Banc Brief for Appellee, 
supra note 163, at 17). 
 238. Id. at 1340. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)). 
 241. Id. at 1341. 
 242. Id. at 1343. 
 243. Id. at 1343-45; see id. at 1344 (“The government’s suggestion that Mr. Tam has 
common-law rights to his mark appears illusionary.”).  
 244. Id. at 1345. 
 245. Id. at 1345-48; see id. at 1345 (“[T]he government appears to argue that trademark 
registration and the accoutrements of registration—such as the registrant’s right to attach the 
® symbol to the registered mark, the mark’s placement on the Principal Register, and the 
issuance of a certificate of registration—amount to government speech.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/1
2016]      LANHAM ACT’S PROHIBITION OF TRADEMARKS 723 
 
 
underlying speech to government speech.”246 Judge Moore summarized 
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,247 in which 
“the Supreme Court detailed the indicia of government speech.”248 Unlike 
vehicle license plates issued by a state, Judge Moore pointed out that, 
“[t]rademarks are not understood to convey a government message or carry 
a government endorsement.”249 In addition, neither the registration symbol 
(®) nor the registration certificate “convert private speech into government 
speech.”250 “In short, the act of registration, which includes the right (but 
not the obligation) to put an ® symbol on one’s goods, receiving a 
registration certificate, and being listed in a government database, simply 
cannot amount to government speech.”251 
Thirdly, in its brief, the government had cited and quoted Rust v. 
Sullivan.252  
[T]he Supreme Court upheld “Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) regulations which limit the ability of Title X 
fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities.” The 
Court confirmed that “[t]he Government can, without violating 
the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain 
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the 
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal 
with the problem in another way.” “In so doing,” the Court 
explained, “the Government has not discriminated on the basis 
of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the 
exclusion of the other.”253 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Id. at 1345-46. 
 247. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 248. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1346 (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239). 
 249. Id. at 1347. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1348; see id. (“The PTO’s processing of trademark registrations no more 
transforms private speech into government speech than when the government issues permits 
for street parades, copyright registration certificates, or, for that matter, grants medical, 
hunting, fishing, or drivers licenses, or records property titles, birth certificates, or articles of 
incorporation. To conclude otherwise would transform every act of government registration 
into one of government speech and thus allow rampant viewpoint discrimination. When the 
government registers a trademark, it regulates private speech. It does not speak for itself.”). 
 252. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 253. En Banc Brief for Appellee, supra note 163, at 24 (citations omitted).  
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The CAFC, however, reasoned that trademark registration does not 
amount to a government subsidy,254 and, as such, the “denial of an 
otherwise-available benefit [i.e., trademark registration] is unconstitutional 
at least where, as here, it has a significant chilling effect on private 
speech.”255 Judge Moore discussed this issue at length, ultimately 
concluding: “Were we to accept the government’s argument that trademark 
registration is a government subsidy and that therefore the government is 
free to restrict speech within the confines of the trademark program, it 
would expand the ‘subsidy’ exception to swallow nearly all government 
regulation.”256 
Part III of the opinion articulated the reasons why the “may disparage” 
prohibition of § 2(a) is unconstitutional even if trademarks are considered 
“commercial speech” and, therefore, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny.257 
The court first reiterated that § 2(a) is subject to strict scrutiny as 
“expressive speech.”258 Judge Moore admitted, however, that “[t]rademarks 
have at times been referred to as commercial speech,” because “[t]hey are, 
after all, commercial identifiers, the symbols and words by which 
companies distinguish and identify their brands.”259 The United States 
Supreme Court established the methodology for analyzing the 
constitutionality of commercial speech in Central Hudson.260 Under the 
Central Hudson test, if the commercial speech at issue concerns a lawful 
activity and is not misleading, then the court asks “whether ‘the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial,’ and whether the regulation ‘directly 
and materially advanc[es]’ the government’s asserted interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.”261 
The court, thus, applied the Central Hudson test to § 2(a). First, Judge 
Moore noted that, “[u]nlike many other provisions of § 2, the 
disparagement provision does not address misleading, deceptive, or 
unlawful marks. There is nothing illegal or misleading about a disparaging 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1348-55. 
 255. Id. at 1348-49 (citation omitted). 
 256. Id. at 1354; see also id. at 1355 (“The government may not place unconstitutional 
conditions on trademark registration.”). 
 257. Id. at 1355-57. 
 258. Id. at 1355. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  
 261. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355 (alteration in original) (first quoting Central Hudson, 447 
U.S. at 566, and then quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555-56 (2001)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/1
2016]      LANHAM ACT’S PROHIBITION OF TRADEMARKS 725 
 
 
trademark . . . .”262 Secondly, the court addressed the government’s 
arguments that its interest in suppressing disparaging marks is 
substantial.263 The opinion discussed the four arguments advanced by the 
government as “substantial interests,”264 but summarized those arguments 
by noting that, “[a]ll of the government’s proffered interests boil down to 
permitting the government to burden speech it finds offensive,” and 
concluded that, “[t]his is not a legitimate interest.”265 Consequently, Judge 
Moore does not even analyze whether § 2(a) directly and materially 
advances the government’s interests and is narrowly tailored to accomplish 
them. Instead, the opinion succinctly stated: “With no substantial 
government interests, the disparagement provision of § 2(a) cannot satisfy 
the Central Hudson test. We hold the disparagement provision of § 2(a) 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.”266 
In its conclusion, the court acknowledged that its holding may well result 
in a certain amount of bruised feelings but, nevertheless, asserted that such 
consequences are sometimes unavoidable, given the importance of freedom 
of speech:  
Whatever our personal feelings about the mark at issue here, or 
other disparaging marks, the First Amendment forbids 
government regulators to deny registration because they find the 
speech likely to offend others. Even when speech “inflict[s] 
great pain,” our Constitution protects it “to ensure that we do not 
stifle public debate.”267  
Judge O’Malley, joined by Judge Wallach, concurred with the majority 
opinion, but wrote separately to say that “§ 2(a) is also unconstitutionally 
vague, rendering it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment to the 
                                                                                                                 
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 1555-57. 
 264. The government argued that it has a significant interest in suppressing disparaging 
trademarks because: 1) it should be “entitled to dissociate itself from speech it finds odious,” 
En Banc Brief for Appellee, supra note 163, at 41; 2) it should be allowed not “to expend its 
resources to facilitate the use of racial slurs as source identifiers in interstate commerce,” id. 
at 43; 3) it “has a compelling interest in fostering racial tolerance,” id.; and, 4) it has a 
substantial interest in “allowing States to make their own determinations about whether 
trademarks should be unenforceable on grounds of public policy,” id. at 44.  
 265. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1357. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
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United States Constitution.”268 Judge O’Malley stressed that “§ 2(a)’s 
inherent ambiguity makes it difficult for would-be applicants to discern its 
boundaries and leads to inconsistent and unreliable actions on the part of 
the government as it seeks to regulate on the basis of content.”269 
Judge Dyk wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.270 Judges Lourie and Reyna joined Judge Dyk with respect to the first 
four parts of Judge Dyk’s opinion.271 Judge Dyk captured the essence of the 
reasoning, stating: “The majority is correct that the bar on registration of 
disparaging marks is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Tam. But in my 
view the majority errs in going beyond the facts of this case and holding the 
statute facially unconstitutional as applied to purely commercial speech.”272 
Judge Dyk maintained that § 2(a) is not a blanket license for the 
government to suppress speech with which it disagrees.273 Rather Dyk 
contended that “the statute is designed to preclude the use of government 
resources not when the government disagrees with a trademark’s message, 
but rather when its meaning ‘may be disparaging to a substantial composite 
of the referenced group.’”274 Hence, Judge Dyk reasoned that the “may 
disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) is not facially unconstitutional but only 
unconstitutional as applied to Tam’s purportedly political speech: “the 
statute is constitutional as applied to purely commercial trademarks, but not 
as to core political speech, of which Mr. Tam’s mark is one example.”275 
One especially logical criticism of the majority opinion raised by Dyk is his 
concern that not all trademarks convey the degree of socio-political 
commentary that Tam’s “Slants” mark conveys.276 He notes: “While I agree 
that some marks, including Mr. Tam’s, have an expressive component, it 
would seem beyond debate that many do not, as is the case with respect to 
routine product identifiers.”277 Therefore, he maintained that, when 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. at 1358 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 269. Id. at 1361 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 270. Id. at 1363 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 1367 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 277. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/1
2016]      LANHAM ACT’S PROHIBITION OF TRADEMARKS 727 
 
 
trademarks are analyzed as commercial speech, § 2(a) is valid under 
Central Hudson.278 
Part II of Judge Dyk’s opinion disagreed with the majority’s view that 
trademark registration is not a government subsidy.279 Because he believes 
that trademark registration is a form of government subsidy, Judge Dyk 
maintained that the government may deny that subsidy on the basis of 
content.280 According to Judge Dyk, “That trademark registration is a 
subsidy is not open to doubt. Contrary to the majority’s characterization, 
federal trademark registration is not a ‘regulatory regime.’ Section 2(a) 
does not regulate any speech, much less impose a blanket ban. It merely 
deprives a benefit.”281 
In Part III, Dyk challenged the majority’s assertion “that subsidies 
require viewpoint neutrality”282 but argued, nevertheless, that, “§ 2(a) is in 
any event viewpoint neutral.”283 He explained this point by stating that “the 
bar on registration of disparaging marks operates in a ‘neutral fashion’ by 
looking only to the views of the referenced group.”284 
In Part IV, Judge Dyk posited that “the protection of disparaged groups” 
presents a sufficiently important governmental interest “to justify its 
regulation defined in terms of ‘reasonableness.’”285 To a large degree, Dyk 
anchored this argument on the theory that “commercial speech is different” 
from “core protected speech,” which requires that, “groups must tolerate the 
disparagement in pursuit of the greater goal of a free marketplace of 
ideas.”286 He concluded Part IV, remarking that “[w]e need not decide 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Id. at 1368 (Dyk, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“In short, many trademarks 
lack the kind of ‘expressive character’ that would merit First Amendment protection for 
offensive content, and a regulation of the use of those marks could satisfy the Central 
Hudson test for commercial speech—a substantial government interest reflected in a 
narrowly tailored regulation. The majority’s contrary conclusion seems to me to be 
unsupported.”). Curiously, however, Judge Dyk makes this assertion in a conclusory fashion 
but fails to articulate in a step-by-step manner just how § 2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition 
satisfies the three-part Central Hudson test.  
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. (citation omitted). 
 282. Id. at 1371 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id.; see also id. at 1372 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[I]t is based 
on an objective, ‘neutral’ assessment of a non-government perspective—in this case, a 
‘substantial composite of the referenced group.’”). 
 285. Id. at 1372 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 286. Id. 
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whether this interest is sufficiently compelling to justify a ban of 
disparaging commercial speech. It is more than sufficient to justify the 
government’s ‘decision not to assist’ disparaging commercial 
expression.”287 
Part V maintained that, for purposes of First Amendment analysis, 
distinguishing between the core/expressive content of trademark speech 
versus its commercial character is not a difficult task.288  
But in Part VI, Judge Dyk agreed with the majority’s view that § 2(a) is 
unconstitutional as applied to Tam.289 He emphasizes that Tam selected the 
mark, THE SLANTS, intentionally trying to make a socio-political 
statement.290  
Given the indisputably expressive character of Mr. Tam’s 
trademark in this case, the government’s recognized interests in 
protecting citizens from targeted, demeaning advertising and 
proscribing intrusive formats of commercial expression—
interests that are sufficient to justify the provision as applied to 
commercial speech—are insufficient to justify application of the 
provision to Mr. Tam.291 
Hence, Judge Dyk concluded: “Accordingly, because no government 
interest can justify restricting Mr. Tam’s core speech on the basis of its 
capacity to injure others, § 2(a) is invalid as applied.”292 
Judge Lourie joined with Parts I-IV of Judge Dyk’s opinion but wrote 
separately to “dissent with respect to the result reached by the majority, 
holding the disparagement provision of § 2(a) unconstitutional as violating 
the First Amendment.”293 Fundamentally, Judge Lourie agreed with the 
government’s position that “the refusal of the USPTO to register a 
trademark is not a denial of an applicant’s right of free speech. The 
markholder may still generally use the mark as it wishes; without federal 
registration, it simply lacks access to certain federal statutory enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1373 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. (“Mr. Tam chose THE SLANTS at least in part to reclaim the negative racial 
stereotype it embodies: ‘We want to take on these stereotypes that people have about us, like 
the slanted eyes, and own them. We’re very proud of being Asian—we’re not going to hide 
that fact.’”). 
 291. Id. at 1373-74 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 292. Id. at 1374 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 293. Id. at 1374 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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mechanisms for excluding others from confusingly similar uses of the 
mark.”294 He noted that, even in the absence of federal registration, a 
trademark owner still maintains common law protection295 and also adheres 
to the view that trademarks are government speech.296 Thus, Judge Lourie 
contended that the PTO’s decision to deny Tam’s registration ought to be 
affirmed.297 
Judge Reyna dissented, arguing that trademarks are commercial speech 
and that, as commercial speech, § 2(a) passes constitutional muster under 
an intermediate scrutiny standard.298 Judge Reyna expressed the opinion 
that § 2(a) is intended “to promote the orderly flow of commerce”299 and 
that, “[c]ommercial speech that insults groups of people, particularly based 
on their race, gender, religion, or other demographic identity, tends to 
disrupt commercial activity and to undermine the stability of the 
marketplace in much the same manner as discriminatory conduct.”300 
He then explained that promoting the orderly flow of commerce is a 
substantial government interest and that § 2(a) survives intermediate 
scrutiny because it presents what Judge Reyna characterizes as a “modest 
burden” to suppress discriminatory commercial speech.301 Curiously, 
however, Judge Reyna failed to articulate why he thinks that § 2(a) meets 
the Central Hudson requirement that the statute in question must be 
narrowly tailored to directly achieve the government’s substantial interest. 
The best he can offer on this point is to substitute a balancing test in place 
of the Central Hudson test, which demands that the statute in question be 
narrowly tailored to directly achieve a substantial government interest. 
According to Reyna: “When we balance the government’s substantial 
interest in the orderly flow of commerce against the modest imposition of § 
2(a) on a narrowly tailored portion of particularly low-value speech, the 
standards of intermediate scrutiny are satisfied.”302 But in order to uphold 
Judge Reyna’s position on this matter, we would need to re-write the third 
prong of the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test; namely, change it 
                                                                                                                 
 294. Id. at 1374-75 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 295. Id. at 1375 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 1376 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 298. Id. at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 299. Id. at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 300. Id. at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 301. Id. at 1379-82 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 302. Id. at 1382 (Reyna, J., dissenting).  
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into a balancing test rather than a requirement that the statute be narrowly 
tailored to directly advance a substantial government interest. 
IV. First Amendment Analysis 
A. First Amendment Overview & Traditional Analysis 
1. Basic Principles 
The First Amendment provides, in part: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”303 At the outset, it is 
helpful to acknowledge that the TTAB does not have the authority to rule on 
whether the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) violates the First 
Amendment.304 This task falls squarely on the shoulders of the federal 
courts.305 The United States Supreme Court is, of course, the ultimate 
authority when it comes to construing the First Amendment. Thus, Supreme 
Court views relating to freedom of speech are the most important.  
Modern First Amendment doctrine began to change and take on its 
contemporary shape in the 1960s—long after the passage of the Lanham Act 
in 1946, and even longer after § 2(a)’s “may disparage” language was added 
to the bill in the 1930s.306 “In the last third of the twentieth century, the [U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 303. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see HAND, supra note 10, at 1 (“Congress proposed the first 
eight [amendments to the Constitution] in the same year that the Constitution was ratified, 
1789, and they were themselves ratified in 1791.”).  
 304. See Nagel & Raschert, supra note 42, at 793 (“The Trial Trademark [sic] and 
Appeal Board issued a pretrial order in March 1994 that struck down Pro-Football's 
constitutional defenses as beyond the scope of the Board's authority.”) (citing Harjo v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1844-45 (T.T.A.B. 1994)); see also Pace, supra 
note 17, at 48 (“Respondents also raised a number of challenges to the constitutionality of 
section 2(a) both on its face and in its application. They claimed that Section 2(a) is 
unconstitutional because it abridges their freedom of speech, is unconstitutionally overbroad 
and is void for vagueness. However, the TTAB never reached the merit of these challenges 
because it determined, correctly, that such findings were beyond its authority as an 
administrative tribunal.”) (footnotes omitted); Lefstin, supra note 44, at 667. 
 305. Nevertheless, because the District of Columbia reversed the TTAB’s decision in the 
Harjo case by ruling that the TTAB’s decision lacked the support of substantial evidence 
and because of laches, that court avoided grappling with the First Amendment issue. See 
Nagel & Rascher, supra note 42, at 794 (“Though rescinding the petitioners standing based 
upon laches, the court did not resolve any constitutional issues pertinent to the case.”) (citing 
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
 306. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65 (4th ed. 2014); see also Pace, 
supra note 17, at 36 (“Congress did not consider the relevance of the First Amendment when 
it enacted Section 2(a). This is apparent because the Lanham Act was promulgated long 
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Supreme] Court developed a basic framework for the analysis of the 
government’s ability to restrict expressive activity, which the Court continues 
to use.”307 The First Amendment requires that courts strive to promote 
freedom for speakers by restricting government interference with speech.308 
Learned Hand once said that the First Amendment “rests upon the premise 
that there is no proposition so uniformly acknowledged that it may not be 
lawfully challenged, questioned, and debated.”309 Justice Brennan, writing for 
the majority in Texas v. Johnson, articulated the essence of the First 
Amendment when he wrote, “[T]he government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”310 Justice Scalia expressed similar thoughts in R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, remarking that the First Amendment prevents the government from 
regulating speech “based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the 
underlying message expressed.”311 “Both Johnson and R.A.V. rest on the 
                                                                                                                 
before First Amendment protections were extended to commercial speech.”). For additional 
discussion regarding commercial speech, see infra Section IV.B. 
 307. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.1(a), at 1252. 
 308. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 238 (“The central goal of most First Amendment 
doctrine is to limit the government’s ability to interfere with speech. In accordance with this 
goal, the emphasis is on ensuring the liberty of the speaker.”); HAND, supra note 10, at 2 
(“That these [i.e., the rights protected by the Bill of Rights] were rights arising out of 
‘Natural Laws,’ ‘inherent’ in the structure of any society, or at least any civilized society, 
were notions widely accepted at the end of the eighteenth century, and behind them lay a 
long history, going back to at least the beginning of our era.”); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 10, § 16.1(b), at 1254 (“All of the clauses of the First Amendment are tied together by 
the concept of freedom of belief.”). 
 309. HAND, supra note 10, at 57 (“Hence it has been again and again unconditionally 
proclaimed that there are no limits to the privilege so far as words seek to affect only the 
hearers’ beliefs and not their conduct.”).  
 310. 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (involving a statute that prohibited desecration of the 
American flag); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (also involving flag desecration); Police 
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 
16.49(d), at 1480 (discussing cases involving flag burning and flag desecration). 
 311. 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992); see also FARBER, supra note 306, at 119-20 (quoting 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377) (A local ordinance punished as a misdemeanor anyone who “place[d] 
on public or private property a symbol . . . including, but not limited to, a burning cross or 
Nazi swastika” in circumstances where “one knows or has reasonable grounds to know” the 
conduct “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race . . . .” Justice 
Scalia’s opinion refused to allow the government to regulate speech “based on hostility—or 
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fundamental premise that the government has no business repressing even 
false and hateful ideas.”312 In a number of cases, applying this principle to 
expressions that many people find utterly deplorable—such as pornography, 
vulgar language, Nazi parades, and racially charged displays of bigotry and 
hatred (e.g., KKK rallies)—has proven to be a difficult and bitter pill to 
swallow. Yet the extreme cases test the mettle of the Constitution and our 
fundamental freedoms.313 As a rule, history has shown that “tolerance works 
better than suppression in maintaining the democratic order.”314 Professor 
Farber suggests that the key question to ask is: “Has the government written a 
permissible rule for regulating this conduct?”315 The right question to ask is 
whether Congress wrote § 2(a) in such a way that it is permissible to refuse to 
register marks that “may disparage.” Analyzing an especially sensitive and 
difficult situation in Collin v. Smith,316 Professor Farber elaborates: 
[T]he Nazis’ beliefs are repugnant to our “core values” and to 
“much of what we cherish in civilization.” Nevertheless, under the 
First Amendment, “there is no such thing as a false idea”; even the 
Nazis are entitled to compete in the marketplace of ideas. In a 
companion case, the Illinois Supreme Court, while admitting that 
the sight of swastikas is “abhorrent to the Jewish citizens of 
Skokie” and that the memories evoked are “offensive to the 
principles of a free nation,” concluded with some reluctance that 
                                                                                                                 
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed” and held that the ordinance violated 
the First Amendment.); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.39(b)-(d), at 1413-16 
(discussing R.A.V.); Smith, supra note 21, at 471-72 (“In R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, the Court 
wrote that ‘[t]he First Amendment does not permit [the government] to impose special 
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.’”) (alterations in 
original) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391). 
 312. FARBER, supra note 306, at 5; see also id. at 65 (“Today . . . it is a bedrock principle 
that the government has no power to ban ideas, no matter how dangerous or undemocratic 
those ideas may seem.”); id. at 119 (“Indeed, the government might use the censorship of 
particular words as a pretext for eliminating certain ideas.”). 
 313. Id. at 15 (“As shown by its willingness to defend with equal fervor the rights of 
those who burn flags and those who burn crosses, the Court clearly now views the protection 
of free speech as one of its core responsibilities.”). 
 314. Id. at 8; see also id. at 9 (“The best argument for free expression is to look back in 
history and around the world at societies that have lacked it—societies that have ranged from 
dismal to terrifying.”); see also id. at 79 (“Proponents of the marketplace of ideas rely on 
public debate to eliminate harmful ideas, and in the meantime hope that the debate against 
them will invigorate more acceptable viewpoints.”). 
 315. Id. at 49. 
 316. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
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“it is entirely clear that this factor does not justify enjoining 
defendants’ speech.”317 
 The Supreme Court has taken a firm stance when dealing with the 
intersection of painful emotions and the First Amendment. One case 
involving extreme emotional anguish stands out: Snyder v. Phelps.318 In 
Snyder, the father of a deceased soldier sued persons who had picketed his 
son’s military funeral, carrying signs that read “God hates the USA” and 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”319 The father alleged intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.320 But the Court ruled that the First Amendment shielded 
the picketers’ speech because it related to a matter of public concern.321 
Arguably, the use of Native American logos as trademarks has also now risen 
to the level of public concern as well. Professor Farber, commenting on such 
cases, acknowledges that “[n]one of these cases show any strong sympathy 
with the victims of ridicule or misrepresentations.”322  
Arguably, the language of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits 
registration of trademarks that “may disparage,” constitutes either a content-
based or viewpoint-based (or both) regulation of speech.323 “Content-based 
                                                                                                                 
 317. FARBER, supra note 306, at 128 (first quoting Collin, 578 F.2d at 1200, 1204, and 
then quoting Village of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. 1978)); see 
also id. at 128 (4th ed. 2014) (“The display of the swastika could not be banned as the visual 
equivalent of ‘fighting words’ (any more than flag burning could be banned).”); NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.6(d), at 1270-71 (attributing the “marketplace of ideas” 
economic metaphor to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes). 
 318. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 319. Id. at 448-49. 
 320. Id. at 449-50. 
 321. Id. at 455, 460.  
 322. FARBER, supra note 306, at 109. 
 323. The CAFC expressly held that § 2(a) constitutes viewpoint discrimination. In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government regulation at issue amounts to 
viewpoint discrimination . . . .”). The distinction between content-based versus viewpoint-
based regulations is not always clear-cut. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 
(2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Content-based laws merit this protection because they 
present, albeit sometimes in a subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech 
based on viewpoint.”); FARBER, supra note 306, at 23 (“Within the category of content-based 
regulations, those relating to the viewpoint expressed by the speaker are more heavily 
disfavored than those based on subject matter or other message characteristics.”); Smith, 
supra note 21, at 466 (“Interestingly, no court has yet found that Section 2(a) constitutes an 
impermissible restriction on free speech.”); id. at 467-68 (“Many have suggested that 
Section 2(a) represents an unjustified restriction on First Amendment freedoms.”) (citing 
Pace, supra note 17; Lefstin, supra note 44); Lefstin, supra note 44, at 679-81 (discussing 
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laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are 
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government 
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”324 
Justice Thomas has explained that “[a] law that is content based on its face is 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, 
content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in 
the regulated speech.”325 Simply stated, the § 2(a) “may disparage” 
prohibition denies trademark registration to marks that have the potential to 
offend persons, institutions, or beliefs.326 It is clear that the “may disparage” 
prohibition of § 2(a) is a content-based and/or viewpoint-based restriction. 
Consider the paradigmatic example of Native American names and imagery. 
Indian logos, names, and even ceremonial dances are permitted to show 
honor, tradition, and respect but not allowed if a substantial composite of 
Native Americans sues and complains that they are disparaging.327 
                                                                                                                 
content-based and viewpoint-based analysis). But for our purposes, the distinction is 
negligible and mostly irrelevant. 
 324. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); id. at 2227 (“Government 
regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the 
topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”). Reed is a case involving the regulation 
of signs. Signs serve functions that are in many respects similar to trademarks—they call 
attention to products and/or services by reaching out to convey a message to the public. 
 325. Id. at 2228 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 
(1993)); see also id. at 2229 (“Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship 
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day 
wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech.”); FARBER, supra note 306, at 23 
(“Government regulations linked to the content of speech receive severe judicial scrutiny.”). 
 326. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 30-31 (“Offensiveness is usually considered a 
content-related characteristic, because the degree of offense is likely to relate to the 
conduct’s perceived meaning.”); see also id. at 36 (“Listeners are expected to decide for 
themselves what they want to hear and whether they believe it. Those who are offended by 
speech are expected to take care of themselves. The audience is not considered to be in need 
of protection.”). 
 327. The CAFC makes the exact point: “The PTO rejects marks under § 2(a) when it 
finds the marks refer to a group in a negative way, but it permits the registration of marks 
that refer to a group in a positive, non-disparaging manner.” In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2015); see also FARBER, supra note 306, at 32 (“The phrase ‘viewpoint 
discrimination’ is not self-explanatory. Presumably, the idea is that some perspectives on a 
topic are allowed while opposing views are not.”); Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 332 (“[A]s 
was noted in Harjo III, the context for using the name is critical, and this is what 
differentiates a disparaging use from a festive use in the sporting arena.”) (citing Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145 (D.D.C. 2003); Wallace, supra note 5, at 
208 (“[I]t is imperative to be aware of the sharp distinction between tribute and rebuke for 
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Although the First Amendment protections are robust, there are, 
nevertheless, a limited number of categories of speech considered to fall 
outside the protections of the First Amendment. Libel, incitement to violence, 
obscenity,328 child pornography, fighting words,329 and false advertising are 
the categories of speech traditionally considered “unprotected speech.”330 But 
trademarks such as “The Slants” or “Redskins” or even the Cleveland 
Indians’ Chief Wahoo logo do not constitute libel, incitement to violence, 
obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, or false advertising. 
Even those who are only casually familiar with the complexities of the 
First Amendment have probably heard of Justice Holmes’s famous example 
of “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,” and his framing the 
First Amendment question as “whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.”331 Under even the somewhat old-fashioned clear-and-present-
danger test articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, it 
seems that Congress does not have a right to prevent registration of marks 
that “may disparage.”332 
An important case that modified, or at least clarified, the clear-and-
present-danger test is Brandenburg v. Ohio.333 Brandenburg involved a KKK 
member who participated in rallies and openly discussed advocacy of 
violence. “The Court . . . held advocacy of violence [is] protected by the First 
                                                                                                                 
the historical Native American image, as it is one easily abused and misrepresented in 
modern culture. Moreover, the use of ‘American Indian dress, dance, and tradition . . . for 
purely entertainment purposes has a particularly deleterious effect because it trivializes the 
very basis of many cultural and religious beliefs.’ In this way, the use of Native American 
imagery for sports logos can create a distinct schizophrenia of identity for Native Americans 
attempting to maintain a sense of cultural history.”) (quoting Blankenship, supra note 5, at 
424). 
 328. For insights and discussion regarding “obscenity,” see generally NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 10, §§ 16.56-16.61, at 1513-38. 
 329. See id. § 16.37, at 1409 (“Yet fighting words also can be an incitement to 
unthinking, immediate, violent action, just like falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater 
immediately incites action (that is, a riot). The immediate reaction means that there is no 
time to debate, to trust the free marketplace of ideas.”). 
 330. See id. § 16.1(b), at 1253-55; FARBER, supra note 306, at 33. 
 331. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 10, § 16.13(b), at 1292. 
 332. For a discussion of the clear and present danger doctrine, see, for example, NOWAK 
& ROTUNDA, supra note 10, §§ 16.12-16.15, at 1291-1303. 
 333. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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Amendment as long as the advocacy did not incite people to imminent 
action.”334 According to the Court, the government lacks the power “to 
forbid . . . advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”335 “Later cases proclaim as central to 
the First Amendment the principle that every idea, no matter how hateful, is 
entitled to full constitutional protection.”336 “[W]e have learned that we can 
live rather comfortably while accommodating a fair amount of political 
craziness around the fringes of society.”337  
Although many forms of expression are protected under the high threshold 
of the clear-and-present-danger test, the Court has upheld statutes that 
prohibit true threats. The defendants in Virginia v. Black338 violated a state 
cross-burning statute. Intent to intimidate was an element of the crime.339 
Here the Supreme Court found that there was intimidation “where a speaker 
directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the 
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”340 The Court held that a state may 
constitutionally ban cross burning with intent to intimidate because such a 
statutory ban would prevent a “true threat.” This case involves an example of 
a threat that crosses the line from mere intimidation to an actual “true threat” 
constituting one of “those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire 
fear of bodily harm.”341 The Virginia cross-burning statute is a far cry from § 
2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition; likewise burning a cross in front of 
someone’s house is a far cry from using the word “Redskins” and a visual 
                                                                                                                 
 334. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.15(c), at 1301 (2010); see FARBER, supra 
note 306, at 77 (“[U]nder Brandenburg, advocacy of violence can be prohibited only when 
(1) it is directed to inciting imminent lawless action, and (2) it is likely to produce such 
action.”). 
 335. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 336. FARBER, supra note 306, at 86; see also id. (In the wake of Brandenburg, “[t]he 
burden is now placed on advocates of government regulation to show that the ‘suppression 
of ideas’ is not their agenda.”). 
 337. Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.1(d), at 1259-60. 
 338. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 339. Id. at 348; see FARBER, supra note 306, at 84 (“Under the statute, burning a cross 
was prima facie evidence of the required intent to intimidate.”). 
 340. Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 341. Id. at 363. 
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image of an American Indian, reminiscent of the Buffalo nickel, as 
trademarks.342 
One commentator has described the case of the Native Americans in the 
Harjo and Blackhorse litigations as follows: “The Native Americans . . . 
simply wish to attend sporting events and read the sports section in the 
newspaper without feeling uncomfortable or upset because of the mocking 
logos.”343 It is abundantly clear that the First Amendment cannot permit a 
statute to restrict speech on the basis that it might make someone feel 
uncomfortable or upset them.344 “Since Section 2(a) contains a content-based 
restriction that conditions the benefits accorded by federal registration upon a 
finding that the trademark is not immoral, scandalous, or disparaging, it 
abridges the trademark owner's First Amendment rights. The government is, 
in effect, attempting to suppress speech through the denial of trademark 
registration.”345 
2. Overbreadth & Vagueness346 
a) Overview 
Modern First Amendment doctrine holds that a statute may be void if it 
is overbroad or if its language is too vague.347 “Under the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own speech or conduct may be 
                                                                                                                 
 342. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 119 (“Under current law, the offensiveness of 
certain forms of expression provides a basis for government regulation only under narrow 
circumstances. First, deliberate efforts to incite a violent response from the audience 
probably can be banned under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine. Second, captive audiences can 
be protected from offensive speech, but only where the speech constitutes an ‘intolerable 
invasion of privacy’ (particularly within the home).”). 
 343. Grose, supra note 41, at 701. 
 344. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 119 (“This set of doctrines limits the state’s ability 
to ban hate speech purely on the basis of its offensiveness or emotional impact.”). 
 345. Pace, supra note 17, at 38. 
 346. Much of the discussion in this section is also relevant to the discussion below in 
Section IV.B. “Commercial Speech Analysis,” because, if statutory language is either 
overbroad or vague (or both), arguably it is not “narrowly tailored” to achieve an objective. 
See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.8(e), at 1277 ([I]t is not entirely clear to 
what extent the overbreadth doctrine applies to so-called commercial speech. . . . [I]f speech 
is deemed to be commercial speech, then the overbreadth analysis is probably 
inapplicable. . . . Although the Court will not employ overbreadth analysis to invalidate a 
regulation of commercial speech that is designed to stop false or misleading commercial 
practices, the Court will require the government to regulate commercial speech in a manner 
that is ‘not more extensive than necessary’ to serve a substantial government interest.”). 
 347. See generally id. §§ 16.8 through 16.9, at 1274-81. 
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prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face ‘because it also 
threatens others . . . who desire to engage in legally protected expression 
but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake 
to have the law declared partially invalid.’”348 Furthermore, “[t]he 
vagueness rule is related to the Court’s longtime concern over standardless 
administrative discretion in speech cases.”349 For example, using the void-
for-vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New 
York statute that banned “sacrilegious” movies.350 In another important 
case construing vagueness, the Southern District of Indiana held 
unconstitutional a state statute that regulated speech depicting the “sexually 
explicit subordination of women.”351 The key word that rendered the statute 
unconstitutional for its vagueness was “subordination.”352 One especially 
pernicious characteristic of the vagueness of the “may disparage” 
prohibition of § 2(a), and similar to a statute prohibiting “sacrilegious” 
movies or materials with sexual “subordination,” is that its lack of clarity 
increases the likelihood that “it might have an in terrorem effect and deter 
persons from engaging in protected activities.”353 The language of § 2(a) is 
both overbroad and vague. Interestingly, both of the key words—“may” and 
“disparage”—contribute to its overbreadth and vagueness. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 348. Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) 
(quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)). 
 349. FARBER, supra note 306, at 55. Arguably, this is precisely the problem that § 2(a)’s 
“may disparage” prohibition presents, because it allows a trademark examining attorney 
standardless discretion when determining whether to allow or deny registration for an 
applicant whose mark “may disparage.” See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 
16.9(b), at 1280-81 (“Several rationales justify special judicial strictness to insure that laws 
that regulate speech, a fundamental constitutional right, are not vague.”). 
 350. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 351. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (S.D. Ind. 1984), 
aff’d, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d sub nom., Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reh’g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).  
 352. Id. at 1338; see HAND, supra note 10, at 12 (“The issues that arise are often 
extremely baffling, and the answers are not obvious. They demand, not only a detached 
approach, but a training in verbal analysis by no means general among legislators, even 
though they are usually lawyers.”). 
 353. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.9(b), at 1281. 
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The word “may” renders the prohibition overbroad and vague.354 By 
definition the word “may” ordinarily implies mere possibility not 
probability. The 1937 Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the 
English Language defines “may.” 
1. To have permission; be allowed; have the physical or moral 
opportunity; as, you may go; you might have seen his love in 
what he did. . . . 2. To be contingently possible; as, it may be; 
you may get off, altho you do not deserve it. In this contingent 
sense of the word may, it is frequently used to form compound 
tenses of the subjunctive or potential modes of other verbs.355 
But interestingly, and perhaps most importantly, this standard dictionary 
published at the very time that the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) 
was being drafted has a separate entry defining the word “may” in a legal 
context. “6. Law. To have liberty or power to: often (in the construction of 
statutes) held to mean must, as imposing obligation, tho in every other use 
may has only a permissive or discretionary connotation.”356 This suggests 
that the drafters likely intended the “may disparage” language to have this 
stronger, obligatory meaning, “must disparage.” Yet, apparently, the TTAB 
and courts have failed to recognize and apply this historically contemporary 
meaning. The TTAB has expressed the view that the word “may” in § 2(a) 
simply means that intent to disparage is not required.357 Although this 
                                                                                                                 
 354. See Pace, supra note 17, at 33 (“The statute does not prohibit ‘matter which 
disparages;’ rather, it prohibits ‘matter which may disparage.’ The latter is certainly a 
broader prohibition than the former. This Article argues that, unlike the test for scandalous 
matter, which is limited to an inquiry of whether the matter is scandalous at the time the 
applicant is seeking registration, the presence of the world ‘may’ in the disparagement 
language expresses Congress' intent that marks that could or might be disparaging, even if 
they are not considered so at the time of the application, should be barred from federal 
registration.”). 
 355. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1531 
(Isaac K. Funk ed., 1937) [hereinafter FUNK & WAGNALLS]. 
 356. Id. 
 357. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 473 (quoting the TTAB’s Harjo decision for the 
proposition that the word “may” in § 2(a) does not require intent to disparage: “Thus, we 
believe the use of the term ‘may’ is necessary in connection with ‘disparage’ in Section 2(a) 
to avoid an interpretation of this statutory provision that would require a showing of intent to 
disparage.”). 
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construction is plausible, it is certainly neither a particularly obvious nor a 
necessarily accurate construction.  
Although the drafters of the Lanham Act may have intended the meaning 
of “must disparage” as indicated by the 1937 Funk & Wagnalls, they 
certainly were capable of expressing a higher degree of probability than that 
which the word “may” ordinarily suggests when that is what they intended. 
The standard of “likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive”358 for example implies a greater degree of probability by using the 
word “likely” rather than the word “may.”359 “Likely” at a minimum 
implies that something has at least close to a 50% probability of occurrence. 
In this regard “likely” is similar to the legal term “foreseeable.”360 But § 
2(a) does not state “is likely to disparage” and, unless we interpret “may” in 
its obligatory sense suggested by the 1937 Funk & Wagnalls, it fails to 
impose a rule that requires any appreciable degree of probability. By using 
the word “may,” Congress left the door open to arguments that even a 
scintilla of evidence of disparagement would suffice. As such, § 2(a) is 
overbroad. 
The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions articulated its statutory 
construction of the word “may.” Unfortunately, the cases do not necessarily 
solve the riddle. For example, the Court recently stated that “[t]he word 
‘may’ customarily connotes discretion” and noted that “[t]hat connotation is 
particularly apt where . . . ‘may’ is used in contraposition to the word 
‘shall’ . . . .”361 Similarly, in United States v. Rodgers, the Court remarked 
                                                                                                                 
 358. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).  
 359. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 23:1; id. § 23:3. 
 360. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 743 
(2005) (“Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term ‘foreseeability’ as ‘[t]he quality of being 
reasonably anticipatable.’ According to Random House, the verb ‘to foresee’ means ‘to have 
prescience of; to know in advance.’” (footnote omitted)); Banks McDowell, Foreseeability 
in Contract and Tort: The Problems of Responsibility and Remoteness, 36 CASE WESTERN 
RES. L. REV. 286, 290 (1985-86) (“Foreseeability is used in everyday language to describe 
actual, subjective awareness of possible future occurrences. It carries a sense of prevision, a 
consciousness of the possibilities of future happenings, and also implies the ability to plan 
for those future possibilities. A foresighted person sees into the future and takes necessary 
precautions to protect himself and others while taking advantage of opportunities. Thus, 
foreseeability is an integral part of prudent human behavior. To the extent that we expect 
humans to be rational beings, they must be charged with some degree of foreseeability.” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 295 (“What the court expects a defendant should have foreseen is 
what the ‘reasonable man’ would have foreseen.”). 
 361. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 553 U.S. 335, 346 (2005); see also 
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) (construing the word “may” as 
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that “[t]he word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree 
of discretion” but also added that “legislative intent to the contrary or . . . 
obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute” could 
necessitate a different conclusion.362 In United States v. Thoman, a late-
nineteenth century case discussing the word “may” and citing even earlier 
cases, the Court said that the meaning of the word “may” “depends on the 
context of the statute, and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it was 
the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power or to impose 
an imperative duty.”363 Additionally, in Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad 
Company, construing an amendment to the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 
where Congress changed “shall” (which had been in the 1926 version of the 
statute) to “may,” the Court said that the change was merely a clarification 
that the Act was not “based on a philosophy of legal compulsion.”364 Hence 
the Court interpreted “may” to indicate nothing stronger than mere 
possibility. There is at least one case, however, where the Court interpreted 
the word “may” to mean “probability” and not “mere possibility.”365 But 
Justice Day expressly stated that that interpretation was based on the 
specific language and context clues in the statute (the Clayton Act) itself—
namely the inclusion of the word “substantially.”366 Therefore, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
“permissive” in Rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Levers v. Anderson, 
326 U.S. 219, 223 (1945) (remarking that “may” does not mean “must” nor does it imply 
that something is mandatory); Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Bank of Monroe v. Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Richmond, 262 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1923) (“It is true that in statutes the word ‘may’ is 
sometimes construed as ‘shall.’ But that is where the context, or the subject-matter, compels 
such construction. Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. 435. Here it does not. This statute 
appears to have been drawn with great care. Throughout the act the distinction is clearly 
made between what the Board and the reserve banks ‘shall’ do and what they ‘may’ do.”). 
 362. 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983); see also Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbart Constr. 
Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198-99 (2000) (quoting Rodgers). 
 363. 156 U.S. 353, 359 (1895) (citations omitted).  
 364. 312 U.S. 630, 635 (1941). 
 365. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922); see 
also Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). Citing Standard Fashion, the 
Court said: “As we have said, the statute does not require that the discriminations must in 
fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable possibility that they ‘may’ 
have such an effect.” Id. 
 366. Standard Fashion Co., 258 U.S. at 356-57 (“Section 3 condemns sales or agreement 
where the effect of such sale or contract of sale ‘may’ be to substantially lessen competition 
or tend to create monopoly. It thus deals with consequences to follow the making of the 
restrictive covenant limiting the right of the purchaser to deal in the goods of the seller only. 
But we do not think that the purpose in using the word 'may' was to prohibit the mere 
possibility of the consequences described. It was intended to prevent such agreements as 
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Court precedents illustrate the malleable nature of the word “may.” It spans 
a continuum reaching from mere possibility, to probability, to mandate—
depending on the circumstances. Because the Court has acknowledged that 
“may” typically implies varying degrees of discretion and because the 
Court has also recognized that it has many shades of meaning, depending 
on the context and circumstances, the logical conclusion is that the “may 
disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) is both overbroad and vague. 
Butler v. Michigan involved a Michigan statute that criminalized books 
that had the potential to harm minors.367 The Supreme Court held that the 
statute was both overbroad and vague.368 It was overbroad for the same 
reason that the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) is overbroad—the 
mere possibility of causing harm casts too wide a net. In the words of the 
Court, “Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”369 The plain 
meaning of the word “may” renders § 2(a) overbroad, and the 
interpretations offered by the TTAB and the Supreme Court also 
demonstrate why it is vague.  
c) “Disparage” 
Similarly, § 2(a)’s use of the word “disparage” is vague. The Lanham 
Act, itself, does not define the term “disparage.”370 Most commentators 
who have looked into the issue have noted with surprise that the legislative 
history of the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) is of little use, and the 
CAFC poignantly noted that “[i]t had no roots in the earlier trademark 
                                                                                                                 
would under the circumstances disclosed probably lessen competition, or create an actual 
tendency to monopoly. That it was not intended to reach every remote lessening of 
competition is shown in the requirement that such lessening must be substantial.”). 
 367. 352 U.S. 380 (1957); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.61(b)(1), at 
1525-26 (discussing Butler). 
 368. See Butler, 352 U.S. at 382-84.  
 369. Id. at 383. 
 370. See Compton, supra note 7, at 18 (“No statutory definition of what constitutes a 
disparaging mark is provided in the Lanham Act. Due to this lack of a basic framework, the 
Trademark Office and the TTAB has been left to create its own definition and test for 
determining if a mark is disparaging.”) (footnote omitted); Kiser, supra note 3, at 8 (“An 
analysis of potentially disparaging trademarks is further complicated by the fact that the 
legislature failed to include a definition of what constitutes a ‘disparaging’ mark under 
section 2(a). At first, the USPTO and the TTAB solved this problem by either conflating the 
treatment of disparaging marks with the jurisprudence on obscene or scandalous marks, or 
by barring registration only when the disparagement appeared ‘obvious’ in the eyes of the 
examining attorney or the TTAB.”) (footnote omitted). 
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statute or the common law.”371 In the legislative hearings regarding the bill, 
the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Leslie Frazer, acknowledged that 
the word “disparage” was likely “to cause a great deal of difficulty in the 
Patent Office, because . . . it is always going to be just a matter of personal 
opinion of the individual parties as to whether they think it [i.e., the 
applicant’s mark] is disparaging.”372 Commissioner Frazer concluded by 
requesting, “I would like very much to see some other word substituted for 
that word ‘disparage.’”373 Representative Lanham, for whom the Act is 
named, immediately concurred and asked for suggested revisions.374 
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the record to indicate that there was any 
subsequent follow-through on this important issue.  
In her law review article twenty years ago, Judge Moore suggested that 
“[s]ince the legislative history does not reveal Congress' intent in using the 
word ‘disparage,’ it should be given its ordinary and common meaning at 
the time of the Lanham Act's enactment. Dictionaries of that time defined 
‘disparage’ as ‘[t]o speak slightly of; to undervalue; to discredit,’ and ‘to 
dishonor by bringing discredit or reproach upon . . . depreciate, 
cheapen.’”375 
                                                                                                                 
 371. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see, e.g., Hopkins & Joraanstad, 
supra note 4, at 275 (“Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Lanham Act does not 
offer much insight as to what constitutes what is ‘scandalous,’ ‘immoral,’ or when a mark 
may ‘disparage.’”); Kiser, supra note 3, at 7 (“The legislative history for section 2(a) does 
not indicate the legislature's goals for, or reasoning behind, adding this disparagement 
prohibition to federal trademark registration . . . .”). For more on the legislative history of the 
Lanham Act, see generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 5:4. 
 372. Hearing on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. On Trademarks, H. Comm. on Patents, 
76th Cong. 18 (1939) (statement of Leslie Frazer) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4744]. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Mr. Lanham replied, “That seems to me, in the light of administration, to be a very 
pertinent suggestion, and if you gentlemen can clarify that with verbiage you suggest it 
would be helpful.” Id. at 21 (statement of Rep. Fritz Lanham). Given the nearly universal 
agreement that the word “disparage” is a vague term, it is somewhat surprising that Judge 
Lee, in considering Fifth Amendment challenges to § 2(a), disagreed, holding that the “may 
disparage” language of § 2(a) is not vague. See Pro-Football v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 
439, 464-68 (E.D. Va. 2015); cf. HAND, supra note 10, at 19 (“What does a body of men like 
a legislature ‘mean’ by the words contained in a statute? What ‘points’ are ‘present’ to their 
minds? Indeed what ‘points’ were common in the minds of a majority of those who voted? 
These are unanswerable questions[.] All we know is that a majority has accepted the 
sequence of words in which the ‘law’ has been couched, and that they expect the judges to 
decide whether an occasion before them is one of those that the words cover.”).  
 375. Pace, supra note 17, at 32 (footnotes omitted); see also Cummings, supra note 5, at 
322 (“Under the Lanham Act, ‘disparagement’ is defined as ‘dishonor by comparison with 
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Indeed, during the 1930s when the “may disparage” language was added 
to the bill, the Oxford English Dictionary provided several definitions of 
“disparage”: (1) “To match unequally; to degrade or dishonour by marrying 
to one of inferior rank”; (2) “To bring discredit or reproach upon; to 
dishonour, discredit; to lower in credit or esteem”; (3) “To lower in position 
or dignity; to degrade”; (4) “To lower in one’s own estimation; to cast 
down”; (5) “To speak of or treat slightingly; to treat as something lower 
than it is; to undervalue; to vilify.”376  
The 1937 Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English 
Language defines “disparage,” in part, as follows: 
1. To regard or speak of slightingly. . . . 2. To affect or injure by 
unjust comparison, as with that which is unworthy, inferior, or of 
less value or importance; as, I do not say this to disparage your 
country. 3. [Rare] To degrade in estimation by detractive 
language or by dishonoring treatment; lower; dishonor; as, such 
conduct disparages religion. 4. To degrade by marrying below 
one’s rank or station.377 
These definitions range from very slight or minor negativity—“discredit,” 
“lower in position,” “speak slightingly,” “affect . . . by unjust 
comparison,”—to rather harsh—“vilify.”378 As such, § 2(a)’s “may 
disparage” prohibition has the potential to prevent registration of marks that 
                                                                                                                 
what is inferior.’”) (citing Harjo, Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 
1738 (T.T.A.B. 1999)); Hughey, supra note 5, at 346 (“The TTAB, relying on the 
dictionary, defined disparaging as matter that ‘may dishonor by comparison with what is 
inferior, slight, deprecate, degrade, or affect or injure by unjust comparison.’”) (citing Harjo, 
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738); id. at 358-59 (“A disparaging mark is one that dishonors by 
association with that which is inferior or slight, or that deprecates, degrades, or injures by 
unjust comparison.”) (citing Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738); Kiser, supra note 3, at 8-
9 (citing and quoting definitions of “disparage” drawn from Hines and Harjo). 
 376. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 476 (1933) (reprinted 1961). In Blackhorse, Judge 
Lee also considered various dictionary definitions of “disparage.” See Blackhorse, 112 F. 
Supp. 3d 439; see also JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1973) 
(“[O]rdinary words are used in a technical legal sense, and it requires a great deal of study, 
in effect a legal education, to understand how those terms are used.”). 
 377. FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 355, at 728 (illustration after definition number one 
omitted). 
 378. Some commentators have taken liberties with the statute’s wording. For example, 
one student author offered his own interpretation, declaring that, “[b]y its own language, the 
Lanham Act provides a basis for the cancellation of a trademark that is considered distasteful 
or harmful to individuals or groups.” Grose, supra note 41, at 701. 
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have a wide range of interpretations, even marks that possess a faint 
possibility of discrediting persons, institutions, or beliefs. In her law review 
article, Judge Moore explains the matter succinctly:  
Tribunals have agreed that determining whether a mark is 
disparaging is highly subjective. The TTAB, which is charged 
with enforcing the Lanham Act, has held that the terms 
“scandalous” and “disparage” are “somewhat vague.” These 
terms render Section 2(a) void for vagueness because they fail to 
provide the public and the PTO with sufficient guidance as to 
which trademarks should be prohibited registration. These vague 
and highly subjective tests do not provide meaningful guidance 
for the PTO.379  
It is apparent in the legislative history that none of the concerns 
discussed during the hearings related to scenarios like those present in 
Hines, Heeb Media, or, for that matter, Harjo and Blackhorse (i.e., 
scenarios involving the disparagement of groups of persons).380 Rather, the 
scenarios discussed concerned the potential disparagement of former 
Presidents (e.g., Benjamin Harrison, George Washington, and Abraham 
Lincoln).381 In her analysis of the legislative history, Professor Compton 
perceptively notes: 
                                                                                                                 
 379. Pace, supra note 17, at 50 (footnotes omitted); see In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (“Because the guidelines are somewhat 
vague and because the determination is so highly subjective, we are inclined to resolve 
doubts on the issue of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging in favor of applicant and 
pass the mark for publication with the knowledge that if a group does find the mark to be 
scandalous or disparaging, an opposition proceeding can be brought and a more complete 
record can be established.”); see also Kiser, supra note 3, at 18 n.115 (quoting this language 
and summarizing the case). 
 380. See Compton, supra note 7, at 11-15. 
 381. Hearing on H.R. 4744, supra note 372, at 18. 
 Mr. Robertson. . . . Why should the Congress of the United States, for example, 
permit Benjamin Harrison's name . . . to be used as a trade-mark on any article, 
device, or merchandise, even though dead?  
 Mr. Marony. In other words, we would not want to have Abraham Lincoln 
gin. 
 Mr. Robertson. No, sir; we would not.  
 Mr. Fenning. Or George Washington coffee.  
 Mr. Rogers. There was a good deal of discussion last year about that very 
thing, and considerable difficulties seem to arise in connection with it which 
ever way we jump. I quite agree that Abraham Lincoln gin ought not to be 
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What is absent from this debate on this portion of the Act is the 
concern or desire to enact a law that protects individuals . . . 
unless that individual is well known. With this in mind, the 
drafters of the Lanham Act appear to be more concerned about 
“trademark disparagement” (false or misleading claims about 
another’s trademark, goods or services, or business) and less 
about trademarks that might disparage others personally (even 
non-trademark holders).382 
In this regard, the drafters seem to have been worried about cases like 
Greyhound, where one mark might disparage another’s mark.383 And one 
intriguing possibility is that the First Restatement of Torts, promulgated in 
1938, just one year before the hearings relating to the wording of § 2(a) 
took place, may have influenced the drafters of the Lanham Act. It stands to 
reason that the drafters must have been aware of the First Restatement. 
Section 624 of the First Restatement, which imposes liability for the tort of 
disparagement, provides:  
One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is 
untrue and disparaging to another’s property in land, chattels or 
intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a 
reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as 
purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined [sic] thereby is 
liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the 
impairment of vendibility thus caused.384  
                                                                                                                 
used, but I would not say the use of G. Washington on coffee should not be 
permissible. We attempted to take care of it in subsection (a) of section 2: 
“Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter 
which tends to disparage persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or to bring them into contempt.” That would take care of the 
abuses, but it would not prevent the perfectly legitimate uses of names. 
Id.; see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 382. Compton, supra note 7, at 12 (footnotes omitted); see also Ward & Quick, supra 
note 26, at 52 (“The Lanham Act does not provide a definition of ‘disparaging,’ and there is 
little legislative history on this section. According to the Federal Circuit, the legislative 
history of the Lanham Act indicates that § 2(a) was intended to preclude registrations that 
conflict with another’s rights, such as the right of privacy and the right of publicity.”) (citing 
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps., 703 F.2d 1372, 1375-76 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 383. See supra Section I.B.2.  
 384. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 624 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
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Section 629 of the First Restatement defines “disparagement”: 
Matter which is intended by its publisher to be understood or 
which is reasonably understood to cast doubt upon the existence 
or extent of another’s property in land, chattels or intangible 
things, or upon their quality, is disparaging thereto, if the matter 
is so understood by its recipient.385 
Both the language and concepts embodied in these First Restatement 
sections seem to reflect outdated, nearly archaic, sensibilities. They were 
certainly written in an era long before modern First Amendment doctrine 
began to take on its contemporary shape. Still, it is particularly relevant that 
this provision expressly includes “intangible things,” given that trademarks 
are such an important subset of intangible property. Comment a. further 
explains: “The definition in this Section includes not only statements by 
words or other conduct, or both, which expressly or by implication deny the 
existence or extent of another’s legally protected interest in land, chattels 
and intangible things, but also statements which attack the quality of the 
land and other things.”386 The core concepts of “disparagement” under this 
provision, then, include: (1) a denial of the existence of property; (2) a 
denial of the extent of an interest of a person’s interest in property; and (3) 
an attack on the quality of a person’s property. These concerns certainly 
sound similar to the concerns expressed in the Lanham Act hearings387 and 
also similar to the issues present in Greyhound.388 If these First Restatement 
sections relating to disparagement are indeed the smoking gun that explains 
the genesis of the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a), then the cases that 
have attempted to apply it to groups of persons using ordinary definitions of 
“disparage” have missed the mark by a wide margin. 
                                                                                                                 
 385. Id. § 629. 
 386. Id. § 629 cmt. a. Another possible explanation for the sudden appearance of the 
word “disparage” in the 1939 draft of the Lanham Act is the case Hahn v. Duveen, 133 Misc. 
871, 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929). In Hahn, the owner of a painting purported to be an 
original by Leonardo Da Vinci sued an art critic for disparagement. The critic publicly 
asserted that the painting was not an original Da Vinci, even though his opinion contradicted 
the opinion of a well-known French critic, who had previously rendered his opinion that the 
painting was an original. The jury was unable to reach a decision and the case was settled 
before retrial. See Ralph E. Lerner and Judith Bresler, Practising Law Institute, Art Law (4th 
Ed. 2012), Chapter 7 Expert Opinions and Liabilities pp. 493-97. 
 387. See supra notes 12, 126, 274-79, 283, 285-86; infra notes 293, 480, 567, and 
accompanying texts. 
 388. See supra Section I.B.2. 
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It is certain, nevertheless, that the concern raised during the legislative 
hearings was real: determining the meaning of “disparage” is highly 
subjective.389 The subjective nature of the word “disparage” serves as 
additional proof of just how vague the “may disparage” prohibition of § 
2(a) really is.390 And the greater the degree of vagueness in the language, 
the less it appears to be “narrowly tailored” in a manner that comports with 
commercial speech analysis, discussed below in Section IV.B.391 In order to 
be “narrowly tailored,” the language would need greater precision.  
On its face, the statute is both overbroad and vague and thus violates the 
First Amendment.392 Consequently, traditional First Amendment analysis 
recommends that, as both overbroad and vague, the “may disparage” 
prohibition of § 2(a) cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 
B. Commercial Speech Analysis393 
1. Trademarks As Commercial Speech & Central Hudson 
As source identifiers, trademarks can be considered a form of 
commercial speech. “Commercial speech may be understood as speech of 
any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for other business 
purpose.”394 In Friedman v. Rogers, the Supreme Court showed no 
hesitation in treating a Texas statute relating to trade names as a law about 
commercial speech.395 In fact, Justice Powell’s opinion assumes that trade 
                                                                                                                 
 389. See supra notes 12, 126, 274-79, 283, 285-86; infra notes 293, 480, 567, and 
accompanying texts. See also, e.g., Compton, supra note 7, at 24 (“The most notable 
problem with the application of the disparaging test is that it is too subjective and instills too 
much power in one person (the examining attorney) to determine the validity of the term as a 
trademark.”); Kiser, supra note 3, at 9 (“Determining whether a trademark is disparaging is 
still a very subjective matter despite the two-part test clarified in Harjo I.”). 
 390. See Hall, supra note 376, at 135 (“The difficulty results from the fact that what 
seems to be a simple question turns out to be a large array of problems that involve whole 
philosophies of law and an inevitable degree of subjectivity.”). 
 391. See infra Section IV.B. 
 392. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 53-57; see also Pace, supra note 17, at 48-49 
(arguing that § 2(a) is unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it is an abridgement of freedom 
of speech; (2) it is overbroad; and (3) it is void for vagueness). 
 393. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 31:139.25; Ann K. Wooster, 
Protection of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 164 
A.L.R. Fed. 1d (2000). 
 394. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.26, at 1352. 
 395. 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979), reh’g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979); see Wooster, supra note 
393 (discussing Friedman); Lefstin, supra note 44, at 673-76 (same); see also NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.31(c)(xviii), at 1384-87. 
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names are a kind of commercial speech. The Lanham Act defines a 
trademark to include “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” that functions “to identify and distinguish” the goods 
or services of the mark’s owner.396 Thus, a trademark’s principal functions 
are to “identify” the owner’s goods and to “distinguish” the owner’s goods. 
The “distinguish” function requires that marks be sufficiently different from 
one another so that consumers can tell the difference between goods and 
services offered by one trademark owner from the goods and services 
offered by others.397 The “identification” function describes a psychological 
phenomenon of cognitive association. Consumers who perceive the mark 
mentally associate that mark with a specific product or service. The 
identification function, then, serves as a mental version of “connect-the-
dots,” whereby consumers’ minds connect, associate, or correlate a mark 
with a specific product or service.398 Identification is also among the goals 
of advertising; advertisers want consumers to associate or correlate the 
message of the advertisement with their company’s products and services. 
Justice Powell once said that the line that separates commercial speech 
from non-commercial speech “will not always be easy to draw.”399 
Nevertheless, given the functions of trademarks, coupled with Justice 
Powell’s interpretation in Friedman, it is both reasonable and logical to 
classify trademarks as a form of advertising and, therefore, as commercial 
speech.400  
                                                                                                                 
 396. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).  
 397. This function is the reason why a mark is refused registration if it is likely to cause 
confusion with another’s mark. See id. § 1052(d). 
 398. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 3:2 (“To identify one seller’s goods and 
distinguish them from goods sold by others.”). 
 399. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978). 
 400. Pace, supra note 17, at 35 (“As commercial speech, a trademark is entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment.”) (citing numerous authorities—both cases and 
scholarship—for the proposition that trademarks constitute commercial speech, which is 
entitled to limited First Amendment protection); see also Smith, supra note 21, at 467 
(“[T]rademark protection should be seen as commercial speech, subject to the Supreme 
Court's test outlined in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York.”) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980)); Wallace, supra note 5, at 214-15 (“Sports team logos and mascots can 
be considered commercial speech because ‘they provide consumers with information about 
the identity and quality of sports teams.’ Commercial speech, unlike political speech, 
‘receives limited First Amendment protection.’”) (footnote omitted). 
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As a rule, the First Amendment shields truthful advertising, but its 
protection is not as strong as in the case of political speech.401 Nevertheless, 
there have been instances where members of the Supreme Court have urged 
that truthful advertising ought to be treated the same as political speech in 
terms of the First Amendment.402 Presumably, names and logos of both 
sports teams and rock bands come within the category of “truthful 
advertising.” In essence, today the Supreme Court treats commercial speech 
as a hybrid. The seminal case, Central Hudson, established the First 
Amendment analysis that applies to commercial speech. 
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has 
developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the 
expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial 
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern a 
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.403 
This Central Hudson test has become the judicial standard for analyzing the 
intersection of commercial speech and the First Amendment.404 Thus, to 
                                                                                                                 
 401. See FARBER, supra note 306, at 16 (“Truthful advertising, however, clearly receives 
some constitutional protection, though not as much as political speech—some might call it 
‘less protected’ speech.”). 
 402. See id. at 172 (“[S]ome Justices have insisted . . . [that] truthful advertising should 
receive exactly the same constitutional protection as other speech such as political 
advocacy.”). 
 403. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see, e.g., Lefstin, supra note 44, at 673; Pace, 
supra note 17, at 38-43 (analyzing and discussing the Central Hudson test’s applicability to 
the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a)). 
 404. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (applying the 
Central Hudson test in a case involving advertising of compounded drugs); Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553-71 (2001) (applying the Central Hudson test in a 
case involving advertising of tobacco and smokeless tobacco products); Greater New 
Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183-196 (1999) (applying the 
Central Hudson test in a case involving advertising of gambling); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499-517 (1996) (applying the Central Hudson test in a case 
involving advertising of prices for alcoholic beverages). See generally also White v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520-22 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
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appropriately assess the constitutionality of the “may disparage” prohibition 
of § 2(a), courts must use the Central Hudson test.405  
2. Lawful & Non-Misleading Activity 
Section 2 of the Lanham Act articulates reasons why an examining 
attorney may refuse registration.406 The majority of reasons relate to a mark 
being either false or misleading.407 For example, §§ 2(a) and 2(e) prohibit 
registration if a mark falsely claims that the goods that it represents are 
made from materials that they are not.408 Similarly, § 2(e) also allows an 
examining attorney to refuse registration for a mark that conveys a false 
impression regarding the geographical origin of the goods or services.409 
Section 2(d) prohibits registration if a mark is confusingly similar to the 
mark of another—in other words, if it is misleading.410 Thus, the majority 
of reasons for refusal to register in § 2 have the effect of preventing 
registration of false and/or misleading advertising. This is important 
because the Central Hudson test expressly supports the suppression of false 
and misleading advertising.411 A mark that “may disparage,” however, is 
not necessarily either false or misleading. The Slants and Redskins, for 
example, are trademarks, which are legitimate. They are neither misleading 
nor related to illegal activities.412 
                                                                                                                 
 405. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.31(b), at 1358-60; see also Lefstin, 
supra note 44, at 682-90 (discussing the possible application of the four-part Central Hudson 
test to § 2(a)).  
 406. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(f) (2012). 
 407. Id.; see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Many of these 
categories bar the registration of deceptive or misleading speech, because such speech 
actually undermines the interests served by trademark protection and, thus, the Lanham 
Act’s purposes in providing for registration.”). 
 408. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (prohibiting “deceptive” marks); id. § 1052(e) (prohibiting 
“deceptively misdescriptive” marks). 
 409. Id. § 1052(e) (prohibiting “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” 
marks); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, §§ 14:1-14:45. 
 410. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (prohibiting marks “likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive”). 
 411. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329 (“These restrictions on registration of deceptive 
speech do not run afoul of the First Amendment.”); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
10, § 16.31(b), at 1359 (“First a court must determine whether the speech is truthful, 
nonmisleading speech concerning a lawful commercial activity.”). 
 412. See Pace, supra note 17, at 39 (“[I]mmoral, scandalous or disparaging marks are 
neither misleading nor fraudulent, and, therefore, the restraints on these marks do not fall 
outside the scope of First Amendment inquiries.”). 
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3. Substantial Government Interest413  
In Central Hudson, the Court considered the state’s interest in energy 
conservation to be “substantial.”414 Presumably the government’s interest in 
prohibiting registration of marks that disparage persons, institutions, or 
beliefs is important, but whether it can be classified “substantial” is a 
different question.415 In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, 
Incorporated v. United States, Justice O’Connor reasoned that the 
government’s desire to reduce a number of the social problems associated 
with gambling was a substantial interest.416 Judge Moore offers this 
perspective: 
While promoting racial harmony is a substantial government 
interest, there is no evidence that Section 2(a) accomplishes this 
goal. One would have to proffer, at a minimum, tangible 
evidence of disruption caused by the use of immoral, scandalous 
or disparaging marks. In Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of 
Ann Arbor [663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1980)], where both parties 
stipulated that the trade name ‘Sambo's’ was offensive to black 
people and ‘conveys to some citizens a pernicious racial 
                                                                                                                 
 413. See Wooster, supra note 393, §§ 3, 6, 9-11, 13-15, 17[b], 20 (analyzing and 
explaining cases where the Court has held the government’s interest to be “substantial” or 
not). 
 414. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.31(b), at 1359. 
 415. See supra text accompanying note 413; see also Pace, supra note 17, at 40-41 
(“[T]he protection of the health and welfare of the citizens constitutes a substantial 
government interest. However, there is no evidence that denying registration for immoral, 
scandalous, or disparaging trademarks will protect health and welfare. At most, these 
trademarks will offend. The fact that some members of society, or even a majority of 
society, might be offended by the trademark is not sufficient to deny otherwise protected 
First Amendment rights. The government's interest in discouraging offensive speech is not a 
substantial interest that warrants suppression of constitutional rights.”) (footnotes omitted); 
id. at 42-43 (explaining that, although some may claim that the government has a substantial 
interest in not using government funds for registering disparaging trademarks, the current 
PTO fee structure indicates that this is not the case) (“It also seems obvious that more time 
would be expended refusing registration than it would in granting registration due to the 
applicant's right to appeal.”); Smith, supra note 21, at 471 (“While Section 2(a) may 
represent an unreasonable restriction on commercial speech depending upon the trademark 
in question and the government interest advanced, no court has analyzed a Section 2(a) 
motion under the Central Hudson test. Precisely what substantial government interest is 
involved remains murky.”). 
 416. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1999). 
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stereotype of blacks as inferior,’ the court held that the trade 
name was a protected First Amendment expression that could 
not be regulated. The court reasoned that mere stipulation that 
the mark affects racial harmony is insufficient evidence to 
surmount First Amendment scrutiny.417 
Preventing some kinds of disparagement may very well be categorized as 
“substantial.” For example, the desire to curb disparagement related to 
gender, race, and class might well be “substantial.” Nevertheless, the “may 
disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) is not specific to any particular type of 
invective; it casts a wide net. Without specificity, it is difficult to assert 
categorically that the government’s interest is substantial. And “[t]he 
government regulation will fail if the interest is not sufficiently substantial 
to justify a restriction on speech . . . .”418  
4. Direct Advancement, Narrowly Tailored 
In the event that trademarks are deemed to fall within the category of 
“commercial speech” for purposes of First Amendment analysis, 
technically speaking the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines do not 
apply.419 Nevertheless, the “narrowly tailored” requirement of the Central 
Hudson test is very similar in terms of the results that flow from its 
application to any given statute. Section 2(a) does not directly advance the 
governmental interest. At best, § 2(a) merely indirectly curbs disparaging 
trademarks because it simply bans registration of them; it does not 
categorically prohibit their use. In order for § 2(a) to comport with the First 
                                                                                                                 
 417. Pace, supra note 17, at 41 (footnotes omitted). See also Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 
333 (“The use of a Native American name and mascot by a sports team is a far cry from a 
distiller seeking to distribute an alcoholic beverage under the label ‘Crazy Horse’ without 
appropriate approval, especially given the rampant stereotypical portrayals of ‘drunk 
Indians’ in popular culture.”); Smith, supra note 21, at 470 (“Similarly, the Sixth Circuit 
struck down attempts by the city of Ann Arbor, Michigan, to deny a sign permit to a 
restaurant named ‘Sambo's’ because the name ‘conveys to some citizens a pernicious racial 
stereotype of blacks as inferior.’ While ‘Sambo's’ clearly was commercial speech and 
‘[p]lainly, racial harmony and equality is a substantial state interest,’ the city did not 
demonstrate that regulation would sufficiently advance its interest to justify the comparable 
restriction on speech. The court noted that ‘even though exposure to the ‘Sambo's’ signs may 
offend some citizens, the ability of the City “to shut off discourse solely to protect others 
from hearing it is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being 
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 418. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.31(b), at 1359. 
 419. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
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Amendment, the government needs to show that § 2(a) is narrowly tailored 
to achieve the government’s goals. According to Professor Farber,  
What the government does need to show is that speech 
regulations are narrowly tailored to achieve their goals. “[W]hen 
there are obviously less restrictive ways for the state to achieve 
its goal, or when much of the regulation’s coverage is gratuitous 
in terms of the state’s asserted interest, it is difficult to maintain 
with a straight face that the regulation is narrowly tailored.”420  
As explained above, in the discussion of overbreadth and vagueness,421 
with regard to both the word “may” and the word “disparage,” the “may 
disparage” language is very broad. The word “may” opens the door widely 
to include literally any probability whatsoever.422 By definition the word 
“may” in a statute implies a mere scintilla of a possibility. The word “may” 
is a decidedly lower threshold than “is likely” or “probable” or 
“foreseeable.”423 Consequently, as written, “may disparage” cannot meet 
the Central Hudson requirement of directly advancing the government’s 
interest in a manner not more extensive than necessary. “The government 
regulation will fail . . . if the means used to advance interest either do not 
directly advance the government interest or do so with an unnecessary 
burden on the ability to communicate the commercial message.”424 
In sum, it seems highly unlikely that the “may disparage” prohibition of 
§ 2(a) can pass the Central Hudson test. The Slants and Redskins, for 
example, are trademarks, which are legitimate. They are neither misleading 
nor related to illegal activities. The next question is whether the 
government’s interest is “substantial”? As was suggested, although the 
government’s interest in prohibiting registration of marks that disparage 
persons, institutions, or beliefs may be important, it is doubtful that it can 
be classified as “substantial.” Next, the Central Hudson test asks whether 
the government’s regulation “directly” advances the government interest. 
Apparently, § 2(a) fails to directly advance the governmental interest 
because, at most, it merely indirectly reduces the likelihood that people will 
adopt disparaging trademarks, because it bars federal registration of them. 
Lastly, the Central Hudson test requires that the regulation be narrowly 
                                                                                                                 
 420. FARBER, supra note 306, at 169. 
 421. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 422. See supra Section IV.A.2.b. 
 423. See supra Section IV.A.2.b. 
 424. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.31(b), at 1359. 
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tailored to the governmental interest. The phrase “may disparage” is too 
broad and vague to possibly be considered “narrowly tailored.”425 
C. Blackhorse Decision & Walker 
1. Overview  
When Judge Lee rendered his decision on July 8, 2015, affirming the 
TTAB’s cancellation of the Redskins’ trademarks, he held that the First 
Amendment did not apply to the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) 
because, he said, the federal trademark registration program was 
government speech not private speech.426 According to Judge Lee, “[T]he 
federal trademark registration program is government speech and is 
therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”427 In addition, he held 
“that the federal trademark registration program is not commercial 
speech.”428 He based his conclusion that registered trademarks should be 
classified as government speech on the Supreme Court’s decision the 
previous month, Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc., wherein Justice Breyer held that the specialty license plate designs 
                                                                                                                 
 425. Smith, supra note 21, at 470. 
 These cases suggest that, if actually forced to decide a case on commercial 
speech grounds as applied to trademark regulation, the Supreme Court and 
circuit courts might agree with the dissenting opinion in Ritchie, which noted: 
[A]bridgement may result from a law that merely burdens an 
exercise of speech . . . “even though a person has no ‘right’ to a 
valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, . . . [the 
government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his 
interest in freedom of speech.”  
Id. (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 426. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 455 (E.D. Va. 2015); id. at 
464 (“Because the federal trademark registration program is government speech, it is exempt 
from First Amendment scrutiny.”). Judge Lee’s opinion also considered several additional 
legal issues and arguments, including the Fifth Amendment takings clause, id. at 467, the 
substantive provisions of § 2(a), id. at 467-68, and laches, id. at 488-89. 
 427. Id. at 448. 
 428. Id. at 457. Given the discussion in Part IV regarding commercial speech, and 
especially Justice Powell’s classification of trade names as commercial speech in Friedman 
v. Rogers, this holding seems circumspect. See 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). 
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issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles were government 
speech, and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment.429 
Judge Lee’s reliance on Walker is based on an erroneous interpretation. 
A careful reading of Walker reveals that the reasons why Justice Breyer 
decided that the designs of the specialty license plates at issue were 
government speech are absent in Blackhorse. The Texas specialty license 
plate program is materially different from the federal trademark registration 
program. The two could not be more dissimiliar. 
Justice Breyer describes the Texas specialty license plates as typically 
displaying both slogans and graphics. He notes that the Texas Department 
of Motor Vehicles Board (Board) is the entity that decides whether to 
approve designs suggested by others. For example, the Board has approved 
specialty plates with slogans such as “Keep Texas Beautiful” and “Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving.”430 In fact, the Board has approved over 350 such 
specialty plate designs.431 The word “Texas” appears on all specialty plates, 
and the State requires that all cars registered in the state have a government-
issued license plate for identification purposes (although persons who want 
a specialty plate pay extra).432  
“The relevant statute says that the Board ‘may refuse to create a new 
specialty license plate’ for a number of reasons, for example ‘if the design 
might be offensive to any member of the public . . . .’”433 The Sons of 
Confederate Veterans (SCV) proposed a specialty license plate design that 
included “[a] faint Confederate battle flag . . . on the lower portion of the 
plate.”434 After an initial rejection, the SCV reapplied, and “[t]he Board 
invited public comment on its website and at an open meeting.”435 After 
receiving comments, “the Board voted unanimously against issuing the 
plate.”436 The Board explained its decision, noting that “many members of 
the general public find the design offensive” and also said that “a 
significant portion of the public associate the Confederate flag with 
                                                                                                                 
 429. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 
(2015) (“In our view, specialty license plates issued pursuant to Texas’s statutory scheme 
convey government speech.”); see Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 458. 
 430. Specialty License Plates, TEXAS DMV, http://txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/ 
specialty-license-plates (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
 431. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 432. Id. at 2243 (majority opinion). 
 433. Id. at 2244-45. 
 434. Id. at 2245. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
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organizations advocating expressions of hate directed toward people or 
groups that is demeaning to those people or groups.”437  
2. Walker’s Legal Principles 
Justice Breyer articulates the controlling law as follows: “When 
government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from 
determining the content of what it says.”438 According to Breyer, this rule is 
necessary because the government must have the freedom “to select the 
messages it wishes to convey.”439 He emphasizes that the First Amendment 
does not apply to situations where the government is the speaker, because, 
“when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to 
espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens 
and it carries out its duties on their behalf.”440 Throughout the opinion, the 
Court repeatedly states that it is basing its decision regarding the Texas 
specialty license plates on its 2009 holding in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, where the Court held that a city government’s decision regarding 
the approval vel non of monument placements (e.g., statues) in a city-
owned public park was “government speech.”441 The decision in Walker 
analogizes the Texas specialty license plate program to monument displays 
in a public park. The Walker Court emphasizes the following similarities: 1) 
the historical tradition that “[g]overnments have long used monuments to 
speak to the public”;442 2) “persons who observe donated monuments 
routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on 
the property owner’s behalf.”443 And “observers” of such monuments, as a 
consequence, ordinarily “appreciate the identity of the speaker”;444 and 3) 
                                                                                                                 
 437. Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 2262 (quoting this language) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 438. Id. at 2245 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2245 (“Thus, government statements 
(and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger 
the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.”); NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.11, at 1284 (“Generally, when a government entity speaks, it 
may say what it wishes, and select the views that it wants to promote.”). 
 439. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
468 (2009)). 
 440. Id. 
 441. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.11, at 1284 (“The placement of a 
permanent monument in a public park is government speech and therefore is not subject to 
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”). 
 442. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 470). 
 443. Id. at 2247. 
 444. Id. 
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“throughout our Nation’s history, the general government practice with 
respect to donated monuments has been one of selective receptivity. And 
we observed that the city government in Summum ‘effectively controlled’ 
the messages sent by the monuments in the [p]ark by exercising ‘final 
approval authority’ over their selection.”445 Justice Alito’s dissent criticizes 
the majority’s application of these three factors, questioning whether the 
Court’s analogies are sound.446  
3. Applying Walker to Trademark Registration 
In Blackhorse, Judge Lee purportedly applies these same three factors.447 
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the Walker majority’s 
reasoning is correct with respect to the Texas specialty license plate 
program, the analogies are incongruent with respect to the PTO’s federal 
registration of trademarks. 
First, with regard to historical tradition, the Walker Court notes that 
license plates, like monuments in a public park, “long have communicated 
messages from the States.”448 According to the Court, “Texas, too, has 
selected various messages to communicate through its license plate 
designs.”449 The federal trademark registration system is very different. 
Aside from trademarks owned by federal, state, or municipal governments, 
the vast majority of registered trademarks are comprised of words, names, 
symbols, and devices selected and communicated by the private owners of 
those marks. The government does not select phrases or images for 
companies that apply for trademarks. There is no history or tradition of 
governments communicating by means of trademarks that are owned by 
non-government entities. According to Judge Lee in Blackhorse, the federal 
trademark registration program “communicates the message that the federal 
government has approved the trademark.”450 But a message of approval is 
not what either Walker or Summum is about. Those cases are about the 
                                                                                                                 
 445. Id. (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471, 473) (citation omitted). 
 446. Id. at 2254-63 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 447. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 458 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 448. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at 470) (“Governments have 
long used monuments to speak to the public.”). Justice Alito’s dissent agrees as regards to 
monuments. Id. at 2259 (“Governments have always used public monuments to express a 
government message, and members of the public understand this.”) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 449. Id. at 2248 (majority opinion). 
 450. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 458 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1127).  
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actual message that the government speaker was communicating—not mere 
countenance. 
Second, Justice Breyer emphasizes that, like the park monuments in 
Summum, people who see Texas license plates on vehicles reasonably 
interpret the plates “as conveying some message on . . . behalf [of the Texas 
government].”451 In support of this proposition, he notes that, “a license 
plate is a government article serving the governmental purposes of vehicle 
registration and identification” and that “Texas also owns the designs on its 
license plates.”452 Judge Lee concludes that this second Walker factor 
supports his determination that trademarks are government speech. He 
notes that federally registered trademarks use “the insignia for federal 
trademark registration ,” which, he asserts “is a manifestation of the 
federal government’s recognition of the mark.”453 Judge Lee thus presumes 
that this shows that “the public closely associates federal trademark 
registration with the federal government . . . .”454 But Lee is stretching logic 
beyond reason. In fact none of the sub-factors that Justice Breyer articulates 
to explain this point apply to federal trademark registration. First, trademark 
owners own the designs of the marks, not the government. In addition, a 
trademark registration does not serve to register the entity that owns the 
trademark in a manner similar to the way that a license plate serves as 
evidence of vehicle ownership. Nor does a trademark registration function 
to identify its owner in a manner similar to the way that a license plate 
identifies both the vehicle itself and the owner of the vehicle. Justice Breyer 
concludes that license plates function “essentially . . . [as] government 
IDs.”455 Trademark registration, on the other hand, does not function as a 
government-issued form of identification for its owner. Trademark 
registration on the Principal Register provides added protections for a 
trademark owner and serves an important notice function by alerting both 
competitors and the public that the owner asserts property rights in the 
mark.456 On this same topic, Justice Breyer also states that both the vehicle 
owner and the government intend to express the government’s endorsement 
                                                                                                                 
 451. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247 (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at 471). 
 452. Id. at 2248. 
 453. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 458. 
 454. Id. at 458-59. 
 455. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
 456. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 19:9.  
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of the messages on license plates.457 Federal trademark registration, on the 
other hand, does not indicate either the owner’s desire to have the 
government’s blessing of the message nor does it express the government’s 
agreement with the mark’s message. Trademark owners apply for federal 
registration to secure the benefits afforded by registration.458 The 
government’s goal is primarily to provide notice of the proprietary claims 
of trademark owners, not to express agreement or endorsement of the 
messages conveyed by trademarks. 
The third factor that Justice Breyer relies on to support his analogy 
between the monuments in Summum and the specialty license plates in 
Walker is what he refers to as “selective receptivity.”459 The concept is 
simple. For example, when a city government makes a decision about 
which statues to erect in a public park, it acts as the arbiter of both the 
medium and the message. Decision makers are responsible for aesthetic 
judgments about the displays as well as the ideas and ideals conveyed by 
those displays. It is common, for example, for parks commissioners to erect 
statues of statesmen, leaders, and soldiers. Similarly, public parks often 
have monuments with names of individuals who served in government 
offices and/or the military—and frequently commemorate those who died 
while serving their country. “The city in Summum simply selected 
monuments that presented the image that the city wanted to project to 
visitors in the park.”460 Justice Breyer asserts that, in like manner, “Texas 
maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. 
Texas law provides that the State ‘has sole control over the design, 
typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for all license plates.’”461 In 
Blackhorse, Judge Lee refers to this Walker factor as “editorial control.”462 
He quotes § 2(b), (c), (d), and (e) in an effort to demonstrate the PTO’s 
power “to deny or cancel a mark’s registration, and thus control what 
appears on the Principal Register.”463 But Judge Lee misunderstands the 
nature of the control granted by these subsections of § 2 and also the 
                                                                                                                 
 457. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (“Indeed, a person who displays a message on a Texas 
license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that 
message. . . . Texas’s license plate designs convey government agreement with the message 
displayed.”). 
 458. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
 459. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2247. 
 460. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.11, at 1284. 
 461. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (citing the relevant Texas statute). 
 462. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 459. 
 463. Id. at 458. 
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process used to apply them. These subsections represent the criteria used by 
examining attorneys to determine whether an applicant’s mark meets the 
legal definition of a trademark, and to ensure that it does not convey false 
and/or misleading (i.e., confusing) information to the public.464 To be sure, 
the process of federal trademark registration entails a completely different 
kind and degree of editorial control from that exercised by the city in 
Summum and the state in Walker. 
First, the nature of the reasons for denial of registration found in 
subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of § 2 are materially different from the 
nature of the reasons for denial found in subsection (a). As was 
mentioned,465 those subsections all provide means to deny marks that are 
false and/or misleading. Section 2(b) prohibits the use of government 
images such as flags or coats of arms, which would falsely mislead 
consumers to think that a government endorses the product. Section 2(c) 
prohibits the use of names, portraits, or signatures of individuals and 
deceased presidents, which likewise would falsely mislead consumers to 
think that those individuals endorse the products. Section 2(d) prohibits 
marks that are misleading because they are likely to cause confusion and 
therefore could be deceptive. Section 2(e) prohibits marks that are merely 
descriptive or false in the sense that they are deceptively misdescriptive. A 
“merely descriptive” mark is a mark that lacks a secondary meaning.466 The 
adverb “merely” is what indicates that the mark lacks secondary meaning. 
Without secondary meaning, a descriptive mark is unable to “identify” an 
applicant’s goods, because, without the cognitive link of secondary 
meaning, descriptive terms simply convey to consumers the contents, 
qualities, or characteristics of goods.467 In addition, § 2(e) prohibits 
registration of marks that are functional, which serves to prevent 
registration of a mark that is likely to conflict with the purposes of patent 
law.468 Consequently, the nature of the “editorial control” of the PTO to 
which Judge Lee refers is not “editorial” in the same sense of park 
monument selection or license plate design selection. Subsections (b), (c), 
(d), and (e) grant the authority to deny registration on grounds that a mark 
                                                                                                                 
 464. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 465. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 466. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 11:2.  
 467. See id. § 11:16. 
 468. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (prohibiting registration of marks that are “as a whole . . . 
functional”). 
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is false and/or misleading—grounds that are categorically outside the scope 
of First Amendment protection.469 Subsection (a) is completely different. 
Secondly, the “editorial” process involved in applying the criteria of 
these subsections of § 2 is entirely different from the process involved with 
monument and license plate design selection. It is the applicant—not the 
government—who selects the design of her mark. The PTO’s examining 
attorney does not have control over the mark. At most an examining 
attorney carries on a dialogue with an applicant via office actions regarding 
problems with an application, such as the provisions of § 2. But office 
action dialogue bears no meaningful similarity to the kind of input nor the 
degree of input that a city government imposes when selecting and 
approving park statues and monuments; nor does it bear any meaningful 
similarity to the kind or degree of input that the state of Texas imposes 
when selecting and approving specialty license plates. 
In concluding the portion of his opinion in Walker, explaining the three 
factors, Justice Breyer summarizes several of his main points: 
And other features of the designs on Texas’s specialty license 
plates indicate that the message conveyed by those designs is 
conveyed on behalf of the government. Texas, through its Board, 
selects each design featured on the State’s specialty license 
plates. Texas presents these designs on government-mandated, 
government-controlled, and government-issued IDs that have 
traditionally been used as a medium for government speech. And 
it places the designs directly below the large letters identifying 
“TEXAS” as the issuer of the IDs. “The [designs] that are 
accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect of 
conveying a government message, and they thus constitute 
government speech.”470 
Registered trademarks share none of these characteristics that evince 
messages conveyed on behalf of the government. The PTO does not 1) 
select trademark designs; 2) present trademarks as a form of government-
mandated, government-controlled, or government-issued IDs that have even 
remotely, much less “traditionally,” been used as a medium of government 
speech; 3) require placement of registered trademarks to be displayed 
graphically underneath any identifier of government ownership, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 469. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 470. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 472). 
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“USA Registered.” The only government identifier is the registration 
symbol , which is relatively small and merely indicates that the mark has 
met the registration criteria established by the Lanham Act. It does not 
indicate that the government agrees with or endorses the message of the 
mark’s owner. Therefore, registered trademarks, unlike the Texas specialty 
license plates, can neither be considered to be “accepted” nor “meant to 
convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.”471 
4. “Forum” Considerations, Insight From the Dissent, & Summary of 
the Applicability of Walker to Trademark Registration 
Rather than classifying the federal trademark registry as “government 
speech,” it is possible that it may be more appropriate to classify it instead 
as either a “public forum,” analogous to sidewalks and public parks, which 
have traditionally provided space for public discourse.472 It is also possible 
that the trademark registry is actually a nonpublic forum of the sort that 
traditionally has been available for private speech. In Walker, Justice 
Breyer concludes that “forum analysis” is unnecessary “[b]ecause the State 
is speaking on its own behalf, [and therefore] the First Amendment 
strictures that attend the various types of government-established forums do 
not apply.”473 However, in making his point, Justice Breyer contrasts the 
Texas specialty license plate program with Lehman v. Shaker Heights, a 
decision in which the Court construed advertising space on city buses as a 
nonpublic forum where “the messages were located in a context 
(advertising space) that is traditionally available for private speech.”474 In 
his dissent, Justice Alito characterizes the Texas specialty plates as a 
“limited public forum.”475 Whether the trademark registry is classified as a 
public forum, a limited public forum, or nonpublic forum, the “may 
                                                                                                                 
 471. Id. at 2249. 
 472. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, §§ 16.1(f), 16.47(c), at 1262-64, 
1449-67. See also Lefstin, supra note 44, at 702-07 (discussing the possible application of 
the public forum doctrine to § 2(a)). 
 473. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
 474. Id. at 2252. 
 475. Id. at 2262 (“What Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to create 
what we have called a limited public forum. It has allowed state property (i.e., motor vehicle 
license plates) to be used by private speakers according to rules that the State prescribes.”) 
(Alito, J., dissenting); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.47(c)(ii), at 1450-
53. 
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disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) violates the First Amendment, because it is 
certainly not a content-neutral, time, place, or manner restriction.476 
Justice Alito’s dissent (joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy) 
begins by pointing out the dire consequence of classifying speech as 
“government speech.” By classifying speech as “government speech,” the 
majority in effect plays a trump card, which avoids the need to analyze the 
facts of the case using the First Amendment. “The Court’s decision passes 
off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a 
precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. 
Under our First Amendment cases, the distinction between government 
speech and private speech is critical.”477 Alito calls this a “dangerous” 
precedent,478 and urges that, “what Texas did here was to reject one of the 
messages that members of a private group wanted to post . . . because the 
State thought that many of its citizens would find the message offensive.”479 
He concludes that to do so “is blatant viewpoint discrimination.”480 
In addition to criticizing the majority’s application of the three main 
factors drawn from Summum,481 the dissent also points out that “spatial 
limitations played a prominent part in our analysis” in Summum.482 Justice 
Alito notes the obvious—that unlike a public park, there is a virtually 
inexhaustible supply of possible specialty license plate designs that Texas 
could adopt.483 The same is true of the federal trademark registry. There is 
no practical limit on the number of marks that can be registered. 
Both the monuments in Summum and the license plates in Walker are 
very different from trademarks registered on the Principal Register. 
Trademarks registered on the Principal Register do not necessarily convey 
messages or images that the United States Government wants to project. It 
is not the government speaking, it is the owners of the trademarks. Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 476. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.1(f), at 1262-64. 
 477. Walker, 1355 S. Ct. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 478. Id. at 2255 (“But the precedent this case sets is dangerous.”) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 479. Id. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 480. Id. 
 481. 1) The historical tradition of government speech in the venue; 2) The perceptions of 
observers that the venue is providing government speech; and, 3) The “selective receptivity” 
of messages by the government. 
 482. Walker, 1355 S. Ct. at 2259 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 483. See id. at 2261 (“The only absolute limit on the number of specialty plates that a 
State could issue is the number of registered vehicles. The variety of available plates is 
limitless, too. Today Texas offers more than 350 varieties. In 10 years, might it be 3,500?”) 
(Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Alito’s dissent explains that “[t]here is a big difference between 
government speech (that is, speech by the government in furtherance of its 
programs) and governmental blessing (or condemnation) of private 
speech.”484 Professor McCarthy makes the same claim: “The government, 
by registering a mark, does not thereby give its approval or imprimatur to 
the propriety, suitableness [sic], or tastefulness of the mark or of the 
suitability or quality of the goods or services with which it is used.”485 
Judge Moore makes this point emphatically: “issuance of a trademark 
registration does not amount to a government endorsement of the 
[trademark],” and punctuates the point remarking: “Since awarding 
registration does not amount to government endorsement of the mark, 
withholding registration does not serve the function of removing the 
government's imprimatur on scandalous, immoral or disparaging marks.”486 
Besides, the mere “government ownership of property does not exempt it 
from these general First Amendment rules.”487 Hence, the Principal 
Register ought not be classified as “government speech.”488 
D. Analogies to Copyright Law, Its First Amendment Jurisprudence (e.g., 
Protection of Pornography & Other Alleged Obscenities), & Fair Use489 
Two lessons from another field of Intellectual Property law provide 
additional food for thought. Courts have considered whether copyright law 
ought to protect works that many find distasteful and/or offensive. Citing 
the need for a robust First Amendment, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
even pornography and other types of offensive, hurtful, and disparaging 
                                                                                                                 
 484. Id. 
 485. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 19:3.50. 
 486. Pace, supra note 17, at 40 (quoting In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 1993)). 
 487. FARBER, supra note 306, at 202. 
 488. In addition to reliance on Walker, Judge Lee also discusses two other cases to 
support his view that the federal trademark registration program is government speech, Sons 
of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th 
Cir. 2002), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). The factors and analyses in those 
cases add nothing to the doctrine that is materially distinct from the factors and analysis 
articulated in Walker. See Pro-Football v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 459-60 (E.D. 
Va. 2015) (discussing the four-part “mixed/hybrid speech test” of SVC); id. at 463-64 
(discussing Rust). 
 489. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.36(c), at 1406-08. Several 
of the amici curiae in In re Tam also pointed out analogies to copyright doctrine.  
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content are entitled to First Amendment protection.490 In one of the most 
prominent cases to consider the issue in the context of obscenity, the 
Supreme Court (Justice Brennan) remarked, “All ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial 
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full 
protection . . . unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited 
area of more important interests.”491 Imagine for a moment the reaction if 
Congress were to attempt to prevent registration of copyright for works that 
“may disparage persons, institutions, or beliefs.” It seems quite certain that 
such a statute would fail First Amendment scrutiny. 
A second lesson drawn from copyright law pertains to the doctrine of fair 
use.492 In copyright law, fair use reflects First Amendment doctrine.493 The 
Copyright Act provides as follows: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made 
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include— 
 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
                                                                                                                 
 490. The Federal Circuit’s opinion makes a similar connection to copyright law, 
explaining that works registered under copyright law are not government speech. In re Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321, 1345-48 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, 
§§ 16.57-16.60, at 1515-24; see also Pace, supra note 17, at 24 (“[C]opyright protection has 
been extended to material that is obscene or scandalous. Courts have justified the extension 
of copyright protection to obscene works on the ground that society's view of what is moral 
and immoral continually changes; what one generation considers obscene, a later generation 
might consider of great literary merit.”) (citing Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult 
Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)); supra note 
177 and accompanying text; infra Sections V.A.1, V.A.3, and V.A.5;. 
 491. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, (1957), reh’g denied, 355 U.S. 852 
(1957).  
 492. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 493. See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
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 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished 
shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made 
upon consideration of all the above factors.494 
The Fair Use doctrine recognizes that certain socially beneficial purposes 
may be exempt from the ordinary constraints of copyright infringement 
analysis. One of the broadest exemptions under this doctrine exists for 
“criticism.” Copyright jurisprudence views criticism as a vital, if not 
necessary, cause for exemption. And during the past twenty-five years the 
most extensive fair use protection for any kind of criticism has been for 
parody.495 In fact, a careful reading of the flagship parody case, Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, demonstrates that a genuine parody enjoys virtually 
complete immunity in terms of liability for Copyright infringement.496 One 
of the core reasons for this broad immunity for parody is that it is an 
important form of social criticism to which people rarely give their consent. 
The same concern applies with equal force to trademarks that some feel 
“may disparage” them. By definition, the function of parody is to criticize 
and ridicule persons, institutions, or beliefs.497 In that sense, a parody 
inherently disparages persons, institutions, or beliefs. Given that modern 
Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence has developed in such a way that 
there is nearly a “parody exception,” it would be anomalous if American 
Intellectual Property Law were to provide such vigorous protection for 
parody through Copyright and yet refuse to protect marks that “may 
disparage” in its federal trademark law. The First Amendment expressly 
allows just this kind of commentary, criticism, and expression of 
contradictory opinion. It allows racist, disparaging, condescending, and 
even pornographic expression. These are protected to promote a vibrant 
democracy, free press, and open debate. Refusing to register trademarks 
that “may disparage” is an overbroad and vague restriction—throwing 
Trademark law out of balance with Copyright—that the First Amendment 
simply cannot countenance. 
                                                                                                                 
 494. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 495. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 496. See generally id. 
 497. See id. at 580; see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE §§ 3:88-89, 3.95, at 
416-21, 431 (2015 ed.). 
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E. Unconstitutional Conditions498 
Finally, one argument that some have advanced is that the “may 
disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) cannot possibly run afoul of the First 
Amendment because a denial or cancellation of federal trademark 
registration pursuant to § 2(a) does not restrict or prevent the mark’s use, 
but rather it merely prevents federal registration.499 And, the argument goes, 
although federal registration provides a registrant many benefits, a mere 
denial of those benefits does not call the First Amendment into question.500 
In her “Additional Views,” Judge Moore contends that denying the benefits 
of federal trademark registration does, in fact, rise to the level of a First 
Amendment concern.501 “The Supreme Court has held that the government 
cannot condition access to a benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally 
protected right under the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine.”502 In his 
book, The First Amendment, Professor Daniel Farber poses this very 
question: “Can the government condition some benefit on the applicant’s 
abstention from undesirable expression?”503 Professor Farber points to 
                                                                                                                 
 498. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.11(d), at 1286-90. 
 499. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 468 (“They often state, in one form or another, 
that Section 2(a) does not violate free speech because ‘although the mark holder who is 
denied federal registration will not receive the benefits conferred on a federal trademark 
registrant, the mark holder may and can continue to use the mark.’ Whether the continued 
ability to use the mark absent federal registration complies with established First 
Amendment doctrine, however, is unclear; thus, it is possible that a well-crafted challenge 
could be successful.”) (footnote omitted); Lefstin, supra note 44, at 699-702 (analyzing the 
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to § 2(a)). 
 500. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.1(a), at 1252 (“In a few instances, the 
government has attempted to influence expressive activities by granting and denying 
monetary benefits.”). One such example is United States v. National Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, a statute that had 
prohibited federal employees from receiving compensation for giving speeches or writing 
articles. See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.52(c), at 1506-07 (discussing this 
case). 
 501. See supra Section III.C. See also Pace, supra note 17, at 37 (“While it is true that a 
denial of registration does not prevent the trademark owner from continuing to use his 
trademark in conjunction with his products, it does deny the trademark owner the benefits 
afforded by federal registration. Denial of registration will certainly act as an economic 
deterrent and discourage use of the trademark.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 502. Pace, supra note 17, at 37-38 & n.197 (citing numerous cases and secondary 
authority in the accompanying footnote). 
 503. FARBER, supra note 306, at 47. 
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Speiser v. Randall504 and explains: “Speiser involved a California tax 
exemption for veterans that required a loyalty oath opposing the forceful 
overthrow of the government. The Court held that to ‘deny an exemption to 
claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize 
them for such speech.’”505 Logically, in an analogous fashion, when the 
PTO denies trademark registration to applicants whose trademarks “may 
disparage,” it likewise penalizes them for such speech.506 Although a denial 
of registration is not, technically speaking, a “prior restraint,” it does have a 
similar effect to a prior restraint. The “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) 
is likely to dissuade or discourage the use of marks that “may disparage” 
and consequently chill speech.507 Thus it creates de facto censorship. 
Conclusion 
Trademark examining attorneys, the TTAB, and the federal courts have 
struggled mightily to apply the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act. A great deal of the struggle is due to a combination of factors, 
including its vagueness and the volatile emotions of those persons who feel 
offended by some marks. The central issue in both Blackhorse and Tam 
involves the complex relationship between federal trademark law (and 
policy) and the First Amendment. Judge Moore’s majority opinion and the 
other opinions in In re Tam (as well as the briefs of the parties) show that 
there are strong arguments on both sides of this issue. The precedent of 
McGinley, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and the question of 
whether trademarks should be treated as commercial speech under the 
Central Hudson test combine to make this a multi-faceted problem. Both 
Justice Breyer’s decision in Walker and Judge Lee’s decision in 
                                                                                                                 
 504. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 505. FARBER, supra note 306, at 47 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518); see also Pace, 
supra note 17, at 37 (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and quoting the 
same language from Speiser). 
 506. See Smith, supra note 21, at 469 (“A comparison of trademark registration to other 
cases concerning the withholding of governmental benefits based on the content of speech 
shows that the registrant's free speech concerns likely outweigh any proffered governmental 
interest in morality or tolerance. The Supreme Court ruled that the Postmaster General could 
not revoke the second-class mail rate for Esquire, Inc. on the grounds that Esquire magazine 
was indecent and morally improper.”) (citing Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 
(1946)). 
 507. For an explanation and discussion of “prior restraint,” see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 10, § 16.16-16.17, at 1303-12. 
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Blackhorse, during the summer months of 2015, have added an additional 
layer of complexity to the debate.  
This Article argues that the “may disparage” prohibition of § 2(a) 
conflicts with the First Amendment for five reasons. First, traditional First 
Amendment analysis indicates that it is a vague and overbroad 
content/viewpoint-based restriction. Second, if trademarks are analyzed as a 
kind of commercial speech, § 2(a) fails the Central Hudson test. Third, a 
careful reading of Walker demonstrates that federal trademark registration 
is not government speech and thus is not exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny. Fourth, principles drawn from copyright law, another important 
branch of intellectual property, suggest additional reasons why First 
Amendment protection is important for trademark policy in the context of § 
2(a)’s “may disparage” prohibition. Finally, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine identifies the reasons why withholding the benefits of federal 
registration pursuant to § 2(a) creates an abridgement of free speech.  
Professor Compton has persuasively argued that § 2(a) should be 
amended to delete the words “disparage or.” In effect this is precisely what 
would occur if the U.S. Supreme Court were to rule that the “may 
disparage” prohibition violates the First Amendment.508 This would retain 
the other aspects of § 2(a) and the ability of that provision to prevent the 
registration of marks that convey false and misleading information. In this 
manner, it would still serve a purpose similar to other subsections of § 2 
that, for example, prohibit the registration of marks that are likely to 
confuse consumers or to convey false information about the contents of 
goods or the geographic origin of goods.509 
Rather than artificially manipulating trademark law to eliminate marks 
that “may disparage,” sound First Amendment policy recommends that the 
marketplace solve the problem. Thus, if enough people refuse to support 
The Slants or Washington Redskins—or any other marks that “may 
disparage”—due to their objections to the offensive nature of those names 
or images, that conduct (i.e., refusal of support), and not an abridgement of 
                                                                                                                 
 508. Compton, supra note 7, at 35 (“My preferred approach to resolving the inherit 
inconsistencies that are sure to arise under the Trademark Act is to amend it so that 
disparaging marks could be registered. I particularly believe this to be the best approach 
because it is more in line with the legislative intent of preventing directed attacks at an 
identifiable individual or institution. Additionally, the current law has proven to be vague in 
terms of setting clear guidelines for resolving these disputes, and application of the 
disparagement test is highly subjective.”).  
 509. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(e) (2012); see also supra Section IV.B.2. 
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the First Amendment, will provoke change.510 That is part of what the First 
Amendment doctrine is designed to encourage. “Just as the ancient Romans 
eventually learned that executing Christians did not suppress Christianity, 
modern Governments should realize that forbidding people to talk about 
certain topics does not encourage public stability. It only creates 
martyrs.”511 
                                                                                                                 
 510. See supra note 466 and accompanying text. The ACLU suggests this concept in its 
brief in the Tam case. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Oregon, and the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s Capital 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, at 7, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 
14-1203) (“[I]n the trademark context . . . a literal marketplace allows members of the public 
to register protest through boycotts of a mark holder’s products or services, or through other 
traditional First Amendment means.”); see also Compton, supra note 7, at 23-24 
(“[c]onsumers who are offended by goods that bear a disparaging mark can voice their 
concerns by protesting to the company’s use of the term, or otherwise ‘vote with their 
wallet’ by not purchasing the goods. Such efforts may drive a company to adopt another 
brand in order to avoid the bad press and loss of revenue by using the disparaging term. For 
this reason, the Trademark Office should err on the side of registration.”) (footnote omitted); 
Pace, supra note 17, at 9 (“It would be economically unwise for a company to use a 
trademark that is offensive to African-Americans. A company's trademark is its commercial 
identity. If a company's symbol is offensive, those who are offended will not buy the 
company's product. For this reason companies are constantly changing their trademarks to 
appeal to consumers.”); id. at 10 (explaining by way of example that the Quaker Oats 
Company has routinely changed the graphics of its Aunt Jemima trademark in an effort to be 
“diligent in assuring that their trademark conforms with contemporary societal views of 
acceptability”).  
 511. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.6(g), at 1271. 
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